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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The effect of aid on economic performance in aid-dependent countries is an issue that has  
attracted considerable attention. The dominant strands in the literature focus on cross-
country studies of the effect of aid on growth, or more recently on welfare or poverty. 
Another, smaller, strand of the literature has focused on the effects of aid of fiscal 
behaviour, as most aid spent in a country goes through or may influence the government, 
typically with country studies, and more recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
initiated work on short- and medium term effect of aid with important insights regarding 
absorption and spending not analysed in more classical fiscal response literature. I 
combine elements of the literature on the effect of aid of fiscal behaviour and of the effect 
of aid on growth as my interest is in the effect of aid in Uganda, a major sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) aid recipient over the past few decades. My primary focus is on the fiscal 
effects of aid, but also considers how, given this, aid affect growth (in private 
consumption).  
 
Uganda is an interesting case study for assessing the effectiveness of aid as for over twenty 
years significant aid inflows have supported government spending in an environment of 
low tax revenue. The restoration of political stability in a country known for large scale 
violence when the Museveni regime was established in 1986, with a commitment to 
economic reform programmes and the resolve to alleviate poverty, renewed donor 
enthusiasm in Uganda and has been associated with large increases in aid inflows 
(Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007; Atingi-Ego, 2005; Collier and Reinikka, 
2001). The aid-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) share, which was about 1 per cent in 1980 
rose significantly to about 5 per cent in 1986 reaching a peak of about 19 per cent in 1992, 
and averaged about 11 per cent between 1990 and 2006 (Egesa, 2011; Mugume, 2008). In 
terms of the budget, total donor support (both direct budget support and project aid) has 
averaged 43 per cent of the national budget over the 2003/4-2008/9 period 
(Macroeconomic Policy department, Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic 
Development (MoFPED) in Background to the Budget, 2008/9). 
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As is often the case in most empirical aid studies, an important issue (but often ignored) in 
the context of a developing country like Uganda is which GDP measure is most reliable as 
this is crucial for measuring the macroeconomic impact of aid.  The most commonly used 
GDP measure in the aid-growth literature is typically from World Development Indicators 
(WDI) or Penn World Tables (PWT) (being considered the most reliable or the easiest to 
obtain). However, disparities in GDP from alternative sources are common and in practice 
one has different estimates of the level, change and growth of GDP for the same country 
over the same period. This is of a particular concern especially in developing countries 
(without exception) where the informal and subsistence sectors are a large share of the 
economy (Jerven, 2010) and where not all transactions in the formal sector are recorded 
(MacGaffey, 1991), and the quality of data is still very poor and measurement perceptions 
of macroeconomic aggregates are varied and weak (Mukherjee, White and Wuyts, 1998). 
We will address the issue of which if any GDP measure is most reliable for Uganda and it 
is from this that the fiscal data will be derived and private consumption will be taken as a 
preferred measure of growth in the rest of the thesis. The study employs a powerful and 
scientifically strict CVAR model (that facilitates learning about complex empirical reality), 
and is executed using CATS in RATS, version 2 and E-views 7.2. 
 
The rest of chapter one is structured to incorporate a discussion on the economic effect of 
aid in Section 1.2 and an outline of the structure of the thesis in Section 1.3.   
 
1.2 The Economic Effects of Aid 
    
The underlying economic rationale for aid to developing countries can be traced back to 
the two-gap model of Chenery and Strout (1966). In the model, investment is the 
cornerstone of growth. This requires domestic savings and, atleast initially, imported 
capital goods. Low income countries are constrained by two gaps: insufficient domestic 
savings to provide the resources needed to finance the level of investment required to 
achieve their target growth rates and insufficient foreign exchange earnings (as they are 
unlikely to have sufficient export earnings) to finance capital imports. As these savings 
and foreign exchange gaps constrain growth, capital flows (of which aid is one form) are 
an important source of development finance (Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998; McGillivray 
and Morrissey, 2000) as they relax the savings and foreign exchange constraints. Bacha 
(1990) added WKH µfiscal-gap¶ to allow for how aid relates to the effects of fiscal and 
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monetary policies on investment (e.g. aid financed public investment may affect private 
investment).  
 
Aid is premised on different development constraints, so aid can be expected to have 
heterogeneous effects. In principle, if we recognise in common with McGillivray (1994), 
Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) and McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) that most of the aid 
that is spent in the country is given primarily to the government, then, any associated effect 
on the economy is likely to be mediated by the public sector fiscal behaviour (i.e. the 
effect on government spending, tax revenue and borrowing).   
 
Fiscal response models (FRMs) (see McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, 2004) offer 
important insights into how donors could expect recipient governments to respond to aid 
receipts. Aid packages come with strong pressXUHV WR VSHQG 2¶&RQQHOOet al., 2008), so 
aid inflows are expected to be associated with an increase in government spending (aid 
additionality). It may also affect taxation either because aid influences tax effort or 
because reforms linked to aid conditionality affects tax rates or the tax base (Morrissey 
2012; Greenaway and Morrissey, 1993). Aid is also expected to be associated with lower 
GRPHVWLFERUURZLQJ$GDPDQG2¶&RQQHOO$]DPDQG/DIIRQWbecause donor 
conditionality often requires the aid recipient to reduce the budget deficit (McGillivray and 
Morrissey, 2000).  
 
It is clear, from the FRMs that aid is likely to be associated with public sector fiscal 
behaviour. Although aid is not an argument in the standard growth models, theory suggests 
that fiscal policy has an important role in stimulating investment and economic growth 
(Ram, 1986; Barro, 1990, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Easterly and Rebelo, 
1993). Public sector growth models feature channels that explicitly incorporate 
government activities. In particular, some expenditures are productive although the taxes 
required to finance them may create distortions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Levine 
and Renelt, 1992; Landau, 1983). In theory, productive government spending financed by 
non-distortionary taxation is growth promoting, but unproductive spending (often 
interpreted as consumption spending) and distortionary taxes are growth retarding (Barro, 
1990). As a source of revenue, aid does not have the price distorting effects of taxes so it 
would be expected to contribute to increased growth if used to finance productive 
expenditure (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). Furthermore, 
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government spending on public goods and services is expected to be more than it would 
have been in the absence of aid (Morrissey, 2012; 2¶&RQQHOOet al., 2008; McGillivray and 
Morrissey, 2001b). This may have positive effects on the private sector and hence promote 
growth (Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 2004; Lin, 1994).  
 
In the literature, aid effectiveness has typically been judged in terms of its effect on 
economic growth usually in cross-country econometric studies. Surveys and discussions of 
the literature on the growth effect of aid are provided in Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), 
McGillivray et al. (2005), Roodman (2007) and many others, but significant disagreement 
remains. Meta-analysis does not resolve the impasse: While Doucouliagos and Paldam 
(2008, 2009, 2010) DUJXH WKDW WKHµFROOHFWLYHHYLGHQFH¶suggests that aid is not effective, 
Mekasha and Tarp (2013) use similar methods to show a positive effect of aid on growth. 
Recent studies of aid effectiveness have been based on some variant of neo-classical or 
endogenous growth models of Lucas (1988), Romer (1986) and Arrow (1962). They base 
their empirical analysis on a general equilibrium growth model, try to address the 
endogeneity of aid, deal with non-linear effects of aid and assess the impact of aid on 
growth controlling for other variables, especially indicators of economic policy and the 
institutional environment in the aid recipient countries (McGillivray et al., 2005; Lloyd et 
al., 2001).  
 
Studies at the centre of the debate on effectiveness of aid takes place in the shadow of the 
controversial Burnside and Dollar (1997; 2000, B-D hereafter) research. This study has 
provoked and mobilized a relatively large and still growing empirical literature. These are 
critical of the validity of the B-D empirical results and its crucial policy implications. 
Critics argue that the study offered a simple analysis, showing that aid has a positive 
impact on growth, but this outcome is contingent RQ µµJRRG¶¶ fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies being in place. Moreover, perhaps because its implications are intuitively plausible, 
the research received prominence in the World Bank (1998) landmark publication, 
$VVHVVLQJ$LG:KDW:RUNV:KDW'RHVQ¶WDQG:K\.  
 
The strongest attacks on the robustness of the B-D result are probably Easterly et al. (2004) 
and Roodman (2004). The former study retains the methodology, model specification and 
country coverage of the B-D study, but extends the sample from 1970-93 to 1970-97, and 
include previously excluded observations. This extension of the data set by four more 
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periods results in the B-D result disappearing (although it is replicated in the 1970-93 
period). This casts doubts to the conclusion that aid is effective in countries with good 
policies. Like Easterly et al. (2004), Roodman (2004) extends the sample and in addition, 
subjects the B-D framework to a battery of additional tests but finds little empirical 
support for the aid-policy link. However, there appears to be four studies to-date (Collier 
and Dehn, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; and Collier and Dollar, 2002; 2004) that 
corroborate the B-D (1997, 2000) conclusion. In a related study, Burnside and Dollar 
(2004b) shift the focus from µJRRG¶ policy to institutions and investigate whether 
institutional quality1 enhances the effectiveness of aid. They estimate a growth model 
similar to their earlier specification and find that aid in itself is not significantly related to 
growth, but the interactive term is, suggesting that institutional quality matter for aid 
effectiveness. 
 
This notwithstanding, a large number of papers directly attack the B-D results on varied 
grounds but importantly, inappropriate econometric methodology and specification of the 
HPSLULFDO PRGHO SUREOHPDWLF GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH µSROLF\¶ YDULDEOH endogeneity issues etc. 
(McGillivray et al. 2005: 7-10). Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), 
Lensink and White (2001), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Easterly (2003), Ram (2004), 
Roodman (2007), among others have analysed the aid-growth relationship using different 
empirical approaches and an interaction term between aid and policy as suggested by B-D. 
None of these studies finds the interactive term to be statistically significant. Dalgaard and 
Hansen (2001), for instance, find that aid stimulates growth irrespective of the policy 
environment and that the B-D result crucially depends on the fact that they deleted five 
observations from the data set. Studies that include aid squared term in the specification 
(see Table A2 in McGillivray et al., 2005: 21) find support for diminishing returns to aid 
(due to limited absorptive2  capacity of countries to take up large inflows of aid and 
problems of the Dutch disease effect) - the threshold of aid to GDP varying between 15 to 
45 per cent (Feeny, 2003). In a related analysis, Dalgaard et al. (2004) add a climate-
UHODWHGYDULDEOHIUDFWLRQRIDFRXQWU\¶VODnd located in the tropics) interacted with aid to 
the B-D growth model specification. They find that the policy index interacted with aid is 
                                          
1 Institutional quality in the study is based on data set constructed by Kaufman et al. (1999)   
2 Absorption is the widening of current account deficit (excluding aid) due to more aid (Foster and Killick, 
2006:3)  
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insignificant, but aid has a strong positive impact on growth of countries outside the 
tropical regions although the impact decreases for countries in the tropics.       
  
Gomanee et al. (2005) test the hypothesis that aid contributes to aggregate welfare 
measured by infant mortality and the Human Development Index (HDI) using data for 104 
recipient countries, and for sub-samples of low-income and middle income countries. They 
find robust evidence that aid is associated with improved values of the welfare indicators, 
and that this effect is greater for low-income countries. They also interestingly find that aid 
increases welfare either directly or through the effect on growth but no evidence that aid 
operates through public spending. Antipin and Mavrotas (2006) use three different data 
sets (including the one used in the B-D paper) and Bayesian instrumental variable to test 
the robustness of the central finding relating to the aid and policy interaction coefficient. 
They find (in their own words) that the problematic interaction term of aid and policy is 
not statistically significant even with the heteroskedastic-consistent estimator, and most 
importantly, its marginal effect on real per capita GDP growth is substantially smaller than 
in the B-D (2000) paper.  
 
Overall, there are no signs of the aid effectiveness debate dissipating. Evidence from cross-
country regressions is inconclusive and puzzling. It is inconclusive in the sense that 
different stories have been told, each proposing a variable on which aid effectiveness 
depends. Some studies find that aid does contribute to growth, whilst others find either a 
negative relationship or even no relationship at all, or that the impact of aid is conditional 
only on policy, institutional quality, amount of aid, or environment etc. It is puzzling in the 
sense that most of these studies use data from the exact same publicly available data bases, 
i.e. aid data from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and macro data from WDI and the 
PWT (Juselius et al., 2011), so that the opposing views on aid effectiveness may seem 
difficult to rationalize. Commentators have attributed opposing views to the use of 
different proxies and context in which aid effectiveness is evaluated. Juselius et al. (2011) 
adds nuance, stressing that the contrasting conclusions are due the use of differences in 
econometric models and methods, exogeneity/endogeneity assumptions and choices of 
data transformations (logs, ratios, levels, growth rates etc). To mention in passing, they 
demonstrate that while data transformations are frequently used (despite the ease with 
which it can be done), it may significantly influence the results (ibid: 5-6). However, it is 
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also fair to observe that the distinct conclusions found in the aid-effectiveness literature are 
perhaps unavoidable. A variety of econometric specifications and approaches are used, and 
results appear sensitive to specification, sample, outliers and how endogeneity is addressed. 
The core problem is that different econometric specifications are associated with different 
technical complications and limitations (Juselius et al., 2011; Roodman, 2008; Durlauf et 
al., 2005). Further investigation may therefore be warranted.  
  
Some studies, mostly country-specific but a few cross-country (most of these are rather old 
and limited) have investigated the effect of aid on the budget behaviour of recipient 
governments, i.e. the effect on spending and taxation. These are reviewed and discussed in 
McGillivray and Morrissey (2001a, 2004) and Morrissey (2012). But µ«there is relatively 
little evidence on the effects of aid on the level and evolution of government spending¶
(Morrissey 2012: 1) and the evidence on tax effort is mixed. Although we cannot 
generalize on how aid affects government fiscal behaviour in recipient countries, it clearly 
does (and the effects may differ by country). Thus, overt concern with the growth effect of 
aid in the literature may distract attention from understanding how aid affects the economy 
through the broader fiscal dimension, and at the same time, concerns with the fiscal effect 
of aid does not reflect on the fact that aid itself is not independent of the level of income 
(or growth) in the aid recipient. Moreover, the focus in the IMF inspired studies on the 
short- and medium term effects of aid, i.e. absorption and spending (see Berg et al., 2010, 
2007; Portillo et al., 2010; Hussein et al., 2009; Foster and Killick, 2006) has not been 
analysed in more classical fiscal response models. Morrissey et al. (2007) address one 
aspect of this in which they investigate the impact of aid on growth within a fiscal 
framework in Kenya. They find that grants were associated with increased spending and 
that government spending had a positive effect on growth. Loans, on the other hand had a 
negative association with growth. Also, Gomanee et al. (2005b), investigate the impact of 
aid on growth via government spending and show that aid financed investment spending 
contributes to growth in SSA.  
 
Most empirical studies are based on cross-country analysis, but like aid (in purpose and 
probably effect), countries are heterogeneous and country specific factors may constrain or 
promote aid effectiveness. As Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) argue, aid-growth results 
are associated with regional differences, and this could be of a serious concern when it 
comes to country-level differences. Thus, one major limitation of focussing on cross-
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country regressions is that country-specific questions regarding aid are omitted (Clist, 
2010). Indeed, Riddell (2007), cited in Juselius et al. (2011) argues that country-based 
evidence provides the only reliable backdrop against which to judge aid effectiveness. This 
thesis engages with more specific fiscal hypotheses on Uganda with the ultimate aim of 
assessing aid effectiveness within the broader context of the economy. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
As the source chosen for GDP may affect inferences on growth and economic performance 
for African countries (Jerven, 2010) and this being essential to assess how aid may have 
related to growth, Chapter two of the thesis examines alternative sources of national 
income to construct a consistent GDP series for Uganda using data on GDP in current, 
constant and PPP prices from WDI, UBOS and PWT6.3 over the period 1970-2008 for 
GDP and 1982-2008 for GDP PPP. The Chapter investigates the extent of discrepancy in 
GDP estimates, and derives year on year percentage GDP growth rates, including 
percentage and average growth rate discrepancies. A particular focus is on sub-periods 
when there are notable divergences between GDP from alternative sources.  
 
The third chapter traces the evolution of the methods used in analyzing the fiscal effects 
of aid. It begins with a brief review of fungibility studies, then proceeds to the fiscal 
response models, which are now being estimated within a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
framework, and then the short- and medium term macroeconomic effect of aid. The 
chapter gives a broad view of the gaps in the fiscal effects literature and lays out our 
contribution. It discusses the theoretical foundation of the cointegrated Vector 
Autoregressive (CVAR) model that we employ in the study, and the data, measurement 
and sources. It also includes trend analyses of aid, fiscal aggregates and other 
macroeconomic variables, presents statistical data description and finally demonstrates that 
the series are unit-root nonstationary.    
 
The fourth chapter investigates the impact of aid on fiscal behaviour in Uganda, i.e. 
effects on public spending, tax revenue and borrowing. It begins from a view point that 
most of the aid that is spent in the country goes to or through the government or finances 
services that would otherwise be a demand on the budget (Morrissey, 2012), so 
effectiveness of aid depends on public sector fiscal behaviour (McGillivray, 1994; Franco-
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Rodriguez et al., 1998; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001). The chapter provides a 
coherent econometric method in which assumptions about effectiveness and 
endogeneity/exogeneity of aid are tested, i.e. allowing the data to speak freely (Hoover et 
al., 2008). It estimates the magnitude of the effect of aid on spending, and formulates and 
tests specific fiscal hypotheses on the link between aid and domestic fiscal variables.  
 
The fifth chapter considers the impact of aid, fiscal variables and exports on growth of 
private consumption to address the growth response to aid in Uganda. Private consumption 
is chosen as a dependent variable to circumvent the difficulty in fiscal aggregates and 
exports, and implicitly aid, being accounting elements of GDP, and to allow a focus on the 
effects on the private sector. Aid may not increase private consumption directly, but may 
do so through effects on government behaviour (assuming some elements of this are 
significant in private consumption growth, such as public investment and public sector 
wages).  
 
The sixth chapter provides a brief conclusion drawing together the research findings, 
addressing some limitations and outlining directions for future work.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
ASSESSING GROWTH PERFORMANCE DURING INSTABILITY AND 
ADJUSTMENT IN UGANDA: A CONTEST BETWEEN DATA SOURCES 
AND DATA TYPE 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The issue of whether national income is correctly measured and whether any element of 
mis-measurement is consistent through time and space (i.e. whether the measure is reliable 
and valid) in alternative sources of GDP for SSA countries has been raised in Jerven 
(2010).There is an element of under coverage in all national accounts, but this is a 
significant issue in African countries where the informal and subsistence sectors are a 
much larger share of the economy. Even more, in the formal sector, not all types of 
HFRQRPLFWUDQVDFWLRQVDUHRIWHQUHFRUGHGGXHWRWKHHIIHFWRIWKHVWDWH¶VODFNRIFDSDFLW\RI
record keeping and the small scale and informality of these transactions (MacGaffey, 1991 
cited in Jerven, 2010). This is reinforced by International agencies requesting national 
statistics offices to provide data on aggregates but then using different statistical methods 
to assemble these into continuous GDP series. For example, they use different statistical 
methods to bridge years when no official statistical data were published and over different 
base years. The combined effect of the poor quality of data and the fact that measurement 
perceptions of macroeconomic aggregates are varied and weak (Mukherjee, White and 
Wuyts, 1998) implies that the source chosen for GDP may affect inferences on growth and 
economic performance for African countries (Jerven, 2010).  
 
In the case of Uganda for almost three decades the focus of macroeconomic policy has 
been to accelerate the realization of the national vision of economic and social prosperity 
for everybody (Background to the budget, various issues). The income measure that has 
been extensively used to measure this unobservable (latent) variable is GDP defined as the 
total market value of all final goods and services produced in a given year. There are 
various statistical approaches to calculating GDP but the most common methods are the 
income, expenditure and output or value added approaches. Using these different 
approaches with different data sources raises the likelihood that GDP estimates can 
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considerably vary. This is an example of the problem of measurement error in economic 
statistics. For example, an anonymous Wall Street Journal article of November 22, 1983 
reports that the Federal Reserve had estimated US personal savings in the second quarter 
of 1983 at an annual rate of $209.3 billion and the Commerce department, for the same 
period, estimated personal savings of only $92.3 billion (annualized). This shows that even 
for the US there can be large differences in estimates of macroeconomic aggregates, and 
hence trusting any source at face value could be unwise.  
 
Discrepancies in measuring macroeconomic aggregates in general and GDP estimates in 
particular are likely to be even greater in poorest developing countries like Uganda. The 
country severely fell apart in the 1970s. In the bottom billion, Collier implores how there 
could be no usable data in such countries during such periods (Collier, 2007:9). Thereafter, 
the country underwent a comprehensive change in economic structure from the mid-1980s, 
where in particular, liberalization may have in general temporarily worsened the 
accounting and record-keeping problem as comprehensive data were no longer available 
from state agencies.3 Deriving GDP estimates from different data and sources, and even 
within the same data source, reveals measurement errors or discrepancies in the series. In 
such circumstances, one will have different estimates of the level, change and growth of 
GDP for the same country over the same period. 
 
This chapter uses the available Ugandan time series for GDP and GDP in Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) from WDI, Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and PWT6.34 to 
investigate the extent of discrepancy in GDP estimates, on the basis of which we derive 
FRQVLVWHQWDQGVWDEOHVHULHV WKDW µµEHVW¶¶ UHIOHFW8JDQGD¶VHFRQRPLFZHOIDUHSpecifically, 
the paper investigates variations in GDP (including at source level) and the GDP PPP 
measures due to variations in compilation methods, the piecing together of shorter series in 
the construction of long time series, the nominal exchange rate, the PPP exchange rate, the 
GDP deflator, size of the revisions and smoothing of data. The choice of these data sources, 
as summarized in Table (1.1), reflects data availability. The chapter contributes to the 
existing economic growth literature by undertaking an in-depth analysis of alternative 
GDP sources for Uganda with the aim of deriving the most reliable series for Uganda. 
                                          
3 See Jerven (2010: 287) for a general discussion with reference to Kenya, Tanzania, Botwana and Zambia 
4 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Centre for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
August 2009. 
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While the chapter is inspired by a similar comparison in Jerven (2010) where the author 
focusses on comparison of annual growth rates, here the focus is on both levels and growth 
rates, thus making a valuable contribution for studies of long-run growth. In this respect, 
the current study differs from most previous studies involving Uganda that have used only 
one source of GDP data, typically WDI or PWT as these have been considered the most 
reliable (or the easiest to obtain). Although one major study of Ugandan growth appears to 
use data from alternative sources, unlike here they are not explicit about any differences 
(Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 2008).  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 explores GDP construction, 
especially the role of exchange rates, while issues relating to real GDP, real GDP per 
capita and GDP PPP per capita are discussed in Section 2.3. Analysis of growth rates, 
including a brief discussion on the particular period when series diverge is presented in 
Section 2. DQG WKH WLPH VHULHV FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ RI 8JDQGD¶V UHDO *'3 LV GLVFXVVHG in 
Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.  
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Table 1.1: 8JDQGD¶V*'3Data Description and Data Sources as used in this Thesis  
Series 
Sourc
e 
Series 
length Series Description Measure Notes: Adopted from source 
GDP 
 
 
 
U
ga
n
da
 
Bu
re
a
u
 
o
f 
St
a
tis
tic
s, 
 
 
U
BO
S 
19
70
-
20
08
 
Aggregate, sector value added 
and expenditure disaggregates  
In current Local and 
USD prices Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies 
using end of year official exchange rate. Data are in current and 
1990 constant UGX and USD prices respectively.   Aggregate 
 In constant Local and 
USD prices (1990=100) 
GDP deflator 
 
UGX GDP deflator (1990=100) 
In
de
x
 
GDP implicit price deflator is the ratio of local and USD current 
prices to local and USD constant 1990 prices  USD GDP deflator (1990=100) 
Exchange rate End of year (Official)  Index  Quantity of local currency (UGX) to 1 USD 
Population    Millions    
GDP 
 
W
or
ld
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t I
n
di
ca
to
rs
, 
W
D
I 
1960-2008 
 
 Aggregate, sector value added 
and expenditure disaggregates 
  In current Local and 
USD prices 
Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies 
using end of year market exchange rate. Data are in current and 
2000 constant USD prices.  
  
Aggregate 
 
In constant USD prices 
(2000=100) 
GDP deflator 
  1970-2008  USD GDP deflator (2005=100) 
In
de
x
 GDP implicit price deflator is the ratio of local and USD current 
prices to local and USD constant 2005 prices  
Exchange rate  1960-2008 End of year (Market)  Quantity of local currency (UGX) to 1 USD 
GDP, PPP per 
capita 
 
 
19
82
-
20
08
 
 
GDP, PPP per capita  In current UDD prices  GDP per capita based on PPP. PPP GDP is GDP converted to 
international dollars using PPP rates. An international dollar has the 
same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the 
United States. Data are respectively in current and 2005 constant 
USD prices.  GDP, PPP per capita 
 In constant USD prices 
(2005=100). 
PPP exchange 
rate  End of year Index 
Exchange rate between two currencies that equates the two relevant 
national price levels if expressed in a common currency at that rate  
Population 1960-2008    Millions   
CGDP, PPP PW
T6
.
3 
1960-2007  GDP, PPP per capita 
 In constant USD prices 
(1996=100) 
The variable CGDP is used, and is real GDP per capita obtained 
from an aggregate using price parities & LCU expenditures for 
consumption, investment & government of Aug 2001 vintage. 
Sources: World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files (2009); World Bank, International Comparison Program database; Uganda Bureau of Statistics: 
National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates & Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3centre for International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 2009. 
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2.2 GDP Construction and Exchange Rates 
 
The primary sources for GDP are WDI and UBOS although time coverage differs, 1960-
2008 (WDI) and 1970-2008 (UBOS) [Although the World Bank must have obtained 
national accounts to construct the series for the 1960s, we found no record of earlier data 
in UBOS]. Each source reports GDP in current market prices, expressed in billions of local 
currency units (LCU or Ugandan Shillings, UGX) and United States Dollars (USD), in 
aggregate and disaggregated by expenditure and sector value added components. The WDI 
GDP estimates (reported in year 2009) are in constant 2000 USD while UBOS estimates 
(reported in year 2009) are in constant 1990 USD. Appendix A presents the sector 
disaggregation of GDP and shows that both sources derive aggregate GDP using the 
expenditure method. Here we focus on how the choice of exchange rate affects the derived 
series in USD.  
 
Current Price dollar value GDP 
 
This section builds from the current price GDP series in LCU, the UGX series discussed in 
Appendix A, to assess differences in how WDI and UBOS convert this to a USD series. 
The choice of which nominal exchange rate (UGX: USD) to use may matter; for example, 
there is likely to be a difference between the end of year and average year exchange rates, 
and there may be different end of year exchange rates (for example, prior to 1992, Uganda 
had no single market-determined exchange rate). In principle, the exchange rate adjusts to 
differences in price changes (inflation) between Uganda and the US, that is, GDP in USD 
deflates GDP in UGX by the excess of Ugandan over US inflation (assumed to proxy 
world inflation).  
 
In practice, however, the nominal exchange rate will not adjust fully to inflation 
differences, most obviously because it is augmented by the global exchange rate 
realignment with other trading partners notably Europe (the Euro and Pound Sterling) and 
there are policy reasons why Uganda may wish to limit changes in the exchange rate (a 
case in point is where an appreciation in the shilling against the US dollar, - the dominant 
FXUUHQF\LQ8JDQGD¶VIRUHLJQWUDQVDFWLRQVSRWHQWLDOO\XQGHUPLQHVWKHFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVRI
its exports). This is especially important prior to the late 1980s when Uganda operated an 
official exchange rate (set by the government rather than the market); exchange rate 
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liberalization began from 1989 but was not completed until 1992. This is discussed in 
more detail below but the principle concern is that it is not evident how to identify the 
appropriate exchange rate prior to the early 1990s.  
 
The nominal exchange rate  e is the relative price of the currency of two trading countries 
(Mankiw, 2007; Blanchard, 2009). The real exchange rate (RER) on the other hand relates 
to the relative prices of tradeables ( TP , importables and exportables) and non-tradeables
 NP  (Mankiw, 2007; Blanchard, 2009); as this reflects relative incentives it is often 
LQWHUSUHWHGDVDPHDVXUHRIDFRXQWU\¶VFRPSHWLWLYHQHVV*LYHQWKHQRPLQDOH[FKDQJHUDWH
e (UGX per dollar) and domestic prices of non-tradeables and tradeables, the real 
exchange rate is:  
 
RER   = 
T
N
P
P
=
w
T
N
eP
P
       (1.1) 
where RER is the real exchange rate, USDLCUe : , NP is domestic price of non-
tradeables and wTP  is the world price of tradeables (in USD). Given the difficulty of 
measuring the non-tradeables, an alternative definition of the RER is derived from the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) approach (Atingi-Ego and Kaggwa Sebudde, 2004). The 
PPP relationship links national price levels and the nominal exchange rate (Enders, 2010) 
to international PPP prices. Using the PPP approach, RER is defined as the nominal 
exchange rate ( e ) corrected for the ratio of foreign price level ( fP ) to the domestic price 
level ( dP ): 
 
RER   =    df PPe        (1.2) 
In (1.2), it is clear that if inflation ( P' ) for f and d
 
differs, e can adjust to maintain RER. 
This approach avoids the difficulty of measuring NP by concentrating on relative rates of 
inflation. However, to the extent that the inflation measure excludes NP , this is incomplete 
(and this RER may not really capture competitiveness). 
 
Here inflation is measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator (World 
Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files, 2009) and not the 
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conventional percentage change in the CPI, which tends to over-state inflation (see 
Mankiw, 2007). Moreover, although CPI and the GDP deflator move together most of the 
time, the two indices differ (see Blanchard, 2009). Assuming that e adjusts to maintain 
RER when relative prices change, we use the nominal exchange rate index. Data on end of 
year nominal exchange rates are obtained from the World Bank and OECD National 
Accounts data files (2009) for WDI and National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates 
for UBOS.  
 
Figure (1.1) provides a plot of the respective source end of year nominal exchange rate. 
Given the large changes in scale, panels A, B and C are presented for sample periods 
1970-1982 (when there was an official and overvalued exchange rate), 1983-1987 (a 
transition to a market exchange rate) and 1970-2008 (entire sample period)  respectively. 
 
The figure reflects the distortions in UgandD¶VH[FKDQJHUDWHPDUNHWIRUWKHJUHDWHUSDUWRI
the sample period. The 1970s was characterized by a series of exchange rate regimes. For 
example, in the period prior to 1974, plots in panel A show a unified exchange rate of 
UGX 0.07143 per USD. Over the period 1975-1981, the Ugandan monetary authorities 
maintained an overvalued exchange rate, accounting for the huge variation from WDI as 
panel A portrays.  
 
Figure 1.1: Nominal Exchange Rate (LCU per USD) Index 
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Notes: On the vertical axis is Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, end of Period), e is nominal 
exchange rate and U and W respectively are UBOS and WDI representations   
Sources:  UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates and World Bank 
and OECD National Accounts data files (2009) 
 
A flexible exchange rate regime with a two-window system was introduced in August 
1982.5  %\  DIWHU D VHULHV RI GHYDOXDWLRQV WKH JDS EHWZHHQ WKH WZR LQVWLWXWLRQV¶
exchange rate not only narrowed, but switched position with the UBOS exchange rate 
exhibiting appreciation pressures. While the UBOS exchange rate remained below that of 
WDI, the massive series deviation between 1984 and the last quarter of 1985 (see panel B) 
could be a result of the deep economic crisis that engulfed the economy in 1984 (Baffoe, 
2000).  
                                          
5 Under the dual exchange rate system, Window I was the official exchange rate while the auction or the 
underground foreign exchange market operated under window II. The exchange rate for the two windows 
moved closer to each other following a significant devaluation to over UGX 270/US$1 in 1984 
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7KH QHDUO\ XQLILHG H[FKDQJH UDWH LQ  FRXOG EH DWWULEXWHG WR 8JDQGD¶V GRPHVWLF
PRQHWDU\ DXWKRULW\¶V LQWHUYHQWLRQ The period in question corresponds to a series of 
exchange rate events, including reductions of the exchange rate misalignment6 effective 
1986, legalisation of foreign exchange market and adoption of a fully-fledged flexible 
exchange rate regime in 1992 (Kasekende and Atingi ± Ego 1995; Loxley, 1989).  
 
While a similar trend movement in the two nominal exchange rates can be inferred from 
the figure panels, the two series are inconsistent. Even if none of the series is consistently 
biased upwards, UBOS series appears relatively over valued on average. These 
inconsistencies could reflect in part differences in the weighting of high rates of inflation. 
It is possible that the high inflation rates may not have been fully reflected in one of the 
exchange rate series. Mugume (2008) attributes the over valuation in the UBOS rate to 
BanNRI8JDQGD¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQWKURXJKLWVVDOHVRIIRUHLJQH[FKDQJHDQLQWHUYHQWLRQWKDW
can give rise to exchange rate misalignment) to keep the exchange rate close to its market 
clearing level while ensuring appreciation at least since the early 1990s. MuJXPH¶V
assertion corroborates the overvaluation that the plots in Figure (1.1) seem to reveal, 
especially effective 1992. Therefore, whereas both sources use exchange rate as of end of 
SHULRG:',¶VUDWHFRXOGEHWKHWUXHPDUNHWFOHDULQJH[FKDQJHUDWHZKLOe that of UBOS is 
a managed float. These nominal exchange rate differences will affect dollar value GDP 
estimates. 
 
Inserting the appropriate values in (1.3) using UGX GDP (aggregate) data in Figure (A3 
(of Appendix A)) and the respective source end of year nominal exchange rate in Figure 
(1.1), a series of GDP measured in billions of current price USD is generated.  
 
 GDP    USDpriceCurrent  
 
= 
 rate exchange nominal
(UGX) GDP  pricecurrent  
    (1.3) 
 
The resulting current price dollar value GDP is plotted in Figure (1.2), and this raises a 
number of striking points. First, regardless of the source, the series shows an upward trend 
LQ 8JDQGD¶V USD GDP at current prices over time. Secondly, the series move together 
(except for 1978-88), although UBOS series is slightly higher from 1992. As these are 
                                          
6 This specifically involved a massive devaluation from UGX 1,400 to UGX 6,000 per 1USD.  
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based on the USD implicit price deflator, the discrepancies could be due to incomplete 
adjustment or differences in the retrospective revisions in the data.  
 
The fixed-base Laspeyres procedure requires several heterogeneous shorter series to be 
pieced together, arguably to ensure that the price structure reflected in the index 7 
construction remains representative (Fuente, 2009). Thus, the base year is updated and the 
national accounts data is linked at regular intervals, usually after every five years. This five 
year window period has, however, been reached at different points in time. WDI GDP 
VHULHV¶ most recent update is in 2005 after the base year was moved from 2000 while 
UBOS series most recent update is 2002 after the base year was moved from 1997/98. 
Young (1989) shows that each time GDP base year is moved forward, GDP drops sharply. 
This and the fact that WDI base year has always preceded that of UBOS may in effect 
explain the inconsistencies. 
 
Figure 1.2: USD GDP (current price U.S dollars), 1970-2008 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is GDP in billions of USD current prices; U & W are respectively 
UBOS and WDI representation  
Sources:  UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates, World Bank 
national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files (2009) and 
$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
                                          
7 This is because over time relative prices and volumes of goods and services change; some products 
disappear from the market place and new products appear (Brueton, 1999).  
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The discrepancy during the period 1977-1986 corresponds to economic shocks. The 
economy suffered deep economic crisis as a result of political turmoil, social disorder and 
pervasive state intervention (Shaw et al., 2007) and external large petroleum price rises 
(Jerven, 2010; Niringiye, 2009). The series discrepancy over this period may partly be a 
result of the differences in the magnitude of the revisions in the data in an effort to carry 
certain definitional changes back in time. It may be the case that actual changes made in 
one of the series may have been very small with no substantial changes made in the key 
components of GDP.  
 
2.3 Real UGX GDP and Real GDP per capita   
 
Real UGX GDP  
 
The recovery and subsequent use of real GDP series draws from a well founded argument 
in economic growth literature. Nominal GDP, estimated as the sum value of all produced 
goods and services at current prices suffers from inherent weaknesses, as an increase from 
one year to the next could be a result of an increase in prices, an increase in the volume of 
goods and services produced or some combination of these two.  
 
Real GDP, that is, GDP estimated in constant prices, removes the impact of price 
fluctuations. In real terms, changes in GDP only reflect changes in the volume of goods 
and services produced, that is, it attributes year on year changes in GDP to changes in 
output quantities, holding prices constant. When analyzing economic growth one wants to 
use changes in real GDP (in aggregate or per capita). As noted in the previous section, 
GDP in USD adjusts for Uganda ± US inflation differences via nominal exchange rate, e . 
Importantly, one should not then deflate this series with a Ugandan deflator to derive a real 
series but could use a US deflator to allow for US inflation (which however is again not 
possible as the US deflator is augmented by the global deflator realignment with other 
trading partners particularly Europe). To circumvent this problem, we use the UGX 
implicit price deflator to derive and compare real UGX GDP series, i.e. we compare real 
GDP in LCU across WDI and UBOS. Subsequently, we convert the USD GDP and the 
real UGX GDP into indices which are then finally compared. While one may argue that 
this is similar to the comparison of growth rates, it is better because it shows when levels 
converge and diverge.  
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The real UGX GDP is recovered from the nominal UGX GDP (given in Figure (A3 of 
Appendix A)) using the UGX implicit price GDP deflator in 2005 constant prices (given in 
Appendix Table A2: Selected UBOS data set).8 This recovery employs the relationship in 
(1.4).  
 
100)(2005 GDP  UGXReal   = 
100)=(2005              
deflator  GDP priceimplicit  UGX
GDP  UGXNominal
  (1.4) 
 
The resulting real UGX GDP series is provided in Figure (1.3).  
Figure 1.3: Real UGX GDP (2005=100), 1970-2008 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is real UGX GDP in billions of constant 2005 prices; U, W are 
respectively UBOS and WDI representations  
Sources:  World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files 
(2009), UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates and 
AuWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
 
Although these are similar, they are inconsistent (real UGX GDP/U is consistently higher 
than real UGX GDP/W) and only converge at three data points (1977, 1983 and 2004). 
The similarity is because alternative sources use a similar fixed-base Laspeyres index 
splicing/linking technique to construct continuous time series. The inconsistence in the two 
series is because of differences in regularity of the time intervals at which alternative 
                                          
8 Detailed Appendix Tables are available with the author on request 
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sources pieced together several heterogeneous shorter series. Commentaries with WDI 
show that the series was linked by butt splicing in 1972 while 1979, 1986, and 2002 
corresponds to a break in analytical comparability data or change of magnitude. It is also 
shown that multiple time series versions were linked by ratio splicing using the first annual 
overlap in 1991 and 2004. No such commentaries about the series linking points are 
available with UBOS except for one point, 2004 when multiple time series versions were 
linked by ratio splicing (as in WDI). So, it appears 2004 corresponds to a common point in 
time at which alternative sources linked multiple time series versions by ratio splicing 
using the first annual overlap, and so may be the convergence in 1977 and in 1983. Overall, 
in the figure, UBOS series is smoother while WDI series displays some variability from 
year to year.  
 
Because we wish to establish when levels in USD GDP (in current prices) and real UGX 
GDP series converge and diverge as a way of comparing the two series, these are 
converted into indices by setting the index for the first year of each series (i.e. 1970) to 100 
and calculating evolution against this base. The resulting USD GDP and real UGX GDP 
indices are respectively shown in Figures (1.4) and (1.5). 
 
Figure 1.4: USD GDP Index (1970=100) 
 
Notes:   On the vertical axis is USD GDP (in current price) indices; U, W represents respectively 
  UBOS and WDI.   
Sources:  UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates, World Bank 
national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files (2009) and 
$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQV 
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From figure (1.4), we observe many points at which the series converge, occurring 
especially during the early to mid-1970s and from about 2002 onwards. The levels however 
also diverge, with a big disparity occurring over the period 1978-1984. Both indices show 
variability and the plots do not point to any index being consistently above or below the 
other. Nonetheless, they are quite similar except for the one period noted above as 
characterized by political and economic instability.  
 
Figure 1.5: Real UGX GDP Index (1970=100) 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is real UGX GDP indices; U, W represent UBOS and WDI respectively.  
Sources: World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data  
  files (2009), UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates and $XWKRU¶V
  own calculations 
 
From the indices in Figure (1.5), levels diverge most over the period 1983-1992. For the 
rest of the period, any divergence is minimal. The UBOS index is smoother but both 
exhibit a similar pattern of evolution.  
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  Real GDP per capita   
 
As noted above, real GDP measures economic welfare at the aggregate level. Real GDP per 
capita distributes this economic welfare and measures the average welfare of a person, and 
is given as the ratio of real GDP to the population.  Using USD GDP series in Figure (1.2), 
real UGX GDP in Figure (1.3) and population data in Appendix Tables (A1 and A2)9, real 
GDP per capita is recovered from (1.5) as: 
 
 capitaper  GDP Real  = 
Population
GDP Real
        (1.5) 
 
Using equation (1.5) we derived real GDP per capita series, denoting this respectively as 
USDy and UGXy in USD and LCU. USD GDP per capita series is plotted and compared 
in Figure (1.6) while the real UGX GDP per capita series is given in Figure (1.7).  
 
Correspondingly, USD GDP per capita (Figure (1.6)) and USD GDP (Figure (1.2)), and 
real UGX GDP per capita (Figure (1.7)) and real UGX GDP (Figure (1.3)) plots are similar 
in levels, but differ in scale (due to the population factor, measured in millions). Hence, the 
two measures of growth (aggregate and per capita) yield growth rates that may differ 
depending on the rate of population growth.    
 
Figure 1.6: USD GDP per capita (current prices) 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is USD GDP per capita (in current prices); U, W represent respectively 
UBOS and WDI.  
                                          
9 For both UBOS and WDI, population is the same and is measured in millions. 
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Figure 1.7: Real UGX GDP per capita (2005=100) 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is real UGX GDP per capita; U & W are respectively UBOS and WDI 
representation  
Sources:  UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates, World Bank 
national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files (2009) and 
$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
We then converted the USD GDP per capita (series in Figure (1.6)) and real UGX GDP 
per capita (series in Figure (1.7)) into indices to reveal when levels converge and diverge. 
USD GDP per capita indices are plotted and compared in Figure (1.8) while the 
comparison of real UGX GDP per capita indices is drawn from Figure (1.9).  
 
Figure 1.8: USD GDP per capita Index (1970=100) 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is USD GDP per capita (in current price) indices; U, W represent 
UBOS and WDI respectively.  
Sources:  UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates, World Bank 
national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files (2009) and 
$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQV 
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Again, the corresponding index plots, i.e. Figure (1.8) and Figure (1.4) [respectively USD 
GDP per capita and USD GDP indices], and Figure (1.9) and Figure (1.5) [respectively 
real UGX GDP per capita and real UGX GDP indices] are similar in levels, but differ in 
scales due to the population factor. So, as before, the same comment as to when levels 
converge and diverge applies.  
    
Figure 1.9: Real UGX GDP per capita Index (1970=100) 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is real UGX GDP per capita indices; U, W represent UBOS and WDI 
respectively  
Sources:  UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates, World Bank 
national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files (2009) and 
$XWKRU¶VRZQcalculations 
 
It has emerged from this section that while real UGX GDP or USD GDP may have been 
used to gauge 8JDQGD¶Veconomic prosperity (be it at aggregate or per capita level), the 
two measures differ depending on whether the series is derived from the implicit price 
deflator (inflation in Uganda) or the nominal exchange rate (inflation differential). In 
particular, basing on the GDP indices, USD GDP measures show similar and significant 
variability, with no series being consistently above or below the other. On the other hand, 
GDP measures derived from the LCU implicit price deflator are similar, but differ in 
stability depending on the data source. The WDI series is relatively volatile while that of 
UBOS is smooth. As the two series are similar especially at the beginning and end of the 
sample period, the real UGX GDP series (aggregate or per capita) is henceforth used to 
derive year on year percentage growth rates, including percentage and absolute average 
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growth rate discrepancies. Based on this, we investigate if differences in underlying UBOS 
and WDI series yield significant discrepancies in the growth estimates in Section 2.4. 
   
Real GDP PPP per capita   
 
We also explored 8JDQGD¶V UHDO *'3 333 SHU FDSLWD XVLQJ WZR PHDVXUHV 3:7 DQG
WDI as UBOS neither constructs GDP PPP nor GDP PPP per capita. In the PWT, cross-
country income data compilation is subject to data quality and countries are given grades 
EDVHGRQWKHDELOLW\WRFRQVWUXFWJRRG333PHDVXUHVDQGDFRXQWU\¶VFDSDFLW\WRSURGXFH
reliable national income accounts and domestic price indices. Grades A, B, C and D 
indicate a margin of error of 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% respectively. For the 43 SSA 
countries in the PWTs, 17 get a D (including Uganda) and 26 get a C (Deaton and Heston, 
2008).  
 
PWT6.3 gives real gross domestic product per capita series in unit 1USD as CGDP while 
in WDI, it is given as GDP PPP per capita. Moreover, the GDP PPP per capita series in 
both cases is expressed in constant international dollars but over different base years. That 
is, 1996 constant prices for the PWT6.3 series as in PWT6.1 and 2005 constant prices for 
WKH:',¶VVHULHV7KHVHULHVFRPSDULVRQFRYHUVWKHSHULRG-2008 (as this is the period 
over which the series is available in alternative sources), and is respectively denoted 
CGDP/PWT and GDP PPP per capita/WDI for PWT and WDI sources in Figure (1.10). As 
can be noted, the series are not only inconsistent, but are not directly comparable given the 
fact that they are based on different base years (Young, 1989; Romer, 1987). 
 
More specifically, the difference between PWT6.3 and WDI series arise from variations in 
the PPP compilation methods with the underlying source. While it is documented that prior 
to 2000, WDI used the PWT (Summers and Heston, 1991) as the main source of PPP, the 
source has since updated its series using the PPP data from the latest International 
Comparison Program (ICP) round for 2005. The ICP round for 2005 introduced other 
improvements in the data and estimation methods for the PPP (World Bank, 2008a, b). 
The PWT6.3 does not include the ICP round for 2005 data but this will be incorporated in 
PWT7.0 version, which, at the time of compilation, was in preparation (Deaton and Heston, 
2008). It is therefore expected that there could be methodological differences between the 
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PWT6.3 and the WDI PPP (Shaohua and Ravallion, 2008; World Bank, 2008a, b and 
Ackland et al., 2006). 
  
Figure 1.10: Real GDP PPP per capita (1982-2008) 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is GDP PPP per capita (in USD) 
Sources:  World Bank, International Comparison Program database Alan Heston, 
  Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Centre 
  for International Comparisons of Production, Income and prices at the 
  University of Pennsylvania, August 2009 
 
Johnson et al. (2009) illustrate the degree of measurement error intrinsic to the PWT 
methodology, pending adjustment notwithstanding and argue that PWT suffers from 
problems of variability and valuation. To illustrate this, they compare version 6.1 of the 
PWT (released in 2002) with version 6.2 (released in 2006). For example, they calculate 
the ten worst growth performers in Africa based on the PWT6.1 data and similarly based 
on the PWT6.2 data. Only five countries were on both lists, and so, they conclude that 
there is considerable variability in the level and growth of PPP-adjusted GDP estimates 
and in the estimates of the PPPs across alternative versions of the PWT. They also 
demonstrate that for years other than the benchmark year, GDP growth and level estimates 
from the PWT are not at PPP prices. Because these shortcomings are intrinsic to the PWT 
methodology, there is little basis for knowing whether version 7.0 of the PWT will 
supersede all previous versions (ibid: 25, emphasis mine) and as such produce GDP PPP 
per capita series that are consistent with those of WDI. 
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This notwithstanding, we facilitate comparison by converting the real GDP PPP per capita 
series into indices. This we do, by setting the index for the first year of each (i.e. 1982) to 
100. Against this base, we calculate evolution and make a comparison to reveal when 
levels converge and diverge. The resulting indices are given in Figure (1.11).  
 
Figure 1.11: Real GDP PPP per capita Index (1982=100) 
 
 
Notes: On the vertical axis is GDP PPP per capita index (1982=100) 
Sources: World Bank, International Comparison Program database Alan Heston, 
  Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Centre 
  for International Comparisons of Production, Income and prices at the 
  University of Pennsylvania, $XJXVWDQG$XWKRU¶V own computations 
 
The indices in the figure are different and do not converge. This is particularly surprising 
because, the two series are supposed to relate to exactly the same latent variable using the 
same indicator, i.e. GDP PPP per capita. CGDP/PWT is consistently biased upwards with 
some volatility at least up to mid-1990s while GDP PPP/WDI is smoother. This implies 
that WDI series would yield growth rates that are relatively more stable than the PWT6.3 
series.  
 
This suggests that any assessment of 8JDQGD¶V HFRQRPLF performance over the period 
would most likely yield conflicting results depending on the GDP PPP data used as the 
two measures differ in level and diverge. As opposed to PWT, WDI measures are 
smoother and appear to be better measured using the ICP round of 2005. In this regard, 
WDI GDP PPP series would be selected for further analysis. However, as GDP PPP data is 
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suitable for cross country studies where one requires internationally comparable measures, 
we do not pursue this measure as our analysis is based on a single country, Uganda. 
 
2.4 Analysis of Annual GDP growth rates   
 
This section derives year on year percentage growth rates to identify any large specific 
annual or periodic growth rate discrepancies in the underlying UBOS and WDI real UGX 
GDP series. The fact that these series differ in level implies that each may yield different 
findings when used in analysing macroeconomic relationships. So, a question as to which 
series could be better arises naturally. This section investigates if the level differences in 
the series yield significant discrepancies in the annual growth rate estimates by computing 
the absolute average percentage discrepancy. The year on year percentage change in real 
GDP growth rate of a series of T annual observations, say TYYY ,......,, 21  is derived as   
 
  
100*
1
1 ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§  


t
tt
Y
YYg
                          (1.6) 
 where, g , is the year on year percentage change in real GDP, t and 1t designates the 
FXUUHQW DQG WKH SUHYLRXV \HDUV¶ UHDO *'3 :H FDOLEUDWH \HDU RQ \HDU UHDO 8*X GDP 
growth rate using real UGX GDP data as in Figure (1.3). A similar calibration can be made 
using real UGX GDP per capita data as in Figure (1.7). The two calibrated growth rates 
would differ as the latter incorporates the rate of population growth, but this is simply a 
population scaling effect. Focusing on economy-wide growth, the percentage growth rates 
derived using aggregate real GDP data as in Figure (1.3) are plotted in Figure (1.12). 
Based on the data in this figure, we derived the percentage growth rate discrepancies, i.e. 
the difference between WDI and UBOS estimated percentage growth rates in each period. 
This is presented in Figure (1.13). In addition, we also compute and report the absolute 
average percentage discrepancy. This is obtained as a ratio of summation of each period 
average percentage discrepancy over the sample period to total sample size. The 
magnitude of this could inform whether the discrepancies in the growth estimates would 
alter inferences on economic performance response to structural shocks or reforms, 
holding other considerations constant.  
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The year on year percentage growth rates derived from the UBOS series is not only 
relatively stable, but also positive since the mid-1980s. On the contrary, the percentage 
growth rate derived from the WDI series is very volatile, characterized by positive and 
negative spikes, which lasts until the mid-1990s. This notwithstanding, neither series 
yields growth rate estimates that are consistently above or below the other. Importantly, 
both series produce growth rate estimates that evolve over time with a similar pattern, 
albeit differing in magnitude, a variation that we estimate at 3.6 percentage points per year 
(i.e. the average absolute percentage discrepancy)  
 
Figure 1.12: Real UGX GDP Percentage Growth Rate 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is real UGS GDP percentage growth rates; U, W represent UBOS and 
WDI respectively  
Sources:  World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files 
(2009), UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates and 
$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQV 
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Figure 1.13: Real UGX GDP Percentage Growth Rate Discrepancies 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is real UGX GDP percentage growth rate discrepancies; U, W 
represent UBOS and WDI respectively. 
Sources:  As in figure 1.12.  
 
While this per year average absolute percentage discrepancy is reasonably large, the two 
series have patterns that are consistent and similar (albeit with one far more volatile). 
Essentially, WDI is suggesting considerable variability in growth compared to UBOS. 
7KLV FRXOG FDSWXUH µWUXH¶ HFRQRPLF LQVWDELOLW\ GXULQJ D SHULRG RI FKDQJH EXW PD\ DOVR
reflect weak underlying statistics, and is likely to have study implications especially when 
assessing growth performance before and after structural adjustment. An important 
question remains regarding the direction of measurement bias, i.e. whether it is due to 
economic instability or weak underlying statistics. As noted in Jerven (2010: 287), there is 
hardly any usable data during periods when a country severely falls apart due to instability, 
and in addition, change in economic structure with liberalization temporarily worsened the 
accounting and record-keeping problem as comprehensive data were no longer available 
from state agencies.  
 
2.5 Statistical characterization of real UGX GDP 
 
It is noticeable from the above level data discussion that although the series are similar, 
they are inconsistent. However, long discussions of series consistency seem immaterial 
once we characterize the data using statistics. An econometric way to assess if either series 
may yield similar inferences is to test whether these series are cointegrated. Cointegration 
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implies that the series represent a common long-run equilibrium, i.e. although they may 
diverge at times the equilibrium is restored after some period. There may be a persistent 
difference between the series, but if they are in equilibrium in the long run one can infer 
that either captures the performance of GDP LQ WKH µORQJ-UXQ¶ VKRUW-run dynamics may 
differ). In the next section, we conduct time series characterization, including testing for 
cointegration between the two indicators (i.e. real UGX GDP/U and real UGX GDP/W) 
for the same latent variable.   
 
The order of Integration and Cointegration 
 
It has been well-documented in time series modelling literature that most economic time 
series are commonly characterized by strong trend components, that is, a deterministic 
and/or stochastic trend or some combination of the two. Many of these are said to contain a 
unit root (non-stationary), that is, the variables in question may have a time variant mean 
and/or non-constant variance. This means working with such series in their levels while 
analyzing economic relationships may give a high likelihood of results that are 
economically misleading, a symptom that Granger and Newbold (1974) call spurious 
regression. This is often characterised by significant t-ratios and a high explanatory power, 
even though the regressors are economically unrelated to the variable being explained. 
Moreover, no inference can be deduced from such results since the least-square estimates 
DUHQRWFRQVLVWHQWDQGWKHFXVWRPDU\WHVWVRIVWDWLVWLFDOLQIHUHQFHQDPHO\WKHµµ)¶¶DQGµµW¶¶
ratio test statistics do not have the limiting distributions (Enders, 2010).  
 
 Because nonstationarity arises quite naturally in the context of macroeconomic time series, 
we undertake several important steps to investigate the presence of and point to 
appropriate econometric procedures of correcting for the trend-like behaviour in the real 
UGX GDP series. The first step involves pre-testing each series to determine its order of 
integration, since by definition cointegration requires that the variables are integrated of 
the same order. We begin with the graphical expositions of the log level and the first 
difference of the log of real UGX GDP/U and real UGX GDP/W. These are respectively 
presented in Figures (1.14) and (1.15). This is because, while the log level real UGX GDP 
could show the trend like behaviour over time (i.e. non-stationary), transforming the 
trending series in its first difference could make the processes stationary.  
 
2 - Measurement of GDP                                                                               Thomas Bwire  
The University Of Nottingham  34 
 
Figure 1.14: Log of real UGX GDP 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis is the log of real UGX GDP/U and real UGX GDP/W  
Source: $XWKRU¶Vcomputations using real UGX GDP data in Figure (1.3). 
 
Figure 1.15: First Differences of the Log of real UGX GDP 
 
 
Notes:  On the vertical axis are the first differences of the log of real UGX GDP/U and real UGX 
GDP/W  
Source:  $XWKRU¶V &RPSXWDWLRQV XVLQJ WKH ORJ RI UHDO UGX GDP data in Figure 
(1.15). 
 
Clearly, the series in Figure (1.14) exhibit trend like behaviour over time (i.e. are trending), 
while those in Figure (1.15) meander in a fashion characteristic of stationary process.  
 
Finally, we determined the order of integration or non-stationarity properties of the series. 
In theory, a vector tz is said to be integrated of order d (i.e. )(~ dIzt ) if variables in tz can 
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be differenced d times to induce stationarity. We employed the commonly used 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) which takes the 
following specification: 
 
¦
 
 ' '
U HGJ
1
120
i
tititt zztccz     (1.7) 
Where, 0c is the intercept term, 2c and J are coefficients of time trend and level of lagged 
dependent variable respectively, ' is the first difference operator and tH are white noise 
residuals. U is the lag-length introduced to account for autocorrelation and is chosen using 
the minimum of the information criteria: Akaike Information criterion [AIC], Schwarz 
Bayesian criterion [SC] or the Hannan-Quinn Criterion [HQ].  
 
To evaluate whether the sequence { tz } contains a unit root, we estimated (1.7) and tested 
the significance of the parameter of interest, i.e. J . If 0 J , the sequence { tz } contains a 
unit root or is otherwise stationary. In the equation, the null hypothesis that 0 J is 
rejected if the t-statistic is less than the critical value reported by Dickey and Fuller (DF) 
(1981), as this is a lower tailed test. Furthermore, mindful of the fact that critical values of 
the t-statistic do depend on whether an intercept ( 0c ) and/or time trend ( t ) is included in 
the regression equation and on the sample size (Enders 2010: 206), the WW - statistic, scaled 
by the 5 per cent critical value is used for 50 n usable observations. Critical values for 
the WW - statistic are obtained from Table A in Enders (2010: 488).   
 
Based on the same equation, we also evaluate whether the data generating process (DGP) 
is characterized by non-stationarity with or without a linear deterministic trend and a drift, 
and non-stationarity with or without a linear deterministic trend. This involves testing joint 
hypotheses on the coefficients of interest, i.e. 0, cJ and 2c . However, under non-stationarity, 
the computed ADF- test statistic does not follow a standard t-distribution, but rather a 
dickey Fuller (DF) distribution and so the critical values for these joint tests are also non-
standard. They follow the non-standard F-statistics denoted by 2I and 3I statistics which 
are constructed in exactly the same way as ordinary F-tests (adopted from Enders, 2010: 
207), i.e.  
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Where SSR (restricted) and SSR (unrestricted) are the sums of the squared residuals from 
the restricted and unrestricted models, r is the number of restrictions, T is the number of 
usable observations and k is the number of parameters estimated in the restricted model.  
 
The joint hypothesis 020    Jcc , i.e. the significance or otherwise of a constant term, 
time trend and non-stationarity is tested using the 2I -statistic. The null hypothesis is then 
that the data are generated by the restricted model and the alternative hypothesis is that the 
data are generated by the unrestricted model. Thus, if 2I (calculated) is smaller than 2I
(critical) (reported by Dickey and Fuller for 50 n usable observations scaled by the 5 per 
cent critical values), we accept the restricted model. Similarly, the joint hypothesis
02   cJ , i.e. the sequence { tz } contains a unit root and no linear deterministic trend is 
tested using the 3I -statistic, and is evaluated on exactly the same grounds as the 2I -
statistic. That is, the restricted model is accepted if 3I (calculated) is smaller than 3I
(critical) (reported by Dickey and Fuller for 50 n usable observations scaled by the 5 per 
cent critical values). Critical values for the iI - statistics are obtained from Table B in 
Enders (2010: 489).  
 
Test results reported in Table 1.2 indicate that the series are  1I in levels but no time trend 
or drift. However, ADF unit root test is known to have (very) low power if the series has 
undergone a (permanent) regime shift during the period under consideration (Harris and 
Sollis, 2005: 57) or if there are outliers in regression residuals. Specifically, Figure (1.14) 
shows DVOLJKWEXWGHWHFWDEOHFKDQJHLQEHKDYLRXURI8JDQGD¶VHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH7KH
period up to early 1980s is characterized with low and declining growth probably due to 
political and economic instability of the 1970s and early 1980s, the second oil price shock 
and the breakdown of the East African Community (EAC) (Collier and Reinikka, 2001; 
Baffoe, 2000; Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 1999; Jamal, 1988; Niringiye, 2009; Jerven, 
2010) during the late 1970s. The economy improved from the mid-¶Vwith political 
stability under the Museveni regime and successful implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs).   
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Such economic behaviour needs to be included in the deterministic part of the model 
(Opoku-Afari et al, 2004), and is likely to bias estimates and result in invalid inference if 
ignored (Juselius, 2003). In addition, Perron (1989: 1371), Hendry and Neale (1991) and 
Campos et al. (1996) argue that in the presence of structural breaks, the various Dickey-
Fuller test statistics are biased towards the non-rejection of a unit root, when in reality the 
series could simply be trend-stationary but characterized by a structural break, which the 
test would fail to take into account. It is unfortunate however that the series at hand is too 
short to enable us reliably conduct unit root tests that allow for breaks in trend. Moreover, 
a Chow test for structural breaks has not been performed as imposing a break point in a 
small sample (like ours) may render the test less informative.10  
 
Table 1.2: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit root test 
 
ADF test in Level 
 
ADF test in First difference  
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GDP/U 
 
 
 -1.558 
(-3.50) 
 
 1.383 
(5.13) 
 
 2.969 
(6.73) 
 
 2 
 
  1I
 
   
-4.429 
(-3.50) 
  
 0I
 
 
GDP/W 
 
 
 -1.321 
(-3.50) 
 
 1.133 
(5.13) 
 
 2.314 
(6.73) 
 
 0 
 
  1I  
   
 -5.244 
(-3.50) 
 
 0I
 
 
Notes:  AIC, SC and HQ were used (maximum set at 6 lags). An unrestricted intercept and restricted linear 
trend were included in the ADF equation when conducting unit root test of all the series in levels. 
Numbers in parenthesis are the 5 per cent critical values, unless otherwise stated. All unit-root non-
stationary variables are stationary in first differences.  
 
Source: $XWKRU¶VComputations using E-Views 7.2 
 
On the basis of unit root testing, we treat real UGX GDP/U and real UGX GDP/W as unit 
root non-stationary, so could be cointegrated. Thus, if there is a long-run relationship 
between real UGX GDP/U and real UGX GDP/W as non-stationary variables, deviations 
from the long-run relationship are stationary. The existence of long-run equilibrium 
relation is evaluated using the Johansen (1988) trace statistic test for cointegration. Central 
                                          
10 Derived probability estimates and associated critical values are likely to be unreliable for inference and 
may lack power owing to diminishing degrees of freedom for each of the resulting regressions (Mackinnon, 
1996) 
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to this test is a choice of the deterministic components (trend, constant and dummies) and 
the lag length that describes an appropriate specification of the data generating process 
(DGP).  
 
The graphical inspection of the data in figure 1.14, together with the discussion given in 
Juselius (2006: 99-100) offers a useful guide to the specification of the deterministic 
components we should be including in the cointegrating space. We include an unrestricted 
constant and a restricted deterministic trend, noting that the series in levels appear to be 
trending and we are not sure whether these linear trends would cancel out in the 
cointegrating relation. Such a specification allows for linear trends in both cointegrating 
space and in the variables in levels, and avoids creation of quadratic trends in the levels, 
which would arise if both the constant and trend are unrestricted. Given the deterministic 
components specification and under the  1I hypothesis, and letting k=3, we chose the lag-
order using the SC and HQ information test criteria (as this allows for an additional 
penalising factor that represents the loss of degrees of freedom as a result of increasing the 
lag length).  
 
SC suggested k=1, while k=2 was suggested by the HQ. The disagreement in the lag 
selection arises because the information criteria are based on different penalties associated 
with the increase in model parameters as a result of adding more lags (Juselius, 2006; 
Johnston and Dinardo, 1997). SC however, has been shown to be strongly asymptotically 
consistent providing the actual DGP is a finite order autoregressive (AR) process, and the 
set maximum lag order is larger than the true order (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004; 
Lütkepohl, 1991). Even where SC and HQ yield conflicting results, they show that SC 
would result in a more parsimonious specification (with fewer parameters) than HQ. So, 
k=1 could be a reasonable approximation of the DGP without significantly affecting the 
degrees of freedom.  
 
However, an analysis of the suitability of this model in terms of a battery of residual 
misspecification tests (see inter alia Godfrey, 1988) shows that the hypothesis of 
normality [   116.1942  F (0.001)] is not supported. As we have already pointed out, this 
FRXOGEHDUHVXOWRIWKHGHWHFWHGFKDQJHLQEHKDYLRXURI8JDQGD¶VHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH
due to political and economic instability prior to mid-1980s and a change in institutional 
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environment (ESAP reforms) and the Museveni regime thereafter. We acknowledge this 
upfront and as a common way of dealing with instability and intervention effects, may 
require incorporating some dummies. Nonetheless, in the results in Table 1.3, we obtain a 
cointegrating relation without dummies in the deterministic part of the model, suggesting 
that dummies do not have a long-run effect. Moreover, including dummies would impact 
on the distribution of the test statistics under the null hypothesis and thus should be used as 
indicative only. 
 
-RKDQVHQ¶Vtrace test has however been shown to have finite sample bias (Juselius, 
2006: 140-2; Cheung and Lai, 1993b; Reimers, 1992).  Hence, for a small sample like the 
one at our disposal, we also report the small sample Bartlett correction which ensures a 
correct test size (Johansen, 2002).   
 
Table 1.3-RKDQVHQ¶V&RLQWHJUDWLRQtrace test Results  
p-r r Eig.value Trace Trace* Frac95 p-value p-value* 
2 0 0.46 31.963 31.205 25.731 0.006 0.008 
1 1 0.202 8.568 8.498 12.448 0.215 0.22 
Notes: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend restricted; *: the small sample corrected test statistic 
(Dennis, 2006: 159-60); Frac95: the 5% critical value of the test of H(r) against H(p). The critical values as 
well as the p-values are approximated using the * - distribution (Doornix, 1998).   
 
Source: $XWKRU¶VComputations using CATS in RATS, version 2 (by Dennis et al., Estima 
2005) 
 
As the trace-statistic result in the table shows, presence of one equilibrium (stationary) 
relation between real UGX GDP/U and real UGX GDP/W is clearly suggeted, even when 
correcting for small sample bias. In fact, over 1970-76 and 2000-08 the two series are very 
close, and they are quite close for 1978-83 and 1993-99. Either series can be considered to 
represent trends in the size of the macroeconomy, but in a slightly different way. Even 
more, figure 1.16 shows cross plots of the two GDP measures, i.e. log of real UGX GDP 
(given in figure 1.14). Reading from the top row (left column) is real GDPW to real GDPU, 
and in the bottom row (right column) is real GDPU to real GDPW on the vertical 
(horizontal) axes in the matrix plot. As seen, it is quite easy to draw a straight line through 
most of the points. This is consistent with the correlations between the two series in Table 
1.4.  
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Figure 1.16: Cross Plots of GDP measures 
 ,Q WKH WDEOH 6SHDUPDQ¶V UDQN FRUUHODWLRQ RUGLQDU\ FRUUHODWLRQ LV UHSRUWHG EHORZ WKH
diagonal while standard Pearson correlation is reported above the diagonal. Using either 
formula, the correlation between the two GDP measures is 0.97.    
 
    Table 1.4: Correlation\Covariance between GDP measures 
                        GDPW        GDPU 
GDPW                                0.969 
GDPU                    0.969  
Notes: Spearman (Pearson) correlations below (above) diagonal 
 
If we put together the statistical evidence, i.e. cointegration results in Table 1.3, cross plots 
in figure 1.16 and correlation/covariance results in Table 1.4, we see that either series can 
be considered to represent trends in the size of the macroeconomy (this is despite real 
GDPW being far more volatile). This suggests either series may be adopted in subsequent 
macroeconomic modelling. However, the UBOS real series is smoother and produces GDP 
growth measure that are stable compared to those of the WDI (these are volatile). 
Moreover, UBOS is also the underlying source from which macroeconomic data is sought 
by the international agencies, including WDI. This is consistent with the remarks in 
Deaton and Heston (2008) cited in Jerven (2010: 278). µµLWPXst always be remembered 
WKDWWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODFFRXQWVDUHQREHWWHUWKDQWKHQDWLRQDODFFRXQWV¶¶ (Deaton and 
Heston, 2009: 43-44). Given this, the less volatile UBOS real series (real UGX GDP/U) 
may be preferable as there is less need to incorporate dummies for future analysis. 
However, as the smoothing may be artificial (i.e. introduced by statisticians), we may also 
want to use the WDI series, at least if interested in performance during the period 1984-
1992 when the two diverge. Moreover, an assessment of the short-run effects of reforms 
GDPW 
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during 1985-95 would be sensitive to the start and end years and the series chosen in the 
analysis.  
 
2.6 Conclusion    
 
This chapter assessed the measurements of GDP for Uganda using data on GDP in current, 
constant and PPP prices from WDI, UBOS and PWT6.3 over the period 1970-2008 for 
GDP and 1982-2008 for GDP PPP. The extent of discrepancy in GDP estimates was 
investigated and year on year percentage GDP growth rates, including percentage and 
average growth rate discrepancies were derived.  
 
The discrepancies in the USD GDP stem from the differences in the nominal exchange rate. 
Although the exchange rate adjusts to differences in price changes (inflation) between 
Uganda and the US, there are differences in the weighting of inflation. This is because it is 
augmented by the global exchange rate realignment with other trading partners (notably 
Europe) and there are policy reasons why Uganda may wish to limit changes in the 
exchange rate. Moreover, WDI converts its series at a market clearing exchange rate while 
a managed float is used by UBOS statisticians. Save for the exchange rate, discrepancies 
arise because of differences in the magnitude of revisions in the data in order to carry 
certain definitional changes back in time, differences in extrapolations to bridge years of 
missing data points and smoothing of  data over various base years.  
 
The two measures of economic performance: real UGX GDP and USD GDP (aggregate or 
per capita), differ depending on whether the series is derived from the implicit price 
deflator (inflation in Uganda) or the nominal exchange rate (to the extent that changes 
represent the inflation differential). Indices for the latter shows greater variability but no 
index is consistently above or below the other. On the other hand, GDP measures derived 
from LCU implicit price deflator, i.e. real UGX GDP series, are quite similar especially at 
the beginning and end of the sample period, although WDI has more variability than 
UBOS. :',YDULDELOLW\LQJURZWKFRXOGFDSWXUHµWUXH¶HFRQRPLFLQVWDELOLW\GXULQJDSHULRG
of change, but may also reflect weak underlying statistics.    
 
Although UBOS and WDI real UGX GDP year on year growth rate estimates have a 3.6 
percentage point average absolute discrepancy per year, statistical evidence shows they are 
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consistent, similar and cointegrated. The UBOS real series is smoother and produces a 
more stable measure of GDP than does the WDI series. It is also the underlying source 
from which macroeconomic data is sought by the international agencies, including WDI. 
Given this, the less volatile UBOS real series (real UGX GDP/U) is preferred as there is 
less need to incorporate dummies for future analysis. This implies that it is from this 
source that the fiscal data is derived and private consumption is taken as a preferred 
measure of growth in the rest of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
EVOLUTION OF THE FISCAL EFFECTS OF AID METHODS, 
THEORETICAL CVAR AND THE DATA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we trace the evolution of the methods used in analyzing the fiscal effects of 
aid over the past 10 years or so. It begins, in section 3.2 with a brief review of fungibility 
studies and proceeds to the fiscal response models, which are now being estimated within a 
VAR framework, and then the short- and medium term macroeconomic effect of aid. The 
section gives a broader view of the gaps in the fiscal effects literature and lays out our 
contribution. Section 3.3 discusses the theoretical foundation of the cointegrated Vector 
Autoregressive (CVAR) model that we employ in the study while an overview of the 
economic performance in Uganda, structured around the data, measurement and sources, 
and the trend analysis of aid, fiscal aggregates and other macroeconomic variables are 
presented in section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 gives the statistical description of data and 
demonstrates that the series are unit-root non-stationary.  
   
3.2 Evolution of the Methods 
 
There is a significant empirical literature on the impact of aid on the fiscal behaviour of aid 
recipients and more recently, on short- and medium term effect of aid with important 
insights regarding absorption and spending not analysed in more classical fiscal response 
literature. The latter literature, only briefly touched on here is inspired by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), while a detailed review of the fiscal effects of aid is provided in 
McGillivray and Morrissey (2001a, 2004) and Morrissey (2012). The authors distinguish 
between fungibility and fiscal response studies.  
 
Fungibility studies analyse effects of aid on the composition of government spending, in 
particular whether aid is spent on those sectors that donors intended. The evidence is 
JHQHUDOO\ µLPSUHFLVH¶ JLYHQ WKH GLIILFXOW\ RI OLQNLQJ DLG GRQRU LQWHQWLRQV DQG VHFWRU
spending (Morrissey 2012). As this is not our focus and is discussed in detail in 
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McGillivray and Morrissey (2004), here we simply highlight four limitations with 
fungibility studies. First, the underlying theoretical model is restrictive in not allowing aid 
to affect expenditure allocations across all headings. The typical model posits two distinct 
types of expenditure headings, one to which aid is allocated and another to which aid is not 
DOORFDWHGWKDWDUHVHSDUDEOHLQ WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VXWLOLW\ IXQFWLRQVRWKDWRQO\IXQJLEOHDLG
affects the spending allocation (Feyzioglu et al., 1998: 34 cited in Morrissey 2012: 3). 
Second, empirical estimation of the model requires that one must know how much of the 
aid donors intended to be spent on each expenditure heading, so the estimation is 
constrained by lack of appropriate data. Third, the econometric techniques used in most 
studies are deficient as they assume that the components of government spending are 
determined independently, but in practice, these are jointly determined and so, this should 
be allowed for in the estimation. Finally, the approach does not allow for the more 
fundamental issues of how aid over time impacts on recipient fiscal behaviour (i.e. effect 
on tax revenue and borrowing), including the interaction of expenditure and revenue 
variables.  
 
The fiscal response models (FRMs) or studies allow for the dynamic effect of aid on 
expenditure patterns (current and capital spending), tax effort, and domestic borrowing. 
They start from the view point of utility maximization, in which government maximizes 
utility based on a quadratic loss function subject to targets for each revenue and 
expenditure category.11  However, empirical applications of FRMs have short-comings, 
mostly related to difficulties in the use and estimation of targets for government 
expenditure and revenue, the treatment of aid, and the 3SLS non-linear econometric 
techniques that have been used are notoriously difficult to estimate, interpret and highly 
sensitive to (and demanding of) the data, often yielding inconsistent estimates of core 
parameters (Morrissey, 2012; Martins, 2010; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001a: 29-30). 
Furthermore, Morrissey (2012) argues that whilst it is necessary to estimate budget targets, 
there is no acceptable theory regarding how governments form revenue and expenditure 
targets; the theoretical framework does not provide a good representation of government 
behaviour; and the behavioural relationship being estimated is assumed fixed over the 
period (i.e. the models do not allow for the fact that spending decisions are made within a 
fiscal framework in which aid is only one component). Osei et al. (2005) add to the list and 
                                          
11 A detailed exposition of this frame work is provided in Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998: 1242-43) 
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argue that FRMs are not predictive theories as they do not generate specific testable 
hypotheses of the effect of aid on fiscal behaviour.    
 
In an effort to overcome many of these difficulties, there is now a growing body of 
empirical literature estimating the FRM within a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework 
and complemented (in as many of the studies) by the estimation of impulse response 
functions. The novelty of VAR estimation techniques stems from its structure which 
provides a tractable frame-work, allowing for the formulation and testing of a number of 
different hypotheses of interest on causal links between aid and the domestic fiscal 
variables, and uncovers and describes data facts and characteristics. The technique takes 
into account the interactions between macrovariables over time, allowing a distinction in 
estimating the long-run (equilibrium) and short-run (adjustment to the equilibrium) 
relations. There is one equation for each and every variable, so all variables in the system 
are treated as potentially endogenous. Each variable is explained by own lags and lagged 
values of the other variables. Assumptions about exogeneity are tested for directly 
avoiding making strong a priori assumptions, thus by design, the econometric model can 
allow the data to speak freely about the empirical content of the model. It is an a-
theoretical approach, i.e. one does not have to maintain the existence of, estimate or test 
specific theoretical formulations of the budgetary planning targets, rather economic theory 
is often invoked to choose the variables to include in the analysis, select the appropriate 
normalization and to interpret the results. 
 
The first country-specific study to model the fiscal effects of aid using a VAR approach 
was Osei and Morrissey (2003), which later appears in the Journal of International 
Development (Osei et al., 2005) for Ghana. Among the many fiscal inter relationships, 
they find that aid to Ghana is weakly exogenous to the domestic fiscal variables (i.e. 
donors do not respond to fiscal imbalance in determining how much aid to allocate to 
Ghana although aid has effects on spending, domestic borrowing and domestic tax 
revenue). Specifically, aid was associated with reduced domestic borrowing (which could 
likely be because the IMF required reductions in borrowing as a quid pro quo for increased 
aid) and increased tax revenue. They also find that recurrent spending rose more than 
investment spending following the increases in aid (suggesting that aid was fungible). This 
they argue, was not actually so because aid was used to reduce borrowing. Another 
interesting finding is that aid did not directly increase spending, although increase in aid 
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permitted spending to rise because of the associated increase in tax revenue. However, 
they do not estimate the magnitude of the effect of aid on spending, nor do they formulate 
and impose any fiscal restrictions to fully test for specific aid- fiscal hypotheses.   
 
Fägernas and Roberts (2004c) apply the VAR approach and study the fiscal effect of aid in 
Uganda, Zambia and Malawi. They find that aid has a strong positive impact on the 
development budget in all the three countries, but the other fiscal effects are country 
specific. Aid displaces tax effort, has a moderately positive impact on the current budget, 
and is associated with higher levels of domestic borrowing in Zambia. In Malawi, aid 
lowers domestic borrowing, and does not discourage tax effort; in Uganda, aid raises 
development and recurrent spending, has a positive long-run effect on domestic revenue 
and the impact on domestic borrowing is negligible. In all these studies, aid exogeneity is 
imposed and not tested and probably because they follow in the footsteps of Osei and 
Morrissey (2003), they neither formulate or test any specific testable hypothesis of the 
effect of aid on fiscal behaviour or estimate the magnitude of the effect of aid on spending. 
With particular reference to Uganda, features of the data over 1972-79 (a decade of 
economic collapse and social disorder) and effect of ESAP reform and the Museveni 
regime are not accounted for in the empirical analysis. Ignoring such shocks and reforms 
may bias estimates and result in invalid inference (Juselius, 2003).  
 
Morrissey et al. (2007) extend the time series FRM approach with official Kenyan data for 
1964-2004, and estimate two vectors; the fiscal effects of aid grants and loans, and the 
impact of aid on growth, but separately. Considering the fiscal effects, they find that aid 
grants were associated with increased spending while loans were a response to 
unanticipated deficits, i.e. if spending exceeded revenue (tax and grants) the government 
sought loans to finance the deficit. Aid grants have an insignificant effect on tax revenue. 
However, the study does not fully explore the CVAR methods.  The fiscal and growth 
effect of aid are considered in isolation and assumptions about exogeneity are not tested 
although they avoid making strong a prior assumptions. In addition, similar to Osei and 
Morrissey (2003) and Osei et al. (2005), the study does not estimate the magnitude of the 
effect of aid (grants or loans) on spending nor do they formulate any testable fiscal 
hypotheses.      
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Martins (2010), provides a more recent comprehensive application of the CVAR in the 
analysis of the fiscal effect of aid using quarterly data set for Ethiopia for the period 1993-
2008. His study is probably the first of its kind that provides new insights into the 
formulation of testable fiscal hypotheses. He finds evidence for a long run positive 
relationship between aid and development spending, but not between aid and recurrent 
spending (hence no evidence that aid is fungible), domestic borrowing increases in 
response to shortfalls in revenue (tax and grants), and there is no evidence that aid reduces 
tax effort. Furthermore, aid grants adjust to the level of development spending. However, 
the validity of some of the tested hypotheses, e.g. aid spending (defined as widening of the 
fiscal deficit (excluding aid) due to incremental aid (Hussain et al., 2009; Foster and 
Killick, 2006: 3)), development spending and categorical fungibility hypotheses is suspect. 
Morrissey (2012) details the practical difficult of linking aid, donor intentions and sector 
spending, based on which these hypotheses could be evaluated. Moreover, the 
classification of spending is problematic (Morrissey 2012) so hypothesis testing based on 
expenditure categories may have been constrained by lack of appropriate data. This 
granted, the tests might not be legitimate and inference may be imprecise. Moreover, like 
the rest of the studies, the magnitude of the effect of aid on spending is not estimated.  
 
In one of the the IMF initiated work on the macroeconomic effect of aid, Berg et al., (2007) 
analyse key issues associated with large increases in aid, including absorptive capacity, 
Dutch disease, and inflation. They develop a framework that emphasizes the different roles 
of monetary and fiscal policy and apply it to the recent experience of five countries: 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, i.e. countries that have often found 
it difficult to coordinate monetary and fiscal policy in the face of conflicting objectives, 
notably to spend the aid money on domestic goods and to avoid excessive exchange rate 
appreciation. The authors find no evidence of actual Dutch disease because a considerable 
part of the aid was used to build international reserves, rather than to transfer resources 
form donor to recipient country. This is ample evidence that the fear of exchange rate 
appreciation played an important part in the policy reaction to aid. While central banks 
held a substantial part of the aid in reserves, the fiscal authorities often increased 
expenditures on domestic goods and services, using the local currency obtained from 
selling the aid to the central bank. They argue, this in effect is an attempt to use the same 
aid dollar twice, once to build reserves and once to finance government expenditure ± a 
policy similar to domestically financed fiscal expansion leading to identical outcomes: a 
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surge in money supply, and a consequent need to decide between inflation, on the one 
hand, and crowding out the private sector through the sale of treasury bills, on the other.  
 
Berg et al., (2010) develop a dynamic micro-founded economic model calibrated to 
Uganda to analyse the short- and medium term issues associated with large aid surges. 
7KHLU DQDO\VLV LV WULJJHUHG FRQVLGHULQJ WKDW RXW RI WKH IHDU RI µµ'XWFK GLVHDVH¶¶ FHQWUDO
banks in aid-dependent countries have frequently responded to aid surges by accumulating 
much of the additional aid in reserves (partial absorption) even as governments spend the 
local currency counterpart on domestic goods. They show that depending on the 
interaction between the policy mix, the efficiency of public investment and learning-by-
doing externalities in the traded sector, this response may stem short-term appreciation 
pressures but can induce medium-term real GDP effects (through private sector crowding 
out). They show that with high efficiency and strong externalities, aid if invested well can 
produce even greater gains (in terms of greater increases in real GDP and welfare) ± 
SURGXFLQJ µµ'XWFK YLJRU¶¶ VXFK WKDW DYRLGLQJ UHVHUYH DFFXPXODWLRQ IXOO DEVRUSWLRQ
maximizes these gains. They also show that partial absorption policies while spending the 
local counterpart can succeed in narrow terms in resisting real exchange rate appreciation, 
but at a cost to private investment and medium-term growth. Finally, their calibration also 
shows that with low efficiency and strong externalities, aid spending can be harmful for 
growth, so partial absorption policies may be better than full absorption, but even better 
would be partial spending.  
 
Portillo et al., (2010) develop a tractable open-economy new-Keynesian model with two 
sectors to analyse the short-term effects of aid-financed fiscal expansions. The model is 
calibrated to help understand recent experience of Uganda, which saw an increase in 
government spending following a surge in aid yet experienced a real depreciation and an 
increase in real interest rates. They distinguish between spending the aid (which is under 
the control of the fiscal authorities), and absorbing the aid, i.e. using the aid to finance a 
higher curUHQW DFFRXQWGHILFLW ZKLFK LV LQIOXHQFHGE\ WKH FHQWUDO EDQN¶V UHVHUYHVSROLF\
when access to international capital markets is limited). They show that although the 
standard treatment of the transfer problem implicitly assumes spending equals absorption, 
a policy mix that results in spending but not absorbing the aid generates demand pressures 
and results in an increase in real interest rates and can also lead to a temporary real 
depreciation if demand pressures are strong enough to threaten external balance. They also 
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argue that limited participation in domestic financial markets ± a key feature of low 
income countries make a real depreciation more likely by amplifying demand pressures 
when aid is spent but not absorbed.  
 
Hussein et al. (2009) develop an analytical framework to investigate the macroeconomic 
challenges created by a surge in aid inflows. They examine possible policy responses to 
increased aid, in terms of absorption and spending of aid ± where the central bank controls 
absorption through monetary policy and the sale of foreign exchange, and where the fiscal 
authority controls spending. They show that different combinations of absorption and 
spending lead to different macroeconomic consequences. Their evidence from five 
countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda) that recently 
experienced an aid surge shows no support for aid-related real exchange rate appreciation, 
but does indicate that the fear for Dutch disease played an important part in the policy 
reaction to aid surges.  
 
Foster and Killick (2006) explores the consequences for macroeconomic management of 
the envisaged scaling-up of aid to African countries. They show that it is the extent to 
which the resulting increased availability of foreign exchange is absorbed (in the form of a 
widened balance of payments current account deficit) which is critical. The argument is 
that it is only when additional foreign resources enter the economy that aid has an impact 
on the levels of production, consumption and investment that the economy can attain.  
They also find that the country cases produced little evidence of aid increases resulting in 
symptoms of Dutch disease (because governments consciously sought to avoid it). 
Importantly, as you may have found out, the key feature of the IMF initiated work lies in 
important insights regarding absorption and spending not analysed in more classical fiscal 
response literature.  
 
In sum, the studies of interest, i.e. the fiscal response studies show the effect of aid on 
spending (including showing that the effect of aid, grants or loans differ for the two types 
of spending (recurrent and capital)). But despite their important contribution, few (if any) 
estimate the magnitude of the effect of aid on public spending. Table 3.1 presents results of 
selected country-specific studies on the dynamic effect of aid, but in general, it is difficult 
to find a consistent pattern regarding the impact of aid on fiscal aggregates. The impact 
appears to be country specific and so lacks a basis for comparing results. This suggests that 
3 Evolution of CVAR Methods and the Data                                           Thomas Bwire    
The University Of Nottingham  50 
 
empirical evidence and theoretical predictions regarding the impact of aid is to the best 
patchy, often contradictory and generally ambiguous.  
 
This study contributes to the aid and fiscal aggregates literature on one country, Uganda, 
over the period 1972-2008. Riddell (2007), cited in Juselius et al. (2011) argues that 
country-based evidence provides the only reliable backdrop against which to judge aid 
effectiveness. This paper follows leads provided by the most recent cointegrated vector 
autoregressive (CVAR) model in Juselius et al. (2011) (as this is a powerful and 
scientifically strict tool that facilitates learning about complex empirical reality) to test for 
specific fiscal hypothesis mostly from Martins (2010). Our work also improves on 
Fagernäs and Roberts (2004a), the only study to our knowledge on the fiscal impact of aid 
on Uganda using a VAR method, by paying attention to features of the data over 1972-79 
(a decade of economic collapse and social disorder), and the effect of ESAP reform and 
the Museveni regime in Uganda. In addition and contrary to many studies of aid impact in 
the literature, our work does not impose endogeneity/exogeneity except where such 
restrictions have been tested and accepted, uses data in absolute terms12 and estimates the 
magnitude of the effect of aid on spending.   
                                          
12 This avoids many of the problems associated with data transformation (logs, ratios, growth rates etc) 
which, even if seemingly innocuous may be invalid (see Juselius et al., 2011: 5 for a detailed discussion). 
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Table 3.1: Results of Selected Studies on the Dynamic Impact of Aid   
 
    
 Incremental Impact of Aid on: 
Study Sample 
Aid 
Measure 
Current 
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
Total 
Spending 
Domestic 
Revenue 
Domestic 
Borrowing 
Martins (2010) 
 
Ethiopia 
(1993Q3-2008Q2) 
Grants 
Loans 
n.r 
n.r 
++ 
n.r 
n.r 
n.r 
++ 
n.r 
? 
n.r 
 
Osei et al., (2005) 
 
Ghana 
(1966-1998) 
 
ODA 
 
++ 
 
+ 
 
 
++ ++ 
 
-- 
 
Morrissey et al., (2007) 
Kenya  
(1964-2004) 
Grants 
Loans 
n.r 
n.r 
n.r 
n.r 
+ 
+ 
n.r 
-- 
n.r 
n.r 
 
 
 
Fagernäs & Schurich (2004) 
 
Malawi 
(1970-2000) 
 
ODA 
Grants 
Loans 
 
--
 
-- 
? 
 
++ 
++ 
+ 
 
 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
 
-- 
--
 
--
 
 
  
 
Fagernäs & Robert (2004a) 
 
Uganda 
(1974-1999) 
 
ODA 
Grants 
Loans 
 
++ 
+ 
++ 
 
+ 
++ 
++ 
 
 
++ 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
..
 
..
 
..
 
 
 
 
Fagernäs & Robert (2004b) 
 
Zambia 
(1972-1998) 
 
ODA 
Grants 
Loans 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
++ 
++ 
+ 
 
 
+ 
--
 
--
 
--
 
 
+ 
+ 
..
 
 
Notes: i).  ++ (strongly positive), + (moderately positive), -- (strongly negative), - (moderately negative), .. (insignificant), ? ambiguous), n..r (not 
   reported or cannot be inferred).  
  ii) Due to differences in the measurement of aid, results are not directly comparable across the table  
 
Source: Author¶s compilation  
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3.3 The Theoretical CVAR Model  
 
Based on the Johansen (1988) approach, Vector autoregressive (VAR) methods have 
become the 'tool of choice' for the estimation and testing of multivariate relationships 
among non-stationary data in much of time series macro-econometrics. As a reduced form 
representation of a large class of dynamic structural models (Hamilton 1994: 326-7), VAR 
offers both empirical tractability and a link between data and theory in economics. 
Accordingly, in the current application, where the aid, fiscal variables, exports and private 
consumption13 are likely to be non-stationary and Cointegrated, it will be convenient to 
couch the empirical analysis in a VAR framework (Hendry and Doornik, 2001: 129). 
Consider an unrestricted n -dimensional VAR ( k ) model: 
 
ttktkttt H  ĭ'yȆyȆyȆy  . . . 2211  , t = 1, 2, T                        (3.1) 
By recursive substitution the equation defines ty (a ( 1un ) vector of endogenous variables) 
as a function of initial values, 10 ,..., ktyy  ; deterministic terms, tDD ,...,1 (constant, linear 
WUHQGV µVSLNH¶DQG LQWHUYHQWLRQGXPPLHVRURWKHU UHJUHVVRUV WKDWZHFRQVLGHU IL[HGDQG
non-stochastic). The VAR ( k ) model is linear in the parameters and assumes that these are 
constant over time. Errors, tHH ,...,1  which are assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed, that is, they are serially uncorrelated (   0 ckttE HH for 0zk ), have zero mean 
(   0 tE H ), and have a time-invariant positive definite covariance matrix uȁ . Thus, the 
error terms follow a white noise process, i.e.  ut N ȁ,0~ 5H . The residual covariance 
matrix, uȁ has dimensions k x k , and contains information about possible 
contemporaneous effects. And parameters,  uk /)33 ,,,...,1 . Providing the data are  1I , 
it will be convenient to express (3.1) in its unrestricted error correction representation of 
the form, 
 
 ttit
k
i
t İĭ'yīyȆy -1t ' ' 

 
¦1
1
1             (3.2) 
                                          
13 Exports and private consumption are included because in one of the chapters, we analyse the effect of aid 
and public sector on the growth of private consumption.  
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Where each of the ( nnu ) matrices  i1 AAI ,..., *i   1,...,1  ki and 
 k1 AAIȆ ...,  comprise coefficients to be estimated by -RKDQVHQV¶V 
maximum likelihood procedure using a (t = 1, . . ., T) sample of data in this model. 
1,...,2,1  ki is the number of lags included in the system and '  is a difference operator. 
The properties of the error correction model in (3.2) are determined by the properties of 
the characteristic polynomial of the process 
 
     ¦
 
 
1
1
11
k
i
in zzzz īȆIA        (3.3) 
Where the complex number z ȯis a root of A if   0 zA . It is the roots of  zA  that 
are particularly interesting. If we assume that all roots of A have modulus larger than one 
ty would be stationary, but would be  1I  if A  has unit roots. It follows then that if 1 z
is a root, Ȇ has reduced rank nr   since   01   ȆA . Thus, providing the data are 
Cointegrated, this allows Ȇ  to be factorised such that 'ĮȕȆ   where Į  and ȕ are both 
( rnu ) matrices of full column rank. Under this decomposition, (3.2) becomes 
 
 ttit
k
i
t İĭ'yīyȕĮy -1t 'c ' 

 
¦1
1
1  , t  «T    (3.4) 
Where tH are independent  ȁ,05N  and  ĭ,ī,...,īȕĮ 1k1  are freely varying parameters. 
The advantage of this parameterization is in the interpretation of the coefficients. The 
effect of the levels is isolated in the matrix 'Įȕ  while 11 ī,...,ī k describes the short-term 
dynamics of the process (Johansen, 1995: 89 and Harris, 1995). It therefore delivers a neat 
economic interpretation to the vector error correction model of (3.2). The r  columns of ȕ
represent the co-integrating vectorVWKDWTXDQWLI\WKHµORQJ-UXQ¶RUHTXLOLEULXPUHODWLRQ(s) 
between the variables in the system, and as we have suggested, this could be the statistical 
analogue of the budgetary equilibrium among the core fiscal variables (DB, G, A, TR) as 
predicted by fiscal response theory (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, 2004). With a 
unique relationship among the fiscal variables, the identification of the long-run relation 
becomes relatively direct.  
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The r  columns of error correction coefficientsD load deviations from equilibrium into 
ty' for correction, thereby ensuring that the equilibrium is maintained. The *i  matrices in 
(3.4) estimate the short-run or transient effect of shocks on ty'  and thereby allow the 
short and long-run responses to differ. In addition, the parameterisation in (3.4) allows the 
short run adjustment effects embodied in the new equilibrium (which lead to permanent 
changes in the level) to be distinguished from the effects of lagged differences (which are 
transitory). Moreover, the specification reduces any multicollinearity, since the first 
GLIIHUHQFHRIWKHYDULDEOHVWHQGWREHPRUHµRUWKRJRQDO¶WKDQWKHOHYHOV-XVHOLXV: 60). 
Also, the reformulation of a VAR model in (3.1) as a VECM in (3.4 or 3.2) does not 
impose any binding restrictions on the original parameters (Juselius, 2006), i.e. does not 
change the value of the maximized likelihood function. There is therefore a direct 
correspondence between the estimated parameters of the two forms. But before we 
examine the existence of long-run relationship(s) among the macrovariables in the system, 
it is instructive to recognise the role of deterministic terms and the lag-length in 
Cointegrated VARs. 
 
Deterministic Terms 
 
As set-out in Johansen (1994) the specification of deterministic terms contained in tD
(such as intercepts, trends and intervention dummies) have an important implication for 
cointegration, as these alters the interpretation of the coefficients (Hendry and Juselius, 
2001). A mixture of levels and first differences that characterize the VECM underscores 
the potentially complex role of deterministic terms in dynamic models comprising non-
stationary variables. Consider for example, a scenario where a unrestricted constant is 
included in tD  in (3.2) or (3.4) to account for the non-zero mean of the cointegrating 
relationships (i.e. > @ ȝyȕ  1'E t ). This unrestricted constant will also allow for linear trends 
in ty  via accumulation of the constant in the first difference (in which case > @ Ȗy  ' tE ). 
Should these linear trends not cancel out in the cointegrating relation, tD  would have to be 
augmented with a linear trend to account for it, which if left unrestricted, would allow for 
quadratic trends in ty  (this being implied where > @ tt ȡy  'E ). Hence, allowing for a 
unrestricted constant and intercepts (trends) in tD may give rise to linear (quadratic) trends 
3-Evolution of CVAR Methods and the Data                                                   Thomas Bwire    
  
The University Of Nottingham 55 
 
in ty . Where these do not occur in the data parsimony dictates they should not appear in 
the model either.  
 
In fact, Juselius (2006) demonstrates that each unrestricted deterministic term in tD  of (3.2) 
or (3.4) represents the combined sum of its contribution to the cointegrating relation(s) and 
growth rates in tyǻ . To illustrate this, consider the Cointegrated VAR(2) model in its error 
correction model representation given in (3.2) or (3.4) where tD  is simply a ( 1uk ) vector 
of constants giving 
 
 
> @ tttt İĭyīyȕĮy  '  111 ǻ'                                                    (3.5) 
Under cointegration, all terms in (3.5) are stationary and thus have a constant mean which 
we may obtain by taking expectations. Hence, taking expectations of (3.5) and letting 
> @ Ȗy  ' tE  = a ( 1uq ) vector describing the unconditional growth rates of each series and 
> @ ȝyȕ  1'E t  = a ( 1ur ) vector of intercepts in the cointegrating relations, yields 
 
   
> @ > @
ĭĮȝ
ĭyȕĮȖīI
 
  11 'E t
 
 
Thus, > @ ĮȝȖīIĭ 1   demonstrating that the constant term in (3.5) consists of two 
components, one related to linear growth rates in the data and the other to the mean values 
of the cointegrating relations (as given by the intercepts of the equilibrium  relations). The 
implication is that deterministic components have to be restricted in certain ways to avoid 
undesirable effects.  
 
The precise specification of tD
 
is important not least because deterministic terms are not 
merely nuisance parameters but they affect the limiting distributions of the cointegration 
test statistics. 
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Determination of the Lag-Length 
 
The appropriate lag-length ( U ) of the VAR in (3.1) is chosen using the minimum of the 
information criteria, which derives from the log likelihood ratio (LR) function, given in 
(3.6).   
 
LR =  1ln2 ++ kkQ  =  1ÖlnÖln : kT kȍ                        (3.6) 
 
Where ȍ  is the residual covariance matrix, T is the length of the effective sample, which 
is kept constant.14 țǾ is the null hypothesis that the model needs k lags and 1+ k  is the 
alternative hypothesis that the VAR model needs 1k lags. The test statistic is 
approximately distributed as F2 with p2 degrees of freedom. However, the LR test alone 
may not be particularly informative, since an extra lag will almost always add information 
and improve the log-likelihood value. Hence, we discount the log-likelihood by an 
appropriate (penalising) factor that represents the loss of degrees of freedom. The Akaike 
(AIC), Schwarz (SC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criteria serves this purpose. 
These are all based on the maximal value of the LR function with an additional penalizing 
factor which is related to the number of estimated parameters (as a result of increasing the 
lag-length). That is, the lower the values, the better the model. Following Juselius (2006: 
70-1), these are defined in (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9) respectively 
 
AIC  =  
T
kp 2Öln 2ȍ       (3.7) 
 
SC  =  
T
Tkp lnÖln 2ȍ       (3.8) 
 
  QH  =  
T
Tkp lnln2Öln 2ȍ      (3.9) 
 
As shown in Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004), AIC asymptotically over estimates the order 
with positive probability, HQ estimates the order consistently (i.e. ppp oÖlim ) and SC is 
                                          
14 The size of the effective sample needs to be the same when testing +k against +k+1; hence it is determined 
by the longest lag. 
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even more strongly asymptotically consistent (i.e. pp oÖ ) under quite general conditions 
if the actual data generating process (DGP) is a finite order AR process and the maximum 
order maxp is larger than the true order. It is further shown that even in small samples of 
fixed size 16tn , the following relations      AICpQHpSCp ÖÖÖ dd hold. So the 
appropriate order of VAR is based on SC in this paper.  
 
As we discuss in the following section, (3.4) readily facilitates estimation and inference on 
key parameters relevant to aid and public sector response and growth in private 
consumption modelling. These are however partial derivatives (by construction) predicated 
on the ceteris paribus clause (Lütkepohl and Reimers 1992), and are interpreted in this 
light. In cases where variables in an economic system are characterised by potentially rich 
dynamic interaction, inference based on 'everything else held constant' may be of limited 
value (Lloyd et al., 2006) and may give a misleading impression of the short- and long-run 
estimates. If what is actually wanted is an estimate of what might happen to all variables in 
the system following a perturbation of known size in one of the equations, then impulse 
response analysis, which describes the resulting chain reaction of knock-on and feedback 
effects as it permeates through the system, provides a tractable and potentially attractive 
solution providing that no other shocks hit the system thereafter (Johnston and DiNardo, 
1997). Thus, we may have to augment estimated parameters in (3.4) with the estimation of 
impulse response functions. The estimation of these functions uses the moving average 
representation of the model in equation (3.4) or (3.1). For simplicity, the model  
  
tttt yyy HED '*c '  111  or   tttpt yyIy HED '*c  111 15 
 
Shows that a change in tH   ctt HH  is equivalent to a change in ty   cyy tt  so 
that clearly, tH is a shock and c is a change. Granger Representation theorem referred to 
above shows  
 
 
  ACCCy thhthttht   ............ 01 HHHHH   (3.10) 
                                          
15 We have in either equation assumed no deterministic terms for simplicity.  
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Where   AAAA cc ĮīȕĮȕC 1 16or in a more compact form and similar to the Ȇ matrix, 
AA c ĮȕC ~ (where   1~ AAAA c īȕĮȕȕ ); hc is the transitory effect and Acontains the effect 
of the initial values defined so that 0 cAE , i.e. Arepresents stationary process in ty .  
  
Equation (3.10) implies that the effect at time ht  of a change c to tH (or ty ) is given as 
   foo w
w  hCccCCcy h
t
ht
,H       (3.11) 
 
Equation (3.11) is the impulse response function. A change c to the system at time t 
propagates through the system and becomes Cc  in the long-run. The permanent effect of a 
change is Cc  and hc is the transitory effect.    
 
In what follows, one may want to use the generalised impulse response function (Koop et 
al. 1996 and Pesaran and Shin, 1998) to assess the effect of one standard error shock to the 
jth equation (aid in this case) at time t on nty . The decomposition of the generalized 
impulse responses derives from the reduced form impulse responses and is obtained as  
 
      ¦¦
  
 c 
p
i
itihtii
p
i
hth eCCeeCCCC
11
HHH     (3.12) 
Where ie is the thic  unit vector. 
  
The effect at time horizon h of variable i on variable j is given by  
 
     ,jihihj CCeCCe  c  ,...3,2,1 h      (3.13) 
 
Where je  is an 1um  selection vector that identifies the source of the shock (hence unit is 
its jth element with zeros elsewhere). The strength of generalized impulse response 
function over its orthogonalized counterpart is that they are invariant to the ordering of the 
variables in the model. This notwithstanding, the effects of a shock are legitimate if the 
                                          
16 AĮ defines the common stochastic trends driving the long-run relation out of equilibrium, while Aȕ
defines the loadings to the common stochastic trends.  
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causality of the economic structure is known or they are prone to misinterpretation 
(Ericsson et al., 1998: 379 cited in Osei et al., 2005). Thus, in order to legitimately 
conduct the impulse response, the simulation exercise may need to be supported by both 
statistical and economic evidence. A major limitation with impulse response analysis for 
VECMs is that standard errors may be large with small samples of data and since they 
increase with the number of periods for which the responses are estimated (Fagernäs and 
Schurich, 2004), they are often stationary insignificant. 
 
3.4 Economic Performance in Uganda 
 
Data, Measurement and Sources  
 
Annual time series data for the period 1972-2008 is used. Foreign aid is defined as the total 
net disbursement of aid from all donors to Uganda, and is an aggregate of grants and loans 
having a grant element of at least 25 percent. Alternative measures of aid, including 
International Monetary Fund-Government Financial Statistics (IMF-GFS), Ministry of 
Finance Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) and Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee: OECD-DAC (2009) 
databases were explored to ensure a consistent series. Some previous applications (see 
among others, Table 3.1) disaggregate aid into grants and loans, because they may have 
different effects (governments prefer grants because they do not have to be repaid; loans 
may encourage fiscal planning for future servicing and repayment costs), such that there 
could be aid aggregation bias. McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) downplay this argument, 
contending that in practice such bias is likely to be minor as aid loans are long-term and 
present governments are unlikely to be around when repayment is due, such that they 
could be treated as grants.  
 
In Uganda, loans accounted for 50-60 per cent of aid flows during the 1980s but grants 
have increased steadily and account for most aid disbursements since 1990 (Holmgren et 
al., 1999). Moreover, as noted in Egesa (2011), aid loans/GDP ratio fell by half from about 
8 per cent in the early 1990s to about 4 per cent in the subsequent years while aid 
grants/GDP share increased from 2 per cent in 1986 to a high of about 12 per cent in 1992 
and averaged 8 per cent each year up to 2004. Nonetheless, whilst a distinction between 
loans and grants may matter (see for example Martins, 2010; 0¶$PDQMD et al., 2005), 
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Uganda became a beneficiary of the KLJKO\LQGHEWHGSRRUFRXQWULHV¶+,3&GHEWUHOLHILQ
1998/99 (Atingi-Ego, 2005; Collier and Reinikka, 2001) and could have anticipated 
significant debt relief. Thus, loans are similar to grants and are treated as net aid 
disbursements in this study. Data on aid disbursement is obtained from Geographical 
Distribution of Financial Flows (OECD-DAC, 2009) databases.  
 
Data on tax revenue and net domestic borrowing from the banking system are from various 
annual reports of the Bank of Uganda (BoU). The non-tax revenue component of domestic 
revenue is omitted from the system so that we are not estimating an identity. Also, as aid is 
based on DAC measures it overstates the amount of aid actually going through the budget. 
It includes some that is not even spent in Uganda (most technical cooperation and 
assistance is spent in the donor country), while some is spent under the control of the 
donors (donors retain control over project aid). So again, there is no true identity. Data on 
total government spending (and its disaggregated components: current and capital 
spending) is from Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). Capital spending constitutes 
central government outlays on additions to fixed assets plus net changes in the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V OHYHO RI LQYHQWRULHV QHW RI SULYDWH LQYHVWPHQW Current spending sums up 
expenditures by all government bodies on general public administration, defence, public 
order and safety affairs, education, health, community, social and economic services, 
agriculture, roads, water, loans repayment and pensions, among others. Total government 
spending is the sum of current and capital spending. The disaggregated components of 
total government spending are considered because we analyse a variant model as a 
refinement of one in which spending is aggregated.  
 
We also extract data on GDP and exports from UBOS because we shall delve into how, the 
fiscal policy mediated by aid impact on the growth (measured by growth in private 
consumption). It is also from UBOS that private consumption is taken as the preferred 
correlate of GDP. Exports include the value of all goods and other market services 
provided to the world (i.e. value of merchandise, freight, insurance, travel, and other non-
factor services). Private consumption is measured as the market value of all goods and 
services, including durable products purchased or received as income in kind by 
households and payments and fees to governments to obtain permits and licenses, and the 
expenditures of non-profit institutions serving households. It excludes purchases of 
dwellings but includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings. All the data are in 
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millions of constant 2005 Uganda Shillings (UGX) prices, and are shown in Figures (3.1) 
and (3.2) below  
Trend Analysis 
 
Trends in fiscal variables are given in Figure (3.1), while the trends in GDP, private 
consumption and exports are in Figure (3.2) %RWK ILJXUHV WUDFN 8JDQGD¶V HFRQRPLF
performance over the period 1972-2008, covering successive phases of mismanagement, 
conflict and economic decline prior to 1988, and the Museveni regime and economic 
stability from the late 1980s.   
 
In 1971, Uganda was considered among those African countries with a chance of 
achieving a GDP growth rate of 7 per cent for the UHVWRIWKHFHQWXU\2¶&RQQHOO
However, that same year, Uganda embarked on a spiral of violence and economic decline 
2¶&RQQHOO. Economic wars, political turmoil, social disorder, a highly over valued 
exchange rate, export taxation and quantitative restrictions on imports were at the root of 
poor economic performance. Public expenditure fell from over 20 per cent of GDP in 1972 
to less than 10 per cent of GDP by 1978 while the tax base and tax yields shrank more 
rapidly on account of new distorting taxes (Fagernäs and Roberts, 2004a). Aid inflows 
from the World Bank and Western countries generally ceased on account of highly 
distorted macroeconomic framework, and probably the tendency of the regime to lean 
towards socialism (Baffoe, 2000; Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 1999) ± so that inflationary 
pressures increased with monetization of the deficit (Fagernäs and Roberts, 2004a).  
 
ODA flows fell from an already low level of 0.2-0.6 per cent of GDP at the beginning of 
1970s to virtually nothing at the end of the decade, then rose to an average of 1.5 per cent 
of GDP between 1981 and 1985 (OECD/DAC data, 2009) during the implementation of 
the first standby arrangement supported by IMF with considerable donor support. This was 
a result of the return of Milton Obote to power in 1980. The only distinct feature in the 
1970s is the high value of total government expenditure (and its current spending 
component) in 1979, which coincides with tKHRYHUWKURZRI,GL$PLQ¶VUHJLPHWKHVHFRQG
oil price shock and the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) at the end of 1970s. 
%HWZHHQDQGUHDO*'3SHUFDSLWDIHOOE\RYHUSHUFHQWSHU\HDU2¶&RQQHOO
2002), qualifying Uganda as a chronic case of economic failure.  
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With political stability and the successful implementation of a World Bank and IMF 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in mid-1980s after the Museveni 
regime was established, Uganda began its recovery, reversing the economic decline of 
1970s and early 1980s. By the late 1980s, Uganda had restored macroeconomic stability, 
and by 1992 it had undergone comprehensive goods and factor markets liberalization; 
down sized the public service; demobilized the army; privatized inefficient and loss 
making state owned enterprises (SOEs) and returned the confiscated property to their 
former Asian owners and established an independent revenue authority (Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA)) to improve tax collection (Bwire and Tamwesigire, 2007; Kasekende 
and Ating - Ego, 1999). Together with the resolve to alleviate poverty and the good 
relationship with major donors made it an attractive target for official aid inflows.  
 
ODA inflows (in absolute terms), increased from UGX 12,489.26 (or equivalently USD 
869.92) million in 1996/97 to UGX 15,990.39 (USD 1,377.12) million in 2008/09 
(OECD/DAC data, 2009), much of which took the form of budget support rather than 
project aid (Berg et al., 2007). As a result, tax revenue and government expenditure 
became more relatively stable than ever in the mid-1990s, with the latter increasing more 
rapidly beginning 1998, rising from 15.9 per cent of GDP in 1998/9 to 21.6 per cent of 
GDP in 2002/3 (Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007). Over the same period, aid 
inflows rose from 9.67 per cent of GDP in 1997/98 to 16.88 per cent of GDP in 2001/2, 
while domestic revenue increased less quickly (declining from 10.3 per cent of GDP in 
1997/8 to 9.6 per cent of GDP in 2001/2) (Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007). 
 
There are two prominent peaks in the ODA flows with one around 1992 and 1993 and the 
VHFRQG EHWZHHQ  DQG  VHH )LJXUH  7KLV FRLQFLGHV ZLWK GRQRUV¶ HIIRUW WR
assist Uganda with the reduction in its external debt burden. During the first peak, the 
country received funds towards its debt reorganization that resulted in retiring of most of 
the commercial loans that had been contracted (Egesa, 2011). The second peak resulted 
from additional funding that was received in the second attempt to rid the country of its 
large debt burden under the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC I and II) debt relief 
initiatives (Egesa, 2011). Besides this, significant donor funding was received to fund 
infrastructure rehabilitation in the early 1990s while the increases during the late 1990s 
was partly due to improvHGFRRUGLQDWLRQRIJRYHUQPHQW¶VVRFLDOSURJUDPVHQVKULQHGLQWKH
first Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997/98, which led to the introduction of 
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the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) in 1998/99 in support of the PEAP (Egesa, 2011). In terms 
of composition, loans accounted for 50-60 per cent of aid flows during the 1980s but 
grants have increased steadily and account for most aid disbursements since 1990 
(Holmgren et al., 1999). The ratio of loans to GDP fell by half from about 8 per cent of 
GDP in the early 1990s to about 4 per cent of GDP in the subsequent years while grants- 
GDP share increased from 2 per cent in 1986 to a high of about 12 per cent in 1992 after 
which it averaged 8 per cent each year up to 2004 (Egesa, 2011). 
Figure 3.1: Trends in Fiscal Variables 
 
Sources:  OECD/DAC (2009) databases and UBOS National Accounts Estimates of 
PDLQ$JJUHJDWHVDQG$XWKRUV¶HVWLPDWHV  
 
The sector allocation of aid over time has been characterized by an adjustment in donor 
funding from heavy capital expenditures in the early 1990s to current expenditures towards 
poverty reduction through the PAF. As shown in Figure (3.1), development expenditures 
matched current expenditures during the early 1990s. However, effective the late 1990s 
current expenditures rose faster than development expenditures probably in line with the 
PEAP objectives. In addition, much of the HIPC resources which became available after 
concluding the HIPC initiative in the late 1990s were directed into key sectors identified 
for poverty reduction such as health, education, agriculture, water and sanitation with 
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much of the expenditures being of current nature (Egesa, 2011). Subsequently, the increase 
in donor inflows through the years have resulted in a rapid increase in current expenditures 
with an equally fast increase in PAF which rose from USD 3.5 million in 1998 to a high of 
USD 142 million in 2004 and was estimated at USD 138 million in 2009 (Egesa, 2011).  
 
Table 3.2 shows selected indicators of the central government fiscal operations between 
2003/04 and 2008/09. Over the period 2003/4-2008/9, total donor support has averaged 43 
per cent of the national budget (Macroeconomic Policy Department, MoFPED) and 
currently stands at some 42.4 per cent (Background to the Budget, 2008/9: 51). ODA flows 
are some 6.61 per cent share of GDP (MoFPED). Current spending rose exponentially at 
an average of 1.6 percentage points per annum over the period 2003/04-2006/07 while 
capital formation spending decayed at an average of 8.4 percentage points per annum over 
the same period. This trend however has changed in the last two periods, and as the table 
shows, current spending has fallen while capital spending has shown a strong increase. 
Though there has been remarkable improvement in current revenue, the current share of 
about 13 per cent of GDP still remains low even by SSA standards.   
 
Table 3.2: Selected Indicators of Central Government Fiscal Operations  
 Indicators 
2003 
/04 
2004 
/05 
2005 
/06 
2006 
/07 
2007 
/08 
2008 
/09 
*RY¶WILQDOFRQVXPSWLRQH[SHQGLWXUH7RWDO
Budget  82.7 83.7 84.3 88.1 87.6 79.8 
Public Investment/ Total Budget 17.3 16.3 15.7 11.9 12.4 20.2 
*RY¶WILQDOconsumption expenditure /GDP 15.3 14.5 14.1 12.7 11.2 10.1 
Public Investment/ GDP 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.9 4.4 4.6 
Aid/Total Budget  52.3 46.9 38.5 48.4 27.6 42.4 
Aid/GDP 11.3 10.5 7.5 9.0 4.9 6.6 
Domestic revenue/GDP 11.8 13.8 12.7 12.8 13.3 12.6 
Tax revenue/GDP n.a 13.6 12.3 12.4 12.9 12.2 
Source:  Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and Macroeconomic Policy Department, MoFPED in 
Background to the Budget, various issues  
 
Turning to Figure (3.2), we see that GDP and private consumption declined at an 
accelerating rate during the 1970s, with no discernible trend during the first half of 1980 
but seems to have increased steadily thereafter. The cumulative effect of inappropriate 
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policies of successive governments together with the second oil price shock and the 
collapse of the EAC at the end of 1970s may explain this brink of collapse. The only 
exception is the high value in 1978/9 in private consumption, which coincides with the 
peak of political and economic instability and subsequent RYHUWKURZRI,GL$PLQ¶VUHJLPH
Economic recovery started in 1986 with the successful implementation of ESAP.  
 
Figure 3.2: Trends in GDP, Private Consumption and Exports 
 
Source: UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates 
 
As seen from the graph, GDP and private consumption plots move together, although (as 
one may expect), the former plot is consistently above the latter. This suggests they may be 
highly correlated and thus, may signal WKDW 8JDQGD¶V *'3 JURZWK has, on average 
expanded household living standards. In fact, over the sample period, Uganda has 
witnessed declining trends in income poverty, which fell from 44 per cent in 1997/98 
(Appleton et al., 1999) to 38.4 per cent in 2002/03 and further to 31.3 per cent in 2005/06 
(UBOS, 2006; Appleton, 2001). There has also been significant reductions achieved in 
HIV/AIDS prevalence (Nannyonjo and Okello, 2008; Okidi et al., 2002), and in the late 
1990s, the country achieved universal primary education (McGee, 2000). Exports 
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exhibited a steady decline in the 1970s, remained moderately low through the 1980s and 
increased above its historically low levels thereafter. 
 
The decline in exports in the 1970s is probably because exports were discriminated against 
through the tax system, price and marketing controls and the overvaluation of the 
exchange rate, which encouraged outward smuggling of exports (Kasekende and Atingi-
Ego, 1999). As a result, all exports except for coffee collapsed (leaving exports to be 
highly concentrated in coffee) (Collier and Reinikka, 2001 and Henstridge, 1996), and this 
also meant that changes in world prices were not passed through to farmers. Effective 1992 
however, the government underwent comprehensive goods and factor markets 
liberalization-rescinding massive implicit taxation by liberalizing financial and foreign 
exchange markets as well as coffee marketing; signalling a conscious effort by the 
JRYHUQPHQW WR LPSURYH WKH µSDVV-WKURXJK¶RI H[SRUWSURFHHGV WR IDUPHUV7KLVPD\KHOS
explain why exports, and private consumption and GDP appear to move together in the 
latter period-a history that provides a useful frame-work for the next chapter which 
examines how, the public sector mediated by aid has over time impacted on the growth of 
private consumption in Uganda. The potential regime or level shift from 1988 and 
transitory blip in 1979/80 are accounted for in the empirical analysis. 
 
3.5 Exploratory Data Description 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The statistical description of the level data in Figures (3.1) and (3.2) is presented in Table 
3.3. The table contains a summary of the commonly used statistical data descriptors. 
Comparing the minimum, maximum and standard deviation suggests wide dispersion of 
the data points for each series without exception. The mean and median for all series (with 
the exception of GC) are not numerically different, suggesting impotence of outliers in the 
data. The Jarque-Bera (J-B) statistics (Mukherjee, White and Wuyts, 1998) suggests 
normal distribution is not rejected (for A, DB and GK), is weakly supported (for G, GC and 
TR) and is rejected (for PC and X). The J-B statistics for G and GC are not statistically 
different, which probably suggests that the behaviour of G is dominated by GC.      
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics  
 A DB G GC GK TR X PC 
 Mean  8911.991  373.2584  15333.57  10643.32  4690.250  8282.460  5929.902  69448.48 
 Median  9895.760  541.6023  10387.18  7011.720  3622.220  5239.507  4656.970  56829.17 
 Maximum  22157.33  2603.623  36633.31  25552.16  11251.79  27494.23  19224.58  190606.8 
 Minimum  141.6200 -2165.340  4948.450  2334.040  1706.970  282.7985  1036.290  13594.49 
 Std. Dev.  7421.362  1322.810  10205.15  7598.886  2757.660  7096.173  4766.058  42466.54 
 Skewness  0.230086 -0.100861  0.911189  0.904180  0.758426  1.145152  1.527921  1.171293 
 Kurtosis  1.630121  1.952707  2.364289  2.334927  2.346647  3.618367  4.472371  3.725377 
         
 Jarque-Bera  3.219504  1.753666  5.742997  5.723419  4.205221  8.676299  17.73848  9.271403 
 Probability  0.199937  0.416099  0.056614  0.057171  0.122137  0.013061  0.000141  0.009699 
         
 Observations  37  37  37  37  37  37  37  37 
Notes: A = aid; DB = domestic borrowing; G = total government spending; GC = current spending; GK = capital spending, TR = tax revenue; X = exports; and PC = 
private consumption expenditure. All the data are in millions of constant 2005 UGX prices. 
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The order of Integration 
 
As a precursor to empirical analysis of time series models, it is crucial that the data are 
investigated and tested for order of integration. It is customary to begin with the graphical 
expositions of the level and first difference of the series to reveal important data features. 
The series in level is given in Figures (3.1 & 3.2), and exhibit trend like behaviour over 
time (i.e. trending). The first difference is provided in Figure (3.3), and appears stationary 
around trend (i.e. trend-stationary).  
 
Both level and first difference plots point to possible breaks associated with outlier 
observations in 1978-79 (for total public spending, current spending, private consumption 
and to a small extent, exports) and a slight but detectable change in behaviour from about 
1988 (this appears to occur in all the series to different degrees except for domestic 
borrowing and exports).  
 
The former corresponds to the climax of the decade of economic collapse and social 
disorder in Uganda (Collier and Reinikka, 2001; Baffoe, 2000; Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 
1999; Jamal, 1988) and possibly the second oil price shock and the breakdown  of the East 
African Community (EAC) in 1977 (Niringiye, 2009; Jerven, 2010).  The latter could be a 
result of a shift in policy regime after the Museveni regime was established in 1987, 
notably from a regulated to a deregulated system following the effective implementation of 
broad economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) that started in 1986 (Bwire and 
Tamwesigire, 2007; Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 1999) and was associated with large 
increases in aid inflows on a scale that Uganda had never previously received. 
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Figure 3.3: Series in First Difference 
 
Fiscal variables 
Private consumption and Exports 
 
Sources:  OECD/DAC (2009) databases and UBOS National Accounts Estimates of 
PDLQ$JJUHJDWHVDQG$XWKRUV¶HVWLPDWHV  
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Finally, we conducted a formal Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test (ADF) test 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981), to determine the series order of integration and the degree 
of differencing required to induce stationarity. The ADF specification estimated to 
generate results in Table 3.4 is given in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2 of the thesis. In the table, 
0 J is the null hypothesis that the sequence { ty } contains a unit root. This is rejected if 
the t-statistic is less than the critical value of the WW - statistic (for 50 n usable 
observations scaled by the 5 per cent critical values) reported by Dickey and Fuller (1981) 
(see Table A in Enders, 2010: 488).  
 
Whether the data generating process (DGP) is characterized by non-stationarity with or 
without a linear deterministic trend and a drift, and non-stationarity with or without a 
linear deterministic trend is also evaluated by testing joint hypotheses on the 0, cJ and 2c
coefficients. As noted earlier, under non-stationarity, the computed ADF- test statistic does 
not follow a standard t-distribution, but rather a dickey Fuller (DF) distribution and so the 
critical values for these joint tests are also non-standard. Instead, they follow the non-
standard F-statistics denoted by the iI - statistics ( 2I and 3I statistics here). The test for the 
joint significance or otherwise of a constant term, time trend and non-stationarity is given 
in the table as 020    Jcc and is tested using 2I - statistic, while the joint hypothesis 
that ty contains unit roots and no linear deterministic trend, i.e. 02   cJ is tested using 
the 3I -statistic. The null hypothesis for these tests is that the data are generated by the 
restricted model and the alternative hypothesis is that the data are generated by the 
unrestricted model. Thus, if iI (calculated) is smaller than iI (critical) (reported by Dickey 
and Fuller for 50 n usable observations scaled by the 5 per cent critical values), we 
accept the restricted model. Or we reject the null hypothesis if iI (calculated) is greater 
than iI (critical). Critical values for the iI - statistics are obtained from Table B in Enders 
(2010: 489).  
 
As expected, test results in Table 3.4 indicate that the series are  1I in levels, but no time 
trend or draft. However, ADF unit root test is known to have (very) low power if the series 
has undergone a (permanent) regime shift during the period under consideration (Harris 
and Sollis, 2005: 57) or if there are outliers in regression residuals. We have already 
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pointed to presence of an outlier observation which occurs around 1979 and a slight but 
detectable change in behaviour from about 1988. Opoku-Afari et al. (2004) argue that 
shocks and reforms are likely to have a fundamental impact on economic behaviour and 
need to be included in the deterministic part of the model, and is likely to bias estimates 
and result in invalid inference if ignored (Juselius, 2003). Moreover, Perron (1989: 1371), 
Hendry and Neale (1991) and Campos et al. (1996) argue that in the presence of structural 
breaks, the various Dickey-Fuller test statistics are biased towards the non-rejection of a 
unit root.  
 
Table 3.4: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit root test
 
 
ADF test in Level
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tA  
-3.049 
(-3.50) 
-.946 
(5.13) 
2.754 
(6.73) 
0 
  1I  
 
-6.705 
(-3.50)  0I  
tTR  
-1.143 
(-3.50) 
-1.867 
(5.13) 
2.704 
(6.73) 0  1I  
 
-6.550 
(-3.50)  0I  
tG  
-1.476 
(-3.50) 
-1.526 
(5.13) 
2.951 
(6.73) 1  1I  
 
-8.350 
(-3.50)  0I  
tGC  
-1.568 
(-3.50) 
-1.270 
(5.13) 
2.663 
(6.73) 1  1I  
 
-8.646 
(-3.50)  0I  
tGK  
-1.515 
(-3.50) 
-.641 
(5.13) 
2.279 
(6.73) 1  1I  
 
-8.646 
(-3.50)  0I  
tDB  
-2.857 
(-3.50) 
1.244 
(5.13) 
-1.130 
(6.73) 0  1I  
 
-8.188 
(-3.50)  0I  
tX  
.0293 
(-3.50) 
-2.069 
(5.13) 
2.421 
(6.73) 1  1I  
 
-5.810 
(-3.50)  0I  
tPC  
.862 
(-3.50) 
-2.185 
(5.13) 
1.039 
(6.73) 2  1I  
 
-9.600 
(-3.50)  0I  
Notes:  A = aid; DB = domestic borrowing; G = total government spending; GC = current spending; GK = 
capital spending, TR = tax revenue; X = exports; and PC = private consumption expenditure. All 
variables are measured in millions of constant 2005 UGX prices. Akaike Information criterion 
[AIC], Schwarz Bayesian criterion [SC] and Hannan-Quinn Criterion [HQ] were used (maximum 
set at 9 lags). An unrestricted intercept and restricted linear trend were included in the ADF 
equation when conducting unit root test of all the series in levels. Numbers in parenthesis are the 5 
per cent critical values, unless otherwise stated. All unit-root non-stationary variables are stationary 
in first differences. 
 
Source: $XWKRU¶VComputations using E-Views 7.2 
 
It is argued that using such a test would lead one to believe that most series contain a unit 
root and hence are non-stationary when in reality the series could simply be trend-
3-Evolution of CVAR Methods and the Data                                                   Thomas Bwire    
  
The University Of Nottingham 72 
 
stationary but characterized by a structural break, which the test would fail to take into 
account (Nelson and Plosser, 1982). However, the series at hand is too short to enable us 
reliably conduct unit root tests that allow for breaks in trend. Moreover, whilst it is 
necessary that we check and test for breaks using various methods that have been 
developed in the literature, a Chow test for structural breaks has not been performed. This 
is because imposing a break point in a small sample (like ours) may render the test less 
informative.17 The econometric methodology, the data and unit ±root test results discussed 
in this chapter forms a basis for the CVAR analysis in the subsequent chapters.  
                                          
17 Derived probability estimates and associated critical values are likely to be unreliable for inference and 
may lack power owing to diminishing degrees of freedom for each of the resulting regressions (Mackinnon, 
1996) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF AID ON CENTRAL 

Ǯ	

 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter is motivated by the Fiscal response models (FRMs) (see McGillivray and 
Morrissey, 2000, 2004), which offer fiscal insights into how donors could expect their aid 
to impact on the fiscal behaviour of recipient governments, i.e. affect spending, tax effort 
and domestic borrowing. Aid inflows are expected to be associated with a direct and 
significant effect on public spending (Morrissey 2012). Aid may also be expected to affect 
taxation either because aid influences tax effort or because reforms linked to aid 
conditionality affects tax rates or the tax base (Morrissey, 2012; Greenaway and Morrissey, 
1993). It could also be expected to be associated with lower domestic borrowing (Adam 
DQG2¶&RQQHOO$]DPDQG/DIIRQWDVGRQRUFRQGLWLRQDOLW\RIWHQUHTXLUHVWKH
aid recipient to reduce the budget deficit (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000).  
 
In principal, because most of the aid that is spent in the country goes to (or through) the 
government, or finances services that would otherwise be a demand on the budget 
(Morrissey, 2012), effectiveness of aid depends on public sector fiscal behaviour 
(McGillivray, 1994; Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001). 
This chapter investigates the impact of aid on fiscal behaviour, i.e. effects on public 
spending, tax revenue and borrowing in Uganda.  
 
As noted earlier, Uganda is an interesting case study for the fiscal effects of aid as for over 
twenty years significant aid inflows have supported government spending in an 
environment of low tax revenue. The aid-GDP share, which was about 1 per cent in 1980 
rose significantly to about 5 per cent in 1986 reaching a peak of about 19 per cent in 1992, 
and averaged about 11 per cent between 1990 and 2006 (Egesa, 2011; Mugume, 2008). In 
terms of the budget, total donor support (both direct budget support and project aid) has 
averaged 43 per cent of the national budget over the 2003/4-2008/9 period 
(Macroeconomic Policy department, MoFPED in Background to the Budget, 2008/9).  
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The empirical analysis in the chapter is founded on the econometric methodology and unit-
root test results discussed respectively in Section 3.3 and Section 3.5 of Chapter 3. Based 
on this, we treat the core fiscal variables - tax revenue (TR), aid (A), domestic borrowing 
(DB) and total public spending (G) ± as unit root non-stationary, i.e.  1I , so could form 
(an) equilibrium relation(s) in a 4-variable VAR model. The fact that the series are non-
stationary suggests a multiplicative rather than additive model specification, which under 
log transformation is brought back into additive form. However, this transformation is 
innocuous as long as the series data points are strictly positive or are at least not too close 
to zero (Juselius et al., 2011). As Figure (3.1) shows, this is problematic in the case of 
domestic borrowing, jeopardizing the validity of log-transformations. Thus, we chose to 
use all series in non-log specification, which in addition to the advantage of not reducing 
the already small sample addresses some of our key questions of interest. For example, by 
how much would the level government spending change following a one million UGX 
level injection of aid?. The analysis is executed using CATS in RATS, version 2 (by J.G. 
Dennis, H. Hansen, S. Johansen and K. Juselius, Estima 2005), unless otherwise stated. 
CATS in RATS is preferred because it is a tailor made toolbox with a number of features, 
probably not available elsewhere. This includes automatic model selection based on 
CATSmining procedure, small sample correction of tests for the cointegrating rank and 
hypotheses on the long-run ȕ . It also includes hypotheses on the long-run Į  and easy 
loading of restricted model structures. 
 
The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the determination of 
the DGP for cointegration analysis, while the residual misspecification tests of the 
appropriate DGP model is discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 describes the 
determination of the cointegration rank and the empirical CVAR model is given in Section 
4.5. The long-run fiscal estimates, long-run structural analysis and testable fiscal 
hypotheses are presented in Section 4.6 and the common trends analysis is given in Section 
4.7. Estimates of a disaggregated variant model are given in Section 4.8, while the 
conclusions and implications for policy are drawn in Section 4.9. 
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4.2 Determination of the DGP for Cointegration Analysis 
 
In this section, we evaluate the existence of equilibrium relation(s) using the Johansen 
(1988) trace statistic test18 for cointegration, also recommended in Lütkepohl et al., (2001: 
304). The trace test is a simple likelihood ratio test to discriminate between those 
eigenvalues which correspond to stationary relations and those eigenvalues which 
correspond to non-stationary relations. It is designed to test the restricted model H(r) with 
rank of r against the general model H(p) with full rank p. Central to cointegration analysis 
is a choice of the deterministic components (trend, constant and dummies) and the lag-
length that describes an appropriate specification of the DGP. These have an important 
implication for cointegration, both statistically and economically (Opoku-Afari et al., 2004; 
Johansen, 1994).  
 
Specification of Deterministic Terms and Determination of the Lag-Length  
 
Given the visual inspection of the data in figure 3.1 and the discussion in Section 3.3 of 
Chapter 3, it is reasonable to modify the standard unrestricted CVAR model given by (3.4) 
with a restricted trend and an unrestricted constant in the VECM at least initially. The 
variables in levels appear to be trending and we are not sure whether these linear trends 
will cancel out in the cointegrating relation. Including an unrestricted constant allows for 
linear trends in both cointegrating space and in the variables in levels and produces a non-
zero mean in the cointegrating relation. Furthermore, it avoids creation of quadratic trends 
in the levels, which would arise if both the constant and trend are unrestricted. Further 
justification for this type of specification is in Juselius (2006: 99-100).  
 
When choosing the lag-length we want to reduce the number of lags as much as possible to 
get as simple a model as is possible, but at the same time we want enough lags to remove 
autocorrelation of the error terms. The appropriate lag-length ( U ) of the VAR is 
determined using the minimum of the SC and HQ information criteria, but subject to non-
rejection of the time independence of the residuals. With a relatively small sample, it is not 
                                          
18
 In the test, the determination of the cointegrating rank, r relies on a top-to-bottom sequential procedure. 
This is asymptotically more correct than the bottom-to-top alternative (i.e. Max-Eigen statistic) [Juselius, 
2006: 131-134]. 
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possible to test long lag-lengths.19 As aid impact is likely to be contemporaneous or with 
relatively quick adjustment dynamics (also see Martins, 2010), we started with lag 2. Thus, 
considering a 4-dimensional CVAR model, an unrestricted constant, a restricted trend, and 
letting k=2 (to facilitate the serach for an initial model specification), and given that the 
series are  1I we estimated a VECM of the form 
 
tit
k
i
t İtȕĮȝyīyȕĮy 0 c'c ' 

 
¦1
1
11-t  , t  «T     (4.1) 
Where  2,0~ GH iidt , 
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««
¬
ª
 
TR
A
G
DB
ty ,  1ȝīȕĮ ,,, 1c are freely varying parameters to be 
estimated, 0ȝ is a  1up vector of an unrestricted constant, and tȕĮ c is a  1up  vector of 
linear trend restricted to lie in the cointegrating space. Based on this model, the appropriate 
lag-length as shown in Table 4.1 is determined.  
 
Table 4.1: Lag Length Determination 
Model (k) Regr SC HQ LM(1) 
VAR (2) 10 61.241 60.077 0.333 
VAR (1) 6 60.619 59.920 0.329 
Notes: SC: Schwarz information criterion and HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion; LM (1): LM order 
autocorrelation test at lag 1. 
 
Test results for minimising the information criteria are given in Table 4.1. As the 
recommendation is to select the lowest value for the information criteria, both SC and HQ 
suggest k=1.  Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004) and Lütkepohl (1991: Chap. 5) show that SC 
is strongly asymptotically consistent providing the actual DGP is a finite order 
autoregressive (AR) process, and the set maximum lag order is larger than the true order. 
Even where SC and HQ yield conflicting results, they show that SC would result in a more 
parsimonious specification (with fewer parameters) than HQ. Thus, VAR(1) could be a 
reasonable approximation of the DGP, but subject to non-rejection of the time 
independence of the residuals. Accordingly, the system is subjected to the autocorrelation 
                                          
19 Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004) VXJJHVW WKDW DQ ³H[FHVVLYHO\ ODUJH YDOXH RI pmax [maximum lags for test] PD\EHSUREOHPDWLF´VLQFHLWDIIHFWVWKHRYHUDOO7\SH,HUURURIWKHWHVWLQJVHTXHQFH  
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Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Johansen, 1995: 21-23). Test results are presented in the 
last column of Table 4.1. The presence of autocorrelation is rejected for both VAR(1) and 
VAR(2). While this suggests that VAR(2) could as well potentially serve the purpose at 
hand, there is a trade-off considering the small sample. Moreover, it is not a choice model 
as per the information criteria. Thus, based on the information criteria, together with the 
LM test, we adopt VAR(1) without significantly affecting the degrees of freedom.  
 
Given 1 k , then 01  ī and therefore, the lagged first difference terms stacked in 1tǻ\
drops out, so (4.1) is reduces to 
 
tt İtȕĮȝyȕĮy 0 cc ' 1-t  , t  «T     (4.2) 
In (4.2), we no longer have short-run dynamics and all terms are defined as before. In what 
follows, we assess the suitability of this model in terms of a battery of residual 
misspecification tests (see inter alia Godfrey, 1988). 
 
4.3 Residual Misspecification Tests 
 
In this section, we focus on the formal system residual misspecification tests to assess the 
validity of the assumptions underlying the VAR(1) model under a restricted deterministic 
trend  assumption. This comprises: the residuals plots; normality; autocorrelation; ARCH 
effects and the models goodness of fit tests. 
 
Residuals Plots 
 
We start with the graphical inspection of the residuals since this can help identify potential 
problems. The figure below is a panel containing 4 plots, for each error correction model 
equation: (a) Actual and fitted values (top left); (b) standardized residuals (bottom left); (c) 
autocorrelations (top right); and (d) histogram (bottom right). Overlaid on the histogram is 
the estimated density function of the standardized residuals (appears as a dotted line in 
print) and the density of the standard normal distribution. It also contains some statistics: 
the univariate normality test by Doornik and Hansen-DH (2008) and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-K-S (Lilliefors, 1967) test for normality, and the Jarque-Bera test computed by 
WKH5$76¶VWDWLVWLFVLQVWUXFWLRQ'HQQLV.  
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Figure 4.1: Actual, Fitted and Standardized Residuals, Autocorrelations and Histograms
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The plots show an outlying observation in the residuals of G equation that occurs around 
1979. The actual and fitted residuals show a slight but detectable change in behaviour in 
most of the series equations (from about 1988). This notwithstanding, the histograms 
portray reasonably normal distribution behaviour. 
 
Table 4.2 reports results for autocorrelation, the Doornik and Hansen-DH (2008) test for 
multivariate and univariate normality, multivariate LM test for the ARCH effects and the 
PRGHO¶VJRRGQHVVRI ILW. From the results, we cannot reject the null of no first or second 
order autocorrelation (see LM(1) and LM(2). The multivariate test for ARCH rejects the 
presence of first order ARCH effects, although it is moderate in the system. Rahbek et al. 
(2002) cited in Juselius (2006) and Dennis (2006) show that the rank tests are robust to 
moderate ARCH effects, so this may not be a problem here. In the table, both measures of 
goodness of fit, i.e. the trace correlation (overall measure of goodness of fit, which is 
roughly an average 2R in the p VAR equations) and the 2R for each error correction 
equation suggest that our model captures, to a reasonable extent, the correlation among the 
fiscal variables in Uganda. 
 
The hypothesis of multivariate normality is not strongly supported. Looking at the 
univariate statistics, normality of the error term is rejected at the conventional 10 percent 
level of significance for G, A and DB. As the standard normal distribution has Skewness of 
0 and kurtosis of 3, we see from the results that G, DB and A have excess kurtosis (fat 
tails). In addition, G has a large degree of Skewness (this is usually due to a problem with 
large outliers). CVAR model is quite robust towards excess kurtosis, but not towards the 
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presence of Skewness. We observe non-normality of the error terms in G, DB and A 
equations, although the residuals are not autocorrelated, which is very important.  
 
Table 4.2: Residual Analysis 
Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
       DDB         DG         DA         DTR 
      843.3586  1589.9078  2477.0003  1272.3122 
DDB   1.000 
DG    -0.005     1.000 
DA    -0.167     0.031      1.000 
DTR   0.151      -0.038     -0.001     1.000 
 
LOG(|Sigma|)                      =  58.090 
Information Criteria: SC          =  60.479 
                      H-Q         =  59.792 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.355 
 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
Ljung-Box(9):         ChiSqr(128) = 122.406 [0.623] 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  19.125 [0.262] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =  17.442 [0.358] 
 
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(8)   =  22.308 [0.004] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) = 128.796 [0.028] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 223.949 [0.118] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
 
    Mean   Std.Dev   Skewness Kurtosis Maximum  Minimum 
DDB  0.000  843.359     0.732   4.411  2591.759 -1922.272 
DG  -0.000 1589.908     1.060   5.812  5478.301 -3515.626 
DA  -0.000 2477.000    -0.059   4.324  5296.400 -7447.000 
DTR  0.000 1272.312     0.469   2.468  3037.071 -2120.722 
 
    ARCH(1)           Normality          R-Squared 
DDB  0.649   [0.421]    5.703  [0.058]    0.345 
DG   2.686   [0.101]    9.814  [0.007]    0.422 
DA   0.022   [0.882]    7.569  [0.023]    0.259 
DTR  0.002   [0.968]    2.591  [0.274]    0.451 
Notes: The multivariate diagnostic test is the chi-square for the joint significance of the variables. Null 
hypothesis is: VEC residuals are Gaussian errors.  
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8VLQJ&$76PLQLQJSURFHGXUH³Find large residuals´ZHHVWLPDWHDQGUHSRrt results for 
extreme values of standardized residuals scaled by the 5 per cent critical values of 3.1934 
simulated for T=36 (i.e. effective sample in the study). Thus, any standard residual larger 
than a threshold of 3.1934 is considered an outlier. Based on the results in Table 4.3, the 
largest residuals are in the G equation (i.e. 3.397). This corresponds to the climax of the 
decade of economic collapse and social disorder in Uganda.   
 
Table 4.3: Extreme Values of Standardized Residuals 
Date Entry SRes_DB SRes_G SRes_A SRes_TR 
1973:01 1 -0.196 -0.097 0.674 0.260 
1974:01 2 0.338 0.447 0.406 -0.237 
1975:01 3 -0.609 0.120 0.304 0.804 
1976:01 4 0.446 -0.247 0.067 0.553 
1977:01 5 -0.988 -0.987 -0.102 -0.236 
1978:01 6 -0.661 -0.887 -0.038 1.598 
1979:01 7 0.094 3.397 * -0.032 -1.138 
1980:01 8 -0.192 -2.180 -0.651 -1.029 
1981:01 9 0.678 1.431 -0.180 -0.918 
1982:01 10 0.697 0.328 -0.868 0.649 
1983:01 11 0.034 0.455 -0.392 0.589 
1984:01 12 0.574 0.838 -0.023 0.195 
1985:01 13 0.256 -1.041 -0.307 -1.190 
1986:01 14 0.374 -0.848 -1.548 -0.978 
1987:01 15 -0.011 -0.247 -0.343 -1.644 
1988:01 16 0.429 0.374 -0.412 -1.115 
1989:01 17 -0.805 0.712 0.073 2.039 
1990:01 18 1.371 -0.759 2.108 0.896 
1991:01 19 2.197 -0.109 2.066 -0.051 
1992:01 20 -0.868 -0.082 0.184 -0.955 
1993:01 21 0.037 0.116 -0.829 0.893 
1994:01 22 -1.035 -0.345 -0.626 1.547 
1995:01 23 -0.451 -1.402 0.577 0.072 
1996:01 24 -0.143 -0.410 -0.973 0.865 
1997:01 25 -0.607 -1.156 0.508 -0.039 
1998:01 26 -1.116 -0.776 -0.427 -0.756 
1999:01 27 1.288 0.067 -0.608 0.855 
2000:01 28 -2.247 0.848 1.806 -1.085 
2001:01 29 -0.503 0.332 -0.036 0.168 
2002:01 30 -1.161 2.272 -0.354 -0.176 
2003:01 31 0.330 -0.188 1.778 -1.066 
2004:01 32 -0.273 0.110 0.784 -0.600 
2005:01 33 -1.167 0.162 0.381 -0.540 
2006:01 34 3.030 0.032 -2.964 0.463 
2007:01 35 1.032 0.156 1.026 2.354 
2008:01 36 -0.173 -0.437 -1.030 -1.046 
Notes: * Maximum Value occurring at 1979:01; 5% C.V = 3.1934 
 
 
From the actual and standardized residuals for G equation, we observe two non-cumulated 
blips (one in 1979 and the other in 1980) with opposite directions in level plus two 
cancelling cumulated mean shifts (one before 1979 and the other after 1980, 1979 and 
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1980 exclusive). As a common way of dealing with outlier observations, this suggests the 
need to generate and incorporate a transitory innovation dummy in the model, 79dum = 
(...,0, 0, 1, -1, 0, 0,...), i.e. 1979=1, 1980=-1, 0 elsewhere.20  In addition, inspection of 
actual and fitted residuals reveal a slight but detectable shift in behaviour from about 1988 
corresponding to a change in institutional environment (ESAP reforms) and the Museveni 
regime. This institutional knowledge motivates the inclusion of a shift dummy, 
 ,...1,1,1,0,0,0...,88  D , taking the value 1 for each year after 1988 inclusive, 0 otherwise 
to capture the µ(6$3UHIRUPLQWHUYHQWLRQand the Museveni regime effectV¶ 
 
So allowing for transitory blip and level shift, we restrict 79dum and 88D to lie in the 
cointegrating space, albeit noting that 79dum cancels out as a consequence of 
cointegration.21 In the residual analysis in Table 4.4, we consider whether this modification 
improves the specification of the model. From the univariate analysis, the errors for G are 
now normally distributed. In effect, the specification of the model is slightly improved, but 
we still reject multivariate normality (ChiSqr(8) = 20.878 [0.007]). This suggests that the 
two variant models, i.e. without (and with dummies) are not statistically different, so 
dummies may be impotent in the model. This notwithstanding, the good news is that 
estimates of the VAR model are robust to deviations from normality provided residuals are 
not autocorrelated. Furthermore, as the subsequent trace - test results will show, we obtain 
a cointegrating relation without dummies, but cointegration disappears when dummies are 
incorporated22 in the deterministic part of the model. Although this is puzzling, theoretical 
predictions would suggest existence of a budgetary equilibrium among the fiscal variables, 
especially that we have allowed for a complete fiscal representation (albeit with some 
omissions so that we are not estimating an identity). Thus, we let a model without 
dummies (basic model) to override the alternate specification (i.e. model with dummies) so 
that subsequent analysis in the rest of the chapter is based on the basic model.    
 
 
                                          
20
 Graphical exposition of this transitory innovation dummy is available with the author on request.    
21 In the cointegrating space, a transitory innovation dummy produces two non-cumulated blips with 
opposite directions but no adjustment after wards as they cancel each other  
22 Trace-test results of a model with dummies can be obtained from the author on request 
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Table 4.4: Residual Analysis with Modification 
Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
       DDB         DG         DA         DTR 
      804.2523   982.1165  2281.6572  1168.6320 
DDB   1.000 
DG    0.039      1.000 
DA   -0.143     -0.048     1.000 
DTR   0.308     -0.180    -0.069     1.000 
 
LOG(|Sigma|)                      =  56.586 
Information Criteria: SC          =  60.169 
                      H-Q         =  59.138 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.517 
 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
Ljung-Box(9):         ChiSqr(128) = 147.419 [0.115] 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(16)  =  22.094 [0.140] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(16)  =  12.276 [0.725] 
 
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(8)   =  20.878 [0.007] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(100) =  94.777 [0.629] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(200) = 215.910 [0.209] 
 
Univariate Statistics 
 
    Mean   Std.Dev   Skewness Kurtosis Maximum  Minimum 
DDB  0.000  804.252     1.077   4.087  2387.962 -1418.509 
DG   0.000  982.117     0.746   3.986  3064.238 -1682.427 
DA  -0.000 2281.657    -0.117   4.297  4931.003 -6932.060 
DTR -0.000 1168.632     0.154   2.449  2603.715 -2408.370 
 
    ARCH(1)           Normality          R-Squared 
DDB  1.969   [0.161]    8.054  [0.018]    0.404 
DG   0.104   [0.748]    4.363  [0.113]    0.779 
DA   0.010   [0.919]    7.323  [0.026]    0.371 
DTR  0.218   [0.641]    0.249  [0.883]    0.537 
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4.4 Trace test Statistics for Cointegration  
 
Having determined the appropriate specification of the DGP, i.e. VAR(1), we use the trace 
statistic test to determine the cointegration rank, and also test for the presence of unit roots 
in the multivariate framework given the cointegration space.23 Note (for emphasis) that we 
specify the deterministic component of the cointegrating space to include an unrestricted 
constant, a restricted deterministic trend, and exclude dummies. Including dummies would 
impact on the distribution of the test statistics under the null hypothesis and thus should be 
used as indicative only. 
   
-RKDQVHQ¶Vtrace test has however been shown to have finite sample bias with the 
implication that it often indicates too many cointegrating relations, i.e. the test is over-
sized. A number of simulation studies suggest that there can be substantial size and power 
distortions, mainly because the asymptotic distributions are poor approximations of the 
true distribution in small samples (Juselius, 2006: 140-2; Cheung and Lai, 1993b; Reimers, 
1992).  Hence, for a small sample like the one at our disposal, we also report the small 
sample Bartlett correction which ensures a correct test size (Johansen, 2002 given in 
Dennis, 2006: 159-60).  
 
Table 4.5-RKDQVHQ¶V&RLQWHJUDWLRQtrace test Results    
p-r r Eig.value Trace Trace* Frac95 P-Value P-Value* 
4 0 0.521 66.002 61.916 63.659 0.031 0.070 
3 1 0.413 39.535 37.835 42.770 0.104 0.148 
2 2 0.303 20.368 19.854 25.731 0.211 0.238 
1 3 0.185 7.374 7.310 12.448 0.316 0.323 
Notes: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend restricted; *: the small sample corrected test statistic 
(Dennis, 2006: 159-60); Frac95: the 5% critical value of the test of H(r) against H(p). The critical values as 
well as the p-values are approximated using the * - distribution (Doornix, 1998).  
   
Trace test suggests presence of one equilibrium (stationary) relation, even when correcting 
for small sample bias among the variables at the 10 per cent level of significance. However, 
Juselius et al. (2011: 12) show that the determination of the cointegrating rank is often 
crucial and may have a significant impact on the analysis. Specifically, the formal (trace) 
test becomes literally uninformative (i.e. the test power is often unacceptably low) for 
                                          
23 This could serve as a good robust check for the ADF univariate unit root test results implemented in E-
views 7.1 and reported in Table 3.4.   
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samples as small as 40-45. With as few as 36 observations in our case, this may be of even 
greater concern. Therefore, we do not exclusively rely on the trace test but follow the 
suggestions in Juselius (2006: 142) and complement the standard analysis with some 
sensitivity checks. These include examination of: the roots of the companion matrix and 
corresponding eigenvalues, and graphs of the cointegrating relations. 
 
The roots of the companion matrix are equal to the inverse of the roots of the characteristic 
equation (Juselius, 2006: 50-2). y{t} is stationary when the roots of the characteristic 
equation are all outside the unit circle or equivalently when the roots of the companion 
matrix are all inside the unit circle. In practice, we need to choose the rank so that the 
largest unrestricted root is far from a unit root, i.e. it has modulus lower than 1. The model 
here is defined for 4 p , 1 k implying 4 ukp roots in the characteristic polynomial 
(i.e. we assume full rank of the Ȇ matrix). Roots of the companion matrix for the model, 
including the corresponding sorted eigenvalues are respectively presented in Figure 4.2 
and Table 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.2: Roots of Companion Matrix 
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Table 4.6: Roots of the companion matrix 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(4) 
      Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1 0.944     0.000   0.944    0.000 
Root2 0.648     0.000   0.648    0.000 
Root3 0.328    -0.213   0.391   -0.577 
Root4 0.328     0.213   0.391    0.577 
 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(3) 
      Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root2 0.947     0.000   0.947    0.000 
Root3 0.317     0.209   0.379    0.583 
Root4 0.317    -0.209   0.379   -0.583 
 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(2) 
      Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root2 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root3 0.945     0.000   0.945    0.000 
Root4 0.147     0.000   0.147    0.000 
 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(1) 
      Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root2 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root3 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root4 0.148     0.000   0.148    0.000 
 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(0) 
      Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root2 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root3 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
Root4 1.000     0.000   1.000    0.000 
 
 
In Figure 4.2, all roots are inside the unit circle, and if we start from Table 4.6 with the 
highest possible rank, i.e. 4 r , there is 1 root (root1) with moduli very close to unit, 
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which we in practice cannot distinguish from a unit root. With 3 r we impose one unit 
root on the process, but we still have one root (root2) with moduli very close to unit. For 
2 r we impose two unit roots and only one root (root3) has moduli very close to unit. For 
1 r we impose three unit roots and now the modulus of the largest unrestricted root is 
0.148, which is far from a unit root, i.e. there are no more unit roots. The eigenvalues of 
the companion matrix indicate that 1 r seems reasonably well supported by the data. 
 
Plots of this potential cointegrating relation comprise two sets of residuals, tZ1ÖE c and tR1ÖE c . 
The former is the equilibrium error as a function of short run dynamics and deterministic 
components, while the latter concentrates out the lagged short-run dynamics (i.e. the 
concentrated model. Given the DGP (i.e. lag-length 1 k ) in the model, tZ1ÖE c and tR1ÖE c
are similar as this nullifies the short run adjustment effects embodied in tZ1ÖE c which tR1ÖE c
corrects for.24As the Z-form (full model) and the R-form (concentrated) versions of the 
model are similar, there may be no need of reporting both. So inference is based on the 
concentrated model, tR1ÖE c in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: Residuals of Cointegrating Relation 
 
This appears to be stationary and as pointed out earlier, it is the statistical analogue of the 
budgetary equilibrium as predicted by fiscal response theory. Since this cointegrating 
relation is stationary, and given the theoretical expectation, suggests the presence of one 
cointegrating vector and also points to impotence of the dummies (no evidence of a break 
                                          
24
 itZE cÖ and itRE cÖ pairs for each of the remaining ( rp  ) potential cointegrating relations are similar, but 
look non-stationary. These are not reported but can be obtained from the Authors on request.   
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in the long-run relation). All this checks are in conformity with the formal (trace) test, and 
together, suggest that 1 r seems reasonably well supported by the data.  
 
Following the confirmation of the cointegrating rank, we tested for the presence of unit 
roots within the multivariate framework using the CATS procedure. The procedure 
expresses the hypothesis of stationarity of variable iy  as  
 
     201 ,: EEE  OH , 
 
Where iİ 01E and 2E is a  1u rp dimensional matrix of unrestricted coefficients 
(Dennis, 2006: 73). The procedure takes as the null hypothesis that a series is stationary 
(against the alternative of a unit unit) (see, for example Kahn and Ogaki, 1992; 
Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), is conditional on the  Ȇr (which is 1 in our case) and is a 
 rp 2F test (ibid: 11-2). This formulation makes it differ from the ADF type testing 
procedure (for which results in Table 3.4 are generated).25 Although the two procedures 
may not be directly comparable, inference on unit root non-stationarity ought not to be 
altered. The CATS procedure test results for stationarity are presented in Table 4.7.  
 
Table 4.7: Test for Stationarity: LR ± test,  32F  
DB G A TR 
7.710 
(.052) 
7.882 
(.049) 
8.334 
(.040) 
7.389 
(.060) 
Notes: Restricted trend included in the cointegrating relationship(s); 5% C.V = 7.815; P-values in 
parentheses 
   
Given the results in the table, we see that stationarity of each variable by itself in the 
system is rejected at the conventional 10 per cent level of significance. This suggests that 
each of the series in the system is unit-root non-stationary, and is consistent with the ADF 
(implemented in E-views 7.2) results given in Table 3.4. So together, these test procedures 
yield a consistent inference, i.e. the series are unit root non-stationary or  1I .   
 
 
                                          
25
 Note that the ADF null hypothesis is nonstationarity and the tests are Dickey-Fuller type test 
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4.5  The Empirical Specification of Cointegrated VAR(1) Model  
 
We considered (from the preceding analysis) a 4-variable CVAR model for 
 c ttttt TRAGDB ,,,y , and structured the restricted empirical error correction 
specification around 1 r cointegrating relation and 3  rp common trends, an 
unrestricted constant, 0ȝ and a vector of linear trends, tȕĮ c restricted to lie in the 
cointegrating space.  The restricted CVAR model for the data becomes  
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Where tiyȕ is the equilibrium error, iĮ is the adjustment coefficient, 0ȝ is a  1up vector 
of an unrestricted constant, ' is the first difference operator and  uit N ȁİ ,0~ 5 . In (4.3), 
the long-run is then the same as the short-run since 1tǻ\ī1 dropped out of the unrestricted 
ECM representation in (3.4). So the system, after having been pushed away from 
equilibrium by an exogenous shock, will adjust back to equilibrium exclusively through 
iĮ (see inter alia Juselius et al., 2011: 7).  
 
To provide empirical content to the structural analysis underlying the causal links between 
aid and domestic fiscal variables, we focus on two types of long-run parameter restrictions. 
Restrictions on ȕ tests long-run exclusion (and is evaluated by 0:  ioH ȕ ), while 
restrictions on Į (evaluated as 0:  iĮoH ) tells us which fiscal aggregates adjust to restore 
budgetary equilibrium in light of disequilibrium. Considered also is a test of a unit vector 
in Į , corresponding to the hypothesis that variable i is purely adjusting to the system 
variables (or is completely endogenous in the system). We now move on to identify the 
long-run stationary relationship implied in (4.3), after which we turn to structural analysis. 
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4.6 The Long-run Fiscal Estimates, Structural Analysis and Testable Fiscal 
Hypotheses 
 
4.6.1  The Long-run Fiscal Estimates 
 
The statistical choice of the rank of one is supported by the fiscal response theory 
(McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004) that these variables together determine the long-run 
fiscal equilibrium. With a unique relationship among the fiscal variables, the identification 
of the long-run relation becomes relatively direct. So normalizing the only existing 
cointegration relation on domestic borrowing (this is a residual and is incorporated to 
identify the fiscal balance), we identified a cointegrated relation among the fiscal variables. 
This translates into a relation explicitly for the long-run fiscal equilibrium for Uganda. The 
corresponding estimates as set out in Equation (4.4a) are obtained (t-ratios in parentheses). 
In addition, in equation (4.4b-d) the existing cointegration relation is normalized 
respectively on government spending, tax revenue and aid to establish the magnitude of 
the impact of aid on spending and the impact on tax revenue of incremental aid (t-ratios in 
parentheses).  
 
trendTRAGDB tttt 387.244484.0137.0223.0     (4.4a)  
            (3.159)   (-2.064)   (-4.929)    (4.638)  
 
trendTRADBG tttt 077.1096171.2614.0485.4      (4.4b)  
  (5.234)   (2.064)    (4.929)      (-4.638)  
  
trendGADBTR tttt 878.504461.0283.0066.2                   (4.4c) 
            (5.234)    (2.064)   (-4.929)     (-4.638)   
 
 TrendTRGDBA tttt 46.1786538.363.131.7     (4.4d) 
 
(-5.234) (-4.929)  (4.929)     (-4.638)  
 
  
Ceteris paribus, estimates of the long-run coefficients in equation (4.4a) suggest a negative 
correlation of aid and tax revenue with domestic borrowing and a positive correlation with 
government spending. Estimates show that any increase in the revenue pool (tax revenue 
or aid) is associated with reduction in borrowing and an increase in public spending 
appears to balloon the budget deficit and hence a need for increased borrowing. We also 
see from the estimates in equation (4.4b) that public spending increase with any increase in 
the revenue pool, including domestic borrowing.  
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Another interesting result from equation (4.4a-b) is that the coefficient on tax revenue is 
larger than the coefficient on aid, suggesting that in the long-run the budget is largely 
driven by tax revenue (or domestic revenue in general). This could probably be because a 
budget driven by domestic revenue reduces the risk of fiscal vulnerability associated with 
aid (aid is both unpredictable and volatile (Bulir and Hamman, 2003)). Furthermore, aid 
and tax revenue coefficients have the same sign, suggesting that borrowing in general is 
the main financing item of primary budget deficit net of aid. As poor countries face the 
greatest difficulty in increasing tax revenue (Teera and Hudson, 2004) given their desired 
expenditure levels, but face a surge in aid, this result imply that Uganda easily alters 
borrowing after aid. In fact, trends in Figure 3.1 and extreme values of standardized 
residuals in Table 4.3 suggest that a surge in aid is associated with lower domestic 
borrowing (i.e. aid implies a lower deficit to finance) and vice versa. This association 
suggests that the net long-run effect of aid in Uganda has, in part, been a reduction in 
domestic borrowing (or aid is used to offset domestic borrowing).  
 
Parameters of interest in equation (4.4c-d), i.e. aid and tax revenue are positively 
correlated. This suggests that in the long-run, aid receipts or reforms linked to aid 
conditionality have been associated with either tax revenue collection efficiency or reforms 
in public finance management. Finally, the trend term is significantly different from zero 
in all the three normalizations. This suggests prima facie that holding other factors 
constant, borrowing does increase every time, while spending and tax revenue or aid 
decrease for the same period. However, neither of this is likely given the graphical 
inspection of the data in Figure 3.1. Trends in domestic borrowing suggest there have been 
reductions in the variable, while spending and tax revenue seem to have been on the rise 
since the mid-1980s so the implication of the trend term seems counter inituitive. Given 
this, it is possible that the trend term is picking up measurement errors in the donor 
measure of aid which is a significant over estimate of the aid that actually goes to 
government or it could be that the omitted budget variables are exhibiting trend behaviour 
(e.g. non-tax revenue may be increasing steadily). The latter possibility is statistically 
tested under hypothesis 1 in Section 4.6.3 below, but does not hold leaving the former as 
the only plausible explanation. We recognize the limitations of DAC measure of aid used 
in the study up-front but note that these are the only available consistent data. 
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4.6.2  Structural Analysis 
 
Long-run exclusion tests  
 
Long-run exclusion is a test of whether (or not) a variable can be excluded from the 
cointegrating relation that has been suggested in (4.4) above. Although the t-ratios imply 
that all variables are significant, the variable exclusion is a further test. If accepted, the 
variable is redundant to the long-run relation(s) (Juselius, 2006: 176) and so can at most 
have a short-run impact. This implies that in the current set up where we do not have short-
run dynamics, a variable that is excludable from the long-run would be of no impact in the 
system. With particular focus on aid, a test of whether it is long-run excludable involves 
evaluating the null hypothesis that 03  E  in (4.3), whilst other ȕ coefficients are 
unrestricted. As  1~ IA , accepting the null hypothesis is akin to suggesting that aid has 
not had any significant long-UXQLPSDFWRQ8JDQGD¶VILVFDOYDULDEOHVDLGLQHIIHFWLYHQHVV
It could describe a situation where there may be institutional factors preventing aid from 
playinJ D UROH LQ WKH ILVFDO HTXLOLEULXP IRU H[DPSOH µDLG OHDNDJH¶ ZKHUH FRUUXSW
government officials use the aid money for private purposes).   
 
Table 4.8: Variable Exclusion: LR-test,  12F  
 
    Statistic   p-value 
Variable 
Null 
Hypothesis Asymptotic 
Bartlett 
correction   Asymptotic 
Bartlett 
correction 
DB  01  E   6.846  4.315    0.009  0.038 
G  02  E   4.310  2.717    0.038  0.099 
A  03  E   4.384  2.684    0.036  0.101 
TR  04  E   7.200  4.539   0.007  0.033 
Trend    5.929      0.015   
Note: Null hypothesis: a variable can be excluded from the cointegrating relations; p-values indicate the 
level at which the null hypothesis can be rejected. Bartlett correction factor is 1.586 
 
Given the results in Table 4.8, the null hypothesis of long-run variable exclusion is 
rejected for all variables in the cointegrating relation and is robust when corrected for 
small sample bias, albeit being borderline so for A at the 10 per cent level of significance. 
Thus, all variables enter into the system cointegrating space in (4.4). Aid is a significant 
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element of long-run fiscal equilibrium and suggests that aid or strictly policy conditions 
attached to aid is likely to have caused beneficial fiscal policy responses in Uganda or that 
in fiscal terms, aid may have been used sensibly.   
 
Long-run weak exogeneity tests  
 
This focuses upon the role played by aid and the domestic fiscal variables in 8JDQGD¶V
budgetary process and is gleaned from a set of restriction tests on the vector of error 
correction coefficients Į . These restrictions are accomplished econometrically by long-run 
weak exogeneity test procedure described in Johansen (1996) (i.e. a zero row in Į ). As iĮ
 
measures the speed at which the corresponding variable in ty'
 
in (4.3) adjusts to 
deviations from the equilibrium, a zero coefficient implies that the variable impacts on the 
long-run stochastic path of the other variables of the system, while at the same time has not 
been influenced by them (Juselius, 2006: 193), and is as such considered to be weakly 
exogenous for the long-run parameters ȕ .  
 
$WDPRUHJHQHUDOOHYHOLW¶VRIHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWWRNQRZZKLFKRIWKHYDULDEOHVDGMXVWWR
maintain equilibrium, since by Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger, 
1987), at least one variable must adjust in order to maintain equilibrium relation. In light of 
the domestic fiscal variables in ty , the test offers insights into the behaviour of budget 
planning authorities in Uganda, indicating which fiscal aggregates adjust in light of budget 
disequilibrium (budget deficit or surplus) to restore the budgetary equilibrium. As our 
IRFXV LV RQ DLG ZH ZRXOG ZLVK WR HVWDEOLVK ZKHWKHU LQ 8JDQGD¶V ILVFDO SODQQLQJ DLG LV
treated as given or whether its allocation actually reflects the state of the budget in some 
way. As with tests on ȕ , this from equation (4.3) can be evaluated from the null hypothesis 
that 03  D , whilst other Į coefficients are unrestricted.   
 
The results in Table 4.9 indicate that the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity cannot be 
rejected only for domestic borrowing. This suggests DB does not adjust to system 
disequilibrium and is exogenous to the long-run relation. Although this is surprising, it 
appears that DB may be determined by factors other than the domestic fiscal variables 
(corroborations from the trend analysis and estimates of the long-run relation suggest this 
may depend on aid and not tax revenue). Long-run weak exogeneity is firmly rejected at 
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the 10 per cent level of significance for aid, government spending and tax revenue. Thus, 
these adjust to maintain equilibrium and are endogenous to the long-run relation. Allowing 
for adjustments in government spending as the results suggest may appear counter intuitive 
as spending is very difficult to reverse once implemented (especially if it involves 
increases in public payroll or statutory expenditures). But, it may imply that government 
spending is planned given the expected revenue envelop but the allocation of spending is 
affected when the revenue outcome is realized, i.e. spending allocation responds to 
revenue outturn.   
 
Notes: Null hypothesis: a variable is weakly exogenous. A large test statistic (small prob.) indicates that the 
null hypothesis of weak exogeneity is rejected.   
 
The long-run weak-exogeneity of aid is not supported demonstrating the peril of assuming 
that aid is exogenous to the fiscal variables without testing. This result suggests, in part, 
that Ugandan fiscal planners have a target for aid revenue, and this expected revenue is 
incorporated into fiscal planning (i.e. when determining revenue and expenditure 
allocations, aid revenue is taken into account) (see inter alia McGillivray and Morrissey, 
2000).26 Alternatively, it could be the case that donors incorporate government spending in 
deciding how much aid to allocate to Uganda, which seems less likely but is possible.  
 
Either way, while we would usually expect causality to run from aid to spending, this 
interpretation paints a different picture for Uganda. It suggests that the government sets 
spending targets according to her development objectives, and then tries to find aid 
resources to finance those ambitions. The existing mutual cooperation in the politics of 
                                          
26 In Foster and Killick (2006: 19), it is noted that Uganda has a more forward-looking view, and has 
achieved some success in getting more aid allocated as budget support, and released early in the budget year. 
Uganda has also been relatively sophisticated in adjusting donor promises based on past disbursement 
performance. 
Table 4.9: Long-run Weak Exogeneity: LR-test,  12F   
Variable Null Hypothesis Statistic p-value 
DB 01  D  1.899 0.168 
G 02  D  3.018 0.082 
A 03  D  3.102 0.078 
TR 04  D  3.309 0.069 
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donor assistance between the Ugandan government and her major donors (Alesina and 
Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Boone, 1996) makes it likely that donors have 
been keen to finance these expenditures, albeit with some levels of unpredictability, which 
could be due to a donor disbursement rule. 27 Aid agreements often include performance-
related triggers for disbursement or general conditionalities. This however does not mean 
that the Ugandan government has control over the aid allocated to her (i.e. aid commitment) 
by donors but rather disbursement FRXOG EH D UHDFWLRQ WR JRYHUQPHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR PHHW
GRQRU¶V administrative or internal procedural requirements and/or other policy pre-
conditions (Eifert and Gelb, 2005). Or it may reflect the exercise of incentive clauses by 
GRQRU¶VLQUHVSRQVHWRHYHQWV over which the Ugandan government has some direct control 
in the context of an on-JRLQJDLGUHODWLRQVKLS2¶&RQQHOOet al., 2008) or both.  
 
Test of a Unit Vector in Į   
 
Under this heading, we test the hypothesis of Į containing a unit vector. This corresponds 
to testing the hypothesis that variable i is purely adjusting to the system variables (or is 
completely endogenous in the system). For example, a test of whether DB is a unit vector 
in Į involves evaluating the null hypothesis that 11  D  in (4.3), whilst other Į coefficients 
are unrestricted. If accepted, then, shocks to the corresponding variable have no lasting 
impact on any of the variables in the system (including itself). Intuitively, it implies that 
the cumulated disturbances from the thi variable do not enter the common trends defined 
by AĮ , noting that 0 c AĮĮ  such that a unit vector in Į  corresponds to a zero row in AĮ . 
Thus, if variable i is purely adjusting in Į , one would expect it to have transitory effects in
AĮ .28 To sum up, a variable with a unit vector in Į is purely adjusting to the cointegrating 
relation and shocks to the variable only have transitory effects. Table 4.10 gives test results 
of a unit vector in Į .  
 
Reading from the row corresponding to r =1, we note that the null hypothesis of a unit 
vector cannot be rejected only for TR, while we reject the null for the remaining domestic 
                                          
27
 The amount they give is unpredictable, sometimes varying by as much as 40 per cent from one year to the 
next (2005 Commission for Africa Report). 
28 Į defines the adjustment to the equilibrium error given by the cointegrating relation, while AĮ defines the 
common stochastic trends.  
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fiscal variables. This means that we can accept that shocks to TR only have transitory 
effects and that only TR is purely adjusting to the long-run equilibrium. 
 
 Table 4.10: Test of Unit Vector in Alpha  
r DGF 5% C.V. DB G A TR 
1 3 7.815 11.579 
[0.009] 
7.617 
[0.055] 
17.049 
[0.001] 
4.921 
[0.178] 
2 2 5.991 6.081 
[0.048] 
2.714 
[0.257] 
11.137 
[0.004] 
0.783 
[0.676] 
3 1 3.841 0.003 
[0.957] 
1.453 
[0.228] 
5.039 
[0.025] 
0.766 
[0.382] 
Notes: LR-test, Chi-Square(4-r), P-values in brackets. 
 
4.6.3  Testable Fiscal Hypotheses 
 
Now that we have established the variables in the long-run fiscal relationship, in another 
phase of test restrictions on the long-run ȕ ; we focus on some ȕ vectors that are assumed 
to be known. Fiscal response models (FRMs) offer important insights into how donors 
could expect recipient governments to respond to aid receipts or how aid revenue may be 
expected to affect the budgetary situation of recipient governments. Aid inflows are 
expected to be associated with an increase in government spending (aid additionality) 
because aLGSDFNDJHVFRPHZLWKVWURQJSUHVVXUHV WRVSHQG2¶&RQQHOOet al., 2008). The 
effect of aid on tax revenue is ambiguous, although the logic is that it is undesirable that 
aid should displace tax effort or be viewed as an alternative to tax revenue by recipients. 
Besides, aid is expected to be associated with lower domestic borrowing (Adam and 
2¶&RQQHOO$]DPDQG/DIIRQWDVGRQRUFRQGLWLRQDOLW\RIWHQUHTXLUHVWKHaid 
recipient to reduce the budget deficit (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000). Applying 
restrictions on the long-run fiscal coefficients ( iȕ ) allows us to assess whether the above 
hypothetical known fiscal vectors are stationary (see inter alia Juselius, 2006). We could 
for example test whether a revenue displacement or whether balanced budget and/or 
whether aid additionality hypotheses are each stationary, i.e. whether each of this is a long 
run relation. Note that equation (4.4) can be normalized on any variable (as we do in (4.5) 
or (4.6)), but for testing of the hypotheses of the fiscal effect of aid, it may be best to 
interpret it in equilibrium form  
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Basing on Equation (4.5), we test, where applicable the long-run fiscal vector restrictions 
in Martins (2010). However, test restrictions in Martins are based on a disaggregated 
model. Aid is disaggregated into aid grants and aid loans and government spending is 
categorized into current and development components. The disaggregation of the latter is 
problematic as investment and consumption spending are intertwined, so that expenditure 
classification is blurred (Morrissey 2012; Osei et al., 2005; McGillivray and Morrissey, 
2000). Furthermore, it is difficult to know what the donors intended the aid to be used for 
or as argued in Morrissey (2012), the difficulty of linking aid, donor intensions and sector 
spending. Despite these data difficulties, Martins tests aid spending, development funding 
and categorical fungibility hypotheses. It is assumed that aid is intended to finance 
investment/development expenditure, but is fungible when government diverts these funds 
to finance consumption spending. However, not all aid is intended to finance investment; 
and consumption and investment spending are necessary complements. Moreover, 
legitimate testing of the above hypotheses requires that one knows how much of the aid the 
donors intended to be spent on each of the expenditure headings (Morrissey, 2012; 
McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004). Thus, the test restrictions on categorical spending, 
compounded by the difficult of linking each of this to donor intentions raises concerns as 
to whether some the hypotheses tested in Martins are legitimate and whether the 
corresponding inferences are precise.  
 
With this caveat in mind, we differ from Martins to the extent that we are not concerned 
with donor aid allocation and where we disaggregate spending, we acknowledge the 
difficulties in expenditure classifications, and do not disaggregate aid. Hence, we restrict 
our tests to the aid additionality/illusion, budget constraint, balanced budget, tax revenue 
displacement and aid-domestic borrowing substitution hypotheses, but with modifications 
where appropriate. These are described in detail below and test results are given in Table 
4.11.  
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Hypothesis 1:  Budgetary constraint  
    
( DBATRG  ( ) 
 
The evaluation of whether budgetary constraint is long-run stationary or non-stationary is 
based on the accounting identity above. The null hypothesis is that the total resource 
envelop (TR, A, including DB) is insufficient to meet the required public expenditures 
FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH DFKLHYHPHQW RI 8JDQGD¶V JURZWK WDUJHWV 7KLV IURP 5) is 
accomplished by testing whether the estimated G coefficient is not statistically different 
from +1, while TR and other financing coefficients (A and DB) are not statistically 
different from -1 (i.e. 1,1,1,1: 43210     EEEEH (Martins, 2010; McGillivray 
and Morrissey, 2001b: 4-7)), whilst the trend coefficient is left unrestricted. If accepted, it 
would imply that inasmuch as the aid inflows have been substantial over the sample period, 
spending needs have been on the rise so that the resource gap remains unfilled (i.e. the 
budget deficit after grants remains), and that thH µUHVLGXDO FRPSRQHQWV RU QHW HUURUV DQG
RPLVVLRQV¶RPLWWHGEXGJHWYDULDEOHV29 are stationary. It would also imply that expansions 
in domestic borrowing as financing of the last resort to balance the fiscal accounts have 
been dismal probably because of compliance with donor aid requirements.   
 
Budget constraint hypothesis over the sample period under consideration is not rejected 
[   915.642  F (0.140)], suggesting that aid inflows remain insufficient to cover the 
spending needs (albeit noting that there is a trend present in the long-run relation) and the 
µRPLWWHGEXGJHWYDULDEOHV¶are stationary. To demonstrate the latter, we performed unit root 
test on non-tax revenue. This yielded the ADF test statistic: 725.3 , which when scaled 
by the 5 per cent critical value of -3.50 (for n=50 usable observations) suggests this is 
stationary.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
29 Some of these include External commercial borrowing, non-concessional external loans and non-tax 
revenue 
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Hypothesis 2:  Balanced / Cash Budget  
    
   (   0;0    DBATRG ) 
 
This investigates the hypothesis that the government tries to meet expenditures exclusively 
with the resource envelope (domestic tax revenue and aid) with no recourse to deficit 
financing. A budget is said to be balanced if the expenditure and revenue envelope (TR and 
A) are equal, assuming no domestic borrowing, while the trend coefficient is left 
unrestricted. From (4.5), this is evaluated as ( 0;1,1,1: 14320     EEEEH ). This 
hypothesis is rejected [   458.842  F (0.076)], suggesting that over the sample period, the 
government has relied on non-concessional foreign loans and/or domestic borrowing to 
balance its fiscal accounts. This is not surprising. The fiscal literature suggests that non-aid 
borrowing is typically considered to be financing of the last resort, i.e. is intended to 
finance an unanticipated gap between expenditure and revenue (McGillivray and 
Morrissey, 2001b). Since poor aid-recipient developing countries face the greatest 
difficulty in increasing tax revenue (Keen and Simone, 2004; Teera and Hudson 2004) but 
face a surge in aid, domestic borrowing could be affected by the way aid is provided.30 For 
H[DPSOH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GRPHVWLF ERUURZLQJ UHTXLUHPHQWV UHYHUVHG IURP D VDYLQJ RI 
per cent of GDP in 1997/8 to a borrowing of 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2001/2 due to actual 
aid disbursements falling short of what had been programmed when the annual budgets 
were drawn up (Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007).  
 
Related to the above, we attempt to establish whether domestic borrowing is avoidable as 
ORZHUERUURZLQJKDVEHHQSDUWRIDLGFRQGLWLRQDOLW\VLQFHWKHV$GDPDQG2¶&RQQHOO
1999; Azam and Laffont, 2003). This is accomplished by testing the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient on DB in the fiscal equilibrium in (4.5) is not statistically different from 
zero (i.e. :0H 01  ȕ , whilst keeping all other coefficients, and the trend, unrestricted). 
This hypothesis is rejected [   768.1342  F (0.008)], suggesting that avoiding domestic 
borrowing has not been feasible, a result that could probably be attributed to binding 
resource constraints. It is worth noting that in Uganda, like in many other developing 
                                          
30 Aid agreements often include performance related triggers for disbursement (conditionality). Provisions 
may therefore reflect the exercise of incentive clauses by donors, in response to events over which the 
Ugandan government has some direct control and in the context of an on-JRLQJDLGUHODWLRQVKLS2¶&RQQHOO
et al., 2008).    
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countries, sources of financing fiscal deficits are limited. The tax base is very small due to 
low incomes per capita and wide spread poverty; capital markets are under developed such 
that only few firms and households hold government debt papers; and while inflow of the 
aid has been substantial and expected WRSOD\LWVµJDS-ILOOLQJ¶UROHGLVEXUVHPHQWKDVEHHQ
characterized by unpredictability and volatility (Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 
2007; Easterly, 2006; Bulir and Hamman, 2003). 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Aid additionality/illusion  
    
   ( AG  0;   DBTR ) 
  
,Q SUDFWLFH DLG SDFNDJHV FRPH ZLWK VWURQJ SUHVVXUHV WR VSHQG 2¶&RQQHOO et al., 2008).  
Eifert and Gelb (2005) and Berg et al., (2007) observe that recipient governments that 
ignore such donor sentiments for too long may face a suspension of aid. Thus, aid inflows 
are additional if they entail an equivalent increase in government expenditure. However, 
spending may not increase by the full amount of the aid, either because some aid is 
directed to other uses such as interest payments or accumulation of reserves (the aid is 
IXQJLEOHRUEHFDXVH WD[UHFHLSWVGHFOLQHRUVRPHRI WKHDLG µOHDNV¶FRUUXSWLon). On the 
other hand, spending can increase by more than the aid if, for example, governments have 
to match aid revenue or aid-financed government spending generates subsequent claims on 
future spending (that may need to be financed by domestic resources), such as the 
recurrent costs required to maintain an investment. Aid-financed government spending 
especially social overhead capital (e.g. roads, utilities, building schools or hospitals) often 
induce an expansion in recurrent spending.31 The situation where government spending 
increases by more than the amount of the net aid inflow has been described as aid illusion, 
such that the impact on spending is more than proportional to aid (McGillivray and 
Morrissey, 2001).  
 
Although the increase in spending as a ratio of the aid alone may not be demonstrated with 
precision, inference on aid additionality/illusion hypothesis can be drawn from the long-
run coefficients in the fiscal relation as suggested in Martins (2010: 38). The coefficient on 
                                          
31 The construction of schools and health units for example has to be accompanied with increased spending 
on consumables such as text books, recruitment of teachers, enhancement of tHDFKHU¶V VDODULHV WUDLQLQJRI
health workers, equipment, ambulances and medicines etc. 
4 ± &HQWUDO*RYHUQPHQW¶V Fiscal Response to Aid                                Thomas Bwire  
The University Of Nottingham 101 
 
government spending is less than 1 (about 0.63), suggesting aid is less than additional and 
thus, precludes aid illusion. However, since this cannot be demonstrated with precision (i.e. 
not possible to ascertain the proportion of spending due to aid alone), we treat this result 
with reservation.  In fact, as we model the fiscal relationship any observed effect of aid on 
spending is mediated by changes in borrowing capacity, noting that low-income countries 
in general have limited ability to affect tax revenue (Keen and Simone, 2004; Teera and 
Hudson, 2004) but can readily alter borrowing (Morrissey, 2012).  
 
Our estimated long-run coefficients show that a 1 million Uganda shillings (UGX) 
increase in the amount of aid disbursed results in UGX 614,349.78 increase in total public 
spending. Thus, about 61 per cent of incremental aid was spent, suggesting that spending 
was less than proportional to aid over the period 1972-2008. This is consistent with the 
findings of Mugume (2008), Foster and Killick (2006) and McGillivray and Morrissey, 
2004).32 A formal test of whether G and A coefficients in the fiscal equilibrium in (4.5) are 
equal and opposite (i.e. 1,1: 320   EEH , 0;0 41   EE ) (albeit keeping the trend 
unrestricted in the long-run relation) is also rejected [   186.1242  F  (0.016)]. This 
evidence is at variance with the flypaper effect as represented by the World Bank (1998).33 
A combination of various factors caveats this finding.  
 
The most obvious being that we use DAC data on aid, which overstates not only the 
amount of aid actually spent in Uganda (some technical cooperation is spent in the donor 
country) but also the amount delivered through the budget (aid that does not go through the 
government cannot appear as government spending). Given this, it is unlikely that any 
more than 61 per cent of the DAC measure of aid to Uganda goes through the budget (to 
the extent that many donors retain control over project spending, the proportion could be 
considerably less). Our estimates are consistent with all aid to the government being spent 
(i.e. aid is fully additional), and does not preclude aid illusion. Also, the concessionality 
implicit in debt relief or write-offs is recorded as ODA grants by the donors even though 
they do not give more money to Uganda. Furthermore, the preceding conclusions are based 
                                          
32 About 63 per cent of incremental aid was spent over the period 1966-2006 (Mugume, 2008), Foster and 
Killick (2006) estimate the same at 74 per cent during 1999-2002 period while McGillivray and Morrissey 
(2004) put it at an average of 70 per cent over 2001-07.  
33 7KHIO\SDSHUHIIHFWLVDWHUPXVHGLQWKHILVFDOIHGHUDOLVPOLWHUDWXUHWRFDSWXUHVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHµµDKLJKHU
tier of government provides a grant to a lower tier of government, with the result that lower tier expenditure 
increases by more than the amount of the grant (Barnett, 1993). In this way, the grant is used to expand the 
SXEOLFEXGJHW¶¶'ROOHU\DQG:RUWKLQJWRQcited in McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000: 420). 
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on estimates in which normalization is on total public spending and as such ignore indirect 
feedback effects operating through the system.  
 
It could also be due to a time lag between aid flows being received and the actual 
expenditure (low absorptive capacity of the government budget). Foster and Killick (2006) 
argue that only 74 per cent of the increase in aid during 1999-2002 was spent by the 
government, of which only 27 per cent was absorbed in higher aggregate spending on 
goods and services in the economy.34 Also, part of the aid is used to reduce borrowing 
because the IMF has often required reductions in borrowing as a quid pro quo for 
increased aid, some is held in Bank of Uganda (BOU) as foreign exchange reserves (Berg 
et al., 2010: 4; Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007: 208; Foster and Killick, 
2006: 14) DQGZHPD\QRWSUHFOXGHWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWVRPHµOHDNV¶VRQRWDOOWKH aid is 
used to support spending.   
 
As Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile (2007) argue, holding any surge in aid in 
foreign exchange reserves KDV LQ SDUW EHHQ 8JDQGD¶V PDFURHFRQRPLF PDQDJHPHQW
strategy of large scale aid inflows but also importantly because of the concerns that aid 
flows will not be a permanent budget resource. So any increase in spending due to 
incremental aid is cautiously implemented to avoid slipping into a fiscal crisis although 
VXFK IHDUV ZRXOGQ¶W DULVH LI donors could make credible commitments to provide 
predictable long-WHUPVXSSRUW2¶&RQQHOOet al., 2008).  
 
µµThe key problem for fiscal vulnerability is not short-term volatility, but the 
danger that the large increase in aid flows to Uganda which occurred after 1998/9 
will not prove sustainable: i.e. they will not represent a permanent budget 
UHVRXUFH¶¶ (Brownbridge and Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2007: 208). 
 
Donor aid is both volatile and unpredictable (Bulir and Hamman, 2003).35 Disbursements 
of budget support for example fell short of the budgeted amount by 54 per cent in 
1999/2000, by 30 per cent in 2000/1, by 38 per cent in 2001/2 and by 10 per cent in 2003/4 
                                          
34 Absorption is the widening of the current account deficit (excluding aid) due to more aid while spending 
is the widening of the fiscal deficit (excluding aid) due to incremental aid (Hussain et al., 2009; Foster and 
Killick, 2006: 3) 
35
 2¶&RQQHOODQG6ROXGRVKRZWKDWDLGIORZVDUHDIIHFWHGE\EXVLQHVV-cycle conditions within donor 
countries and Fleck and Kilby (2006a, 2006b) show that party transition in the US presidency affect not only 
bilateral US flows but also the allocation of World Bank aid.  
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and exceeded the budgeted amount by 2 per cent in 2002/3  (Brownbridge and Tumusiime-
0XWHELOH7KLVQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJDµXVH-it-or-lose-it constraint hangs over aid flows 
2¶&RQQHOO et al., 2008) such that spending cautiously in the current period amounts to 
risking a reduction in the future flows (Eifert and Gelb, 2005). Therefore, as spending 
pressures are intrinsic to the aid relationship, aid surges carry with them an expectation of 
macroeconomic repercussions and potential macroeconomic management problems 
(subjects beyond the scope of this paper but appropriate for further country specific 
research).  
 
 Hypothesis 4:  Revenue displacement  
 
   ( TRA  0;   DBG ) 
    
A particular concern of the donors is that aid may discourage incentives to increase tax 
effort in poor aid dependent countries (Franco-Rodriguez and Morrissey, 1998: 1243). 
However, addressing the tax effect associated with aid tend to be difficult as there can be 
many effects in opposing direction (Morrissey, 2012). Economic liberalization policies 
associated with aid conditionality tend to reduce tax revenue (Greenaway and Morrissey, 
1993). For example, rHIRUPVVXFKDVWUDGHOLEHUDOL]DWLRQHURGHWKHUHYHQXHIURPµHDV\WR
FROOHFW¶WD[HVVXFKDVWDULIIV$L]HQPDQDQG Jinjarak (2006, 2009 cited in Morrissey, 2012). 
Moreover, WD[UHIRUPVWKDWPD\XOWLPDWHO\UHSODFHWKHORVWUHYHQXHWKURXJKµKDUGWRFROOHFW¶
taxes, such as VAT take some time to become fully operational and may need significant 
investment in tax collection and resources for monitoring and enforcement. Baunsgaard 
and Keen (2005) cited in Morrissey (2012) show that periods of economic policy reforms 
in developing countries tend to be associated with reductions in the tax/GDP ratio, 
especially for the poorest countries, noting that these are the very periods that tend to be 
associated with aid episodes. Thus, a negative correlation between aid and tax ratios may 
be due to aid conditionality, but not a behavioural effect of aid reducing tax effort.  
 
Also, when tax efforts are fairly high, recipient governments may use the extra fiscal space 
provided by aid flows to offer tax subsidies to key sectors of the economy or reduce tax 
induced distortions and crowd in private investment (Martins, 2010; Fagernäs and 
Schurich, 2004). In this case, aid has a behavioural effect on the tax rates and may reduce 
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tax effort, although such reductions may not necessarily be undesirable. However, studies 
on the fiscal effect of aid and on the determinants of tax/GDP ratios do not provide solid 
evidence that aid has a behavioural effect on tax effort. Probably because the repayment 
obligation of aid grants and aid loans differ36, Gupta et al. (2004) find that aid grants have 
a negative effect on tax effort while loans encourage tax effort. On the contrary, Clist and 
Morrissey (2011) find no robust evidence for a negative effect of aid grants on the 
tax/GDP ratio. Similarly, Morrissey et al. (2007) find no evidence for an effect of aid on 
tax effort.  
 
On the other hand, some of the policy conditions attached to aid have the aim of increasing 
the tax base, tax collection efficiency, and tax rates (Morrissey, 2012: 11-2). Evidence 
shows that since the mid-1980s, aid has been associated with conditions including 
measures to increase tax revenue (Clist and Morrissey, 2011), and aspects of governance 
(Brun et al., 2009 cited in Morrissey 2012).  
 
Therefore, as there tends to be many effects of aid on tax revenue but in opposing 
directions, the actual effect is for empirical evidence to resolve. We test the hypothesis that 
aid displaces tax effort, i.e. the hypothesis that the coefficients on A and TR in (4.5) (whilst 
keeping the trend term unrestricted) are equal and opposite [i.e. 1,1: 430   EEH ,
0;0 21   EE ] using the Ugandan fiscal data. This hypothesis is not supported 
[   470.2142  F (0.000)], which suggests that aid to Uganda has not had a pervasive 
dampening effect on domestic revenue effort in the long-run. Since low income countries 
are severely constrained in their ability to increase tax/GDP ratios, it may be the case that 
Uganda is raising as much tax revenue as is feasible because of concerns that the aid will 
not be sustained or because there are associated public finance management reforms and 
revenue collection efficiency. A similar result has been found in Martins (2010) for 
Ethiopia and in Osei et al. (2005) for Ghana. In Kenya, no significant effect was found 
(Morrissey et al., 2007).  
 
 
 
                                          
36 Aid grants create no repayment obligation (so they have a negative effect on tax effort, while aid loans 
have repayment obligation (so they encourage tax effort (Gupta et al., 2004).  
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Hypothesis 5:  Aid-domestic borrowing µSHUIHFWsubstitutLRQ¶   
     
( DBA  0;   TRG ) 
 
The relationship between aid and non-aid borrowing is not clear. Fiscal theory would 
suggest that domestic borrowing is a consequence of the cost of aid unpredictability and 
volatility (Bulir and Hamman, 2003) such that aid flows and domestic borrowing could be 
viewed as substitutes and would be negatively correlated. But some empirics show that aid 
facilitates increased non-aid borrowing (Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998) in which case, it is 
plausible to think in terms of the vicious circle in which aid flows are diverted to retire 
RQHURXVSXEOLFORDQVHVSHFLDOO\WKHµRGLRXVGHEW¶GHEWVHUYLFLQJEXWWKLVPDNHVLWHDVLHU
to borrow again in the future. Alternatively, as McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) argue, 
the knowledge that a government is in receipt of aid allows it to increase borrowing, as 
creditors perceive that it has the ability to service debts.  
 
Besides, certain aid expenditures require matching spending by the recipient or spending 
officials may misperceive their budget constraint given incremental aid (especially in an 
environment of poor public expenditure management) ± aid illusion arises and the direct 
link between aid and spending is weakened. McGillivray and Morrissey (2001a) argue that 
HYHQ LI UHFLSLHQW JRYHUQPHQWV GR QRW KDYH µPDOLFLRXV¶ LQWHQWLRQV DLG FDQ EH DVVRFLDWHG
with expenditure increases in excess of the aid itself, and this may lead to the need for 
borrowing to finance the deficit.  
 
The hypothesis of whether aid and non-aid borrowing are perfect substitutes, i.e. whether 
DB and A coefficients in the fiscal equilibrium in (4.5) are equal and opposite 
( 0,0,1,1: 42310     EEEEH ), keeping the trend unrestricted is tested. Although the 
hypothesis is weakly rejected, it is not supported [   992.742  F (0.092)] and suggests that 
these effects take place, but is not persistent, i.e. domestic borrowing is a response to 
shortfalls in foreign aid (and is repaid when there is good performance in aid flows). This 
result is consistent with the evidence for Ethiopia (Martins, 2010). Although for Ghana, 
this hypothesis is not tested, simulation results show that aid significantly reduced 
domestic borrowing because IMF demanded borrowing reductions in the 1980s (Osei et al., 
2005: 5).  
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Conversely, the alternative hypothesis that aid and domestic borrowing are complements, 
i.e. whether DB and A coefficients in (4.5) are equal ( 0,0,1,1: 42310     EEEEH ), 
keeping the trend coefficient unrestricted in the long-run fiscal relation is also not 
supported [   247.1042  F (0.036)]. Although this could not be rejected in the case of 
Pakistan (Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998), it may not be surprising for Uganda. It could be 
due to the benefits of the HIPC debt relief that Uganda qualified for in 1997/98 and a 
series of debt rescheduling packages that followed thereafter. 
 
Table 4.11: Hypotheses Tests on the Fiscal Effect of Aid: L-R test,  42F .  
Restrictions derive from Equation (7):  004321 ItTRAGDB   EEEEE  
Testable Fiscal Hypotheses Statistics 
p-
value 
 
Inference 
Budget Constraint  1,1,1,1 4321     EEEE   6.915  0.140 
 
Accept 
Balanced Budget   0;1,1,1 1432     EEEE   8.458  0.076 
 
Reject 
Aid additionality/ Illusion  0;0,1,1 4132     EEEE   12.186  0.016 
 
Reject 
Tax Revenue 
Displacement  0,0,1,1 2143     EEEE   21.439  0.000 
 
Reject 
A-DB µSHUIHFWVXEVWLWXWHV¶   0,0,1,1 4231     EEEE   7.992 0.092  
 
Reject 
A-DB µFRPSOHPHQW¶  0,0,1,1 4231     EEEE  10.247 0.036 
 
Reject 
Notes: Test results are robust to small sample bias correction. Bartlett correction factor = 1.461. The 
deterministic time trend is unrestricted in all these tests to measure non-zero average linear growth 
rates.  
 
The preceding investigations on the potential long-run relation among the fiscal variables 
provide interesting insights into fiscal dynamics in Uganda. Existence of a budget 
constraint and not a balanced budget is supported. Thus, while aid flows to Uganda have 
been substantial, the resource gap has remained big and is often reduced by domestic 
borrowing (which is repaid when revenues are health). Aid induces increased tax effort, 
reduces domestic borrowing and increases public spending. This result suggests that aid or 
strictly policy conditions attached to aid were associated with or caused beneficial policy 
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responses in Uganda. Our evidence suggests that a 1 million UGX increase in the DAC aid 
disbursed results in UGX 614,350 increase in total public spending. Although spending is 
less than proportional to incremental aid, it is more than what it could have been in the 
absence of aid. The evidence that a budget constraint hangs over the budget 
implementation suggests that aid to the government (budget) is likely to be fully additional 
and it is even possible that total spending increases by more than aid actually delivered 
through the budget. So aid additionality/illusion hypothesis remains inconclusive given the 
nature of the aid measure used. Moreover, as noted in Osei et al.(2005), our conclusion is 
subject to a distinction between aid as finance from aid as policy condition, i.e. if one 
could infer that good policy (say improved public finance management) means that aid 
was used better, or that aid promoted good policy. Regrettably, neither distinction has been 
possible in our case. Ultimately, it could be the case that in fiscal terms, aid appears to 
have been utilized sensibly.  
 
As demonstrated in the empirical CVAR specification in equation (4.3), the DGP cannot 
allow for the analysis of short-run dynamics and this has a bearing on the simulation of the 
impulse response functions. It implies that the chain reaction associated with the knock-on 
and feedback effects (save for the time it would take for the system to stabilize) following 
a shock of known size to aid cannot be simulated. Instead, it is the interactions of the long-
run parameters of the model that are simulated, but this has comprehensively been 
analysed in a battery of hypotheses tests, so the simulations are not intuitively relevant and 
are not reported. Most importantly, the hypothesis of aid exogeneity is not statistically 
supported. As aid impact has been the main theme in this study and aid is not exogenous to 
the estimation of the long-run parameters, the impulse responses could not be statistically 
legitimate (Pesaran et al., 2000). In an alternative approach, we extend the above CVAR 
analysis and delve into the identification of common trends, permanent and transitory 
shocks in the system (Juselius, 2006: 84-85).  
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4.7  The Common Trends Representation 
 
In this section we consider the Granger Representation of the CVAR model in (4.3) to 
decompose y{t} into two parts: A unit root process into pushing forces (the common 
trends) and a stationary part (the cointegrating relation). We then explore the duality 
property between the Ȇ matrix and the long-run impact matrix (the C-matrix) to 
decompose the system into transitory and permanent components (Gonzalo and Granger, 
1995). The permanent components then represent the budgetary equilibrium while the 
transitory components capture deviations from equilibrium. Now consider a VAR(1) 
model in (4.3), with linear trend restricted to lie in the cointegrating relation to avoid 
quadratic trends in the data.  
  
 tİtȕĮȝyȕĮǻ\ 1tt cc  0 ,  Tt ,...,1      
where  6,0..~ diitH and 0ȝ is an unrestricted constant.  
 
With an initial value 0y , we note that AĮ has full rank and is of dimension  rpp u
 
so 
that 0 c AĮĮ  holds and rank   p AĮĮ .  
 
Given the unique relationship between Į and AĮ  (i.e. 0 c AĮĮ ), and ȕ and Aȕ (i.e.
0 c Aȕȕ ), it follows that    
 
    IȕĮȕĮyĮȕĮȕ t  cccc AAAA 11       (4.6) 
 
Using this identity, the p-dimensional vector ty can then be decomposed as follows 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
ttt yȕĮȕĮyĮȕĮȕy cccc AAAA
A

	
	
DE spsp
11
    (4.7) 
 
Where   
 
a) tyȕc in  Dsp cointegrating relations, i.e. pulling forces are 
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 tt İȕȝȕyȕȕĮIyȕ cccc c 1t       (4.8) 
 
Noting that the Eigen value of  ĮȕI c should be inside of the unit circle when tyE c is 
stationary, and   
 
b) tyĮAc in  Aȕsp common trends, i.e. pushing forces are 
 
 , 0it ĮȝWĮİĮyĮ PAA AA ccc c ¦
  trend
ticdeterminis1
	
trends
stochastic
common
t
i
, ȕĮȝ c    (4.9) 
Substituting (4.8) and (4.9) into (4.7), we obtain moving average representation 
corresponding to (4.3).   
 
t
t
i
YȝW ~
1
0  ¦
 
PCCİCy it       (4.10) 
Where  
  AAAA cc ĮīȕĮȕC 1  ; PC measures the slope of the linear trends in ty , 0PC measures the 
initial values, and tY
~
represents the stationary process in ty .  
  
If we define   1~ AAAA c īȕĮȕȕ or alternatively   1~ AAAA c īȕĮȕĮ , then, it is possible to 
re-write the C -matrix as a product of two matrices, i.e. AA c ĮȕC ~ (in case of the former 
formulation. This is similar to ȕĮ c  . So the decomposition of AA c ĮȕC ~ resembles the 
decomposition of ȕĮ c  , hence the duality property between the C -matrix and the Ȇ
matrix. In the Ȇ matrix form, ȕ determines the common long-run relations and Į load 
deviations from equilibrium for correction, while in the C - matrix form, AĮ determines 
the common stochastic trends driving the long-run relation out of equilibrium and Aȕ
defines the loadings to the rp  common stochastic trends, ¦
 
Ac
t
1i
iİĮ . The only important 
difference is that in the C - matrix, Aȕ~ is a function not only of Aȕ , but also of AĮ . Based 
on the C - matrix, we decompose the stochastic driving forces in the system into 
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permanent and transitory effects (and hence determine which shocks have long-run impact 
on the variables in the system).  
 
Table 4.12: The MA-Representation and Decomposition of the Trend (Unrestricted Model) 
The Coefficients of the Common Trends: 
 
RE-NORMALIZATION OF ALPHA Orthogonal: 
 
ALPHA Orthogonal (transposed) 
       DB     G      A      TR 
CT(1) 0.969 -0.093  0.229 0.000 
CT(2) 0.093 -0.721 -0.686 0.000 
CT(3) 0.120  0.359 -0.361 0.852 
 
ALPHA Orthogonal (transposed) 
         DB      G     A     TR 
CT(1)   3.012  0.000 1.000 0.000 
       (1.492) (.NA) (.NA) (.NA) 
CT(2)  -2.996  1.000 0.000 0.000 
      (-1.579) (.NA) (.NA) (.NA) 
CT(3)   2.683  0.000 0.000 1.000 
       (1.493) (.NA) (.NA) (.NA) 
 
The Loadings to the Common Trends, BETA_ORT(tilde): 
     CT1      CT2      CT3 
DB   0.040   -0.066    0.143 
    (2.400) (-2.400)  (2.400) 
G    0.121    0.802    0.429 
    (2.899) (11.766)  (2.899) 
A    0.878    0.199   -0.432 
   (16.125)  (2.240) (-2.240) 
TR  -0.109    0.177    0.616 
   (-3.387)  (3.387)  (5.425) 
 
The Long-Run Impact Matrix, C 
      DB       G        A        TR 
DB   0.704   -0.066    0.040    0.143 
    (5.708) (-2.400)  (2.400)  (2.400) 
G   -0.887    0.802    0.121    0.429 
   (-2.899) (11.766)  (2.899)  (2.899) 
A    0.892    0.199    0.878   -0.432 
    (2.240)  (2.240) (16.125) (-2.240) 
TR   0.794    0.177   -0.109    0.616 
(3.387)  (3.387) (-3.387)  (5.425) 
 
The Linear Trends in the Levels, C*MJU 
   DB       G       A       TR 
 -47.943 698.682 455.424 598.954 
 
Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
       DB         G          A          TR 
     782.5694  1940.3185  2525.3800  1487.3711 
DB   1.000 
G    0.377     1.000 
A   -0.205     0.115      1.000 
TR  -0.762     0.136     -0.187     1.000 
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Transitory shocks (r) have no long-run impact on the variables in the system and are 
defined by zero (insignificant) columns in the C - matrix. Permanent shocks (p-r) have a 
significant long-run impact on the variables of the system, and are defined as non-zero 
(significant) columns in the C-Matrix. The extent to which each variable in the system has 
been influenced by any of the cumulated empirical shocks is given by the rows of the C-
Matrix. Test results for the unrestricted moving average representation and decomposition 
of the trend are given in Table 4.12.  
 
With 4 p and a cointegration rank of 1 r , results in the table show that we have 1 r
cointegrating relation and 3  rp common stochastic trends driving the long-run 
relations out of equilibrium. The common stochastic trends are given by ALPHA 
Orthogonal and beta_ort(tilde) define their loadings. In the unrestricted estimates in Table 
4.12, it appears that the first common stochastic trend is shocks to aid with a small 
(potentially insignificant) effect from domestic borrowing, while the second and third 
common stochastic trends are respectively shocks to government spending and shocks to 
tax revenue (each with a small and potentially insignificant effect from domestic 
borrowing). As the loadings in beta_ort(tilde) (given by   1~ AAAA c īȕĮȕȕ ) define how 
the variables in the system react to the common stochastic trends, the results show that 
atleast each variable in the system is affected by the individual cumulated empirical shocks.  
 
 
However, estimates of Aȕ~ and AĮ in Table 4.12 are unrestricted, and so the common trend 
estimates are not uniquely determined. From the results in Table 4.9, we see that the null 
hypothesis of long-run (weak) exogeneity of domestic borrowing could not be rejected. 
Clearly, this corresponds to a zero row in Į , which, by construction corresponds to a unit 
vector in AĮ . A unit vector in AĮ means that one of the common stochastic trends in the 
model is given by the cumulated shocks to the weakly exogenous variable, so the 
cumulated residuals to long-run weakly exogenous variable (domestic borrowing in our 
case) can be considered a common stochastic trend even though the results in Table 4.12 
show that the variable itself is not a common stochastic trend (see Juselius 2006: 263). 
Hence, the 3 common stochastic trends in the model are given by the cumulated shocks to 
domestic borrowing, i.e. domestic borrowing is purely pushing the system as the shocks to 
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it cumulate into common stochastic trends in the model and it does not adjust to the 
equilibrium error.  
 
This notwithstanding, the  Aȕsp and  AĮsp is uniquely determined and so the estimated 
C - matrix is unique. This is similar to Į and ȕ  where the Ȇ matrix was uniquely 
estimated, even though the unrestricted Į and ȕ vectors were not) (Juselius, 2006: 258). A 
column-wise inspection of the C - matrix shows there could be borderline significant 
coefficients in the tax revenue column, with only own coefficient being clearly significant, 
while there is atleast one variable with a significant long-run impact in the columns to 
domestic borrowing, spending and aid. As the null hypothesis for a unit vector in Į
 
could 
not be rejected for tax revenue, it is purely adjusting to the only cointegrating relation and 
shocks to this variable only have transitory effects. Together, these results suggest that 
shocks to tax revenue have no lasting effect on the variables in the system, while shocks to 
domestic borrowing, spending and aid do have a permanent effect. This finding that the 
pulling forces are primarily given by empirical shocks to tax revenue is consistent with our 
previous findings and confirms that budget spending plans in Uganda for the sample 
period considered here have been adjusting to, but not pushing tax revenue. Conversely, 
empirical shocks to domestic borrowing, spending and aid are the pushing forces of the 
system. Also reported in the table are estimates of the long-run covariance matrix and the 
slopes of the common trends.  
 
In the next step, we proceed to just-identify the rp  common trends by imposing an 
identifying weak exogeneity restriction on domestic borrowing (similar to restrictions on 
Į in Section 4.6.2) in one of the common trends without changing the value of the 
likelihood function. Thus, the common trends are just-identified by this operation and no 
testing is involved (ibid: 257). Further details of this form of operation are provided in 
Juselius (2006: 262-64). The restricted moving average representation and decomposition 
of the trend test results are given in Table 4.13.  
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Table 4.13: The MA-Representation and Decomposition of the Trend (Restricted Model) 
The Coefficients of the Common Trends: 
 
RE-NORMALIZATION OF ALPHA Orthogonal: 
 
ALPHA Orthogonal (transposed) 
       DB     G      A      TR 
CT(1) 0.000 -0.713 -0.702 0.000 
CT(2) 1.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 
CT(3) 0.000  0.458 -0.465 0.757 
 
ALPHA Orthogonal (transposed) 
       DB     G     A      TR 
CT(1) 0.000 1.000  0.985 0.000 
      (.NA) (.NA)  (.NA) (.NA) 
CT(2) 1.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
      (.NA) (.NA)  (.NA) (.NA) 
CT(3) 0.000 0.000 -1.210 1.000 
      (.NA) (.NA)  (.NA) (.NA) 
 
The Loadings to the Common Trends, BETA_ORT(tilde): 
     CT1     CT2      CT3 
DB  0.000    1.000   -0.000 
   (0.000)  (6.785) (-0.000) 
G   0.737   -0.701    0.488 
   (7.662) (-2.736)  (2.736) 
A   0.267    0.712   -0.496 
   (2.008)  (2.008) (-2.008) 
TR  0.323    0.861    0.400 
   (4.037)  (4.037)  (2.692) 
 
The Long-Run Impact Matrix, C 
      DB       G        A        TR 
DB   1.000   -0.000    0.000   -0.000 
    (6.785) (-0.000)  (0.000) (-0.000) 
G   -0.701    0.737    0.135    0.488 
   (-2.736)  (7.662)  (2.736)  (2.736) 
A    0.712    0.267    0.863   -0.496 
    (2.008)  (2.008) (12.654) (-2.008) 
TR   0.861    0.323   -0.166    0.400 
    (4.037)  (4.037) (-4.037)  (2.692) 
 
The Linear Trends in the Levels, C*MJU 
   DB       G       A       TR 
 -31.893 692.154 462.547 623.001 
 
Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
       DB         G          A          TR 
    1041.8890  1811.6333  2506.4927  1508.6730 
DB   1.000 
G   -0.325     1.000 
A    0.093     0.187      1.000 
TR   0.739     0.239     -0.246     1.000 
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From the results of the restricted model in Table 4.13, one of the three common trends is 
now identified as cumulated shocks to domestic borrowing (¦
 
t
i
iDB
1
,
ÖH ), i.e. the weakly 
exogenous variable. Thus, the restriction on iDB,ÖH is just-identifying, i.e. the weak 
exogeneity restriction on 
,2Į A imply that ,2ȕA~ and the first column of the C - matrix 
(¦ DBİÖ ) are identical, so is the third column (¦ TRİÖ ) of the C - matrix and 3~ ,ȕA  , while 
1
~
,
ȕA is approximately equal to the second column (¦ GİÖ ) of the  C - matrix. Compared to 
the C - matrix in unrestricted model in Table 4.12, we note that the coefficients to tax 
revenue in the restricted model have now become less significant and those of domestic 
borrowing generally more significant. In conclusion, the weak exogeneity identifying 
restriction on domestic borrowing removes the previous highly significant coefficient in 
the tax revenue column, although the conclusion regarding adjustment is unaltered.            
 
4.8  A disaggregated Variant Model 
 
Equation (4.4) assumed that all forms of public spending have an equal effect on the other 
items in the budget. However, as we would like to offer insights into the disaggregated 
spending impact of aid, disaggregation of G into current consumption (GC) and 
development (GK) spending as a refinement of (4.4) is warranted. So a disaggregate 
variant of (4.4) is also analysed and the resulting long-run estimates are set out in (4.11) [t-
ratios in parentheses]: 
 
TrendTRAGCGKDB ttttt 876.365541.0269.0110.0428.1   (4.11)        
 (5.029)       (-1.376)     (-3.676)     (-5.571)      (9.109)      
 
Similar to the aggregate model, these estimates suggest, ceteris paribus, a negative 
correlation of aid and tax revenue with domestic borrowing and a positive correlation of 
domestic borrowing with capital spending. Thus, the same interpretation as in the 
aggregate model holds for corresponding correlations. Current spending is insignificant, 
suggesting it could be excludable from the long-run relation. So we re-estimate (4.11) 
excluding GC and report results in (4.12) [t-ratios in parentheses]. 
 
TrendTRAGKDB tttt 730.344598.0253.0282.1                   (4.12)  
 (4.890)     (-3.598)     (-7.002)       (7.211)      
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Given the results in (4.12) when GC is excluded, coefficients are not significantly different 
from those in (4.11) suggesting GC may be ruled out from the long-run relation. So 
comment is restricted to capital spending coefficient, as the rest of the coefficients are 
consistent with those in the aggregate model. In the long-run, domestic borrowing is more 
closely linked to capital spending. We however caution that care should be exercised when 
interpreting this result. It may be a measurement problem where the aggregation of 
productive (investment) expenditure includes substantial non-productive (consumption) 
expenditure (Kweka and Morrissey, 2000). This notwithstanding, we have tested the 
hypothesis that GC and GK coefficients in (4.13) are equal (LR test [   774.2652  F
(0.000)]. Thus, the hypothesis of equal coefficients is not supported.     
 
Beyond the coefficient signs and magnitudes depicted in Equation (4.11), the same relation 
is particularly suited for a test of aid fungibility. Aid is said to be fungible if recipients fail 
to use it in a manner intended by donors (World Bank, 1998; Franco-Rodriguez and 
Morrissey, 1998). As noted in McGillivray and Morrissey (2004), fungibility falls in three 
important categories ± general fungibility, sector fungibility and additionality (also see 
Morrissey 2012: 2) but here we concentrate on general fungibility because of the obvious 
data problems. The assumption underlying general fungibility is that donors grant aid to 
finance public investment and fungibility arises when recipients divert these funds to 
finance government consumption spending (Franco-Rodriguez and Morrissey, 1998). This 
is under the assumption that such diversion reduces the effectiveness of aid (World Bank 
1998 in Morrissey 2012). However, consumption spending is a necessary complement to 
investment spending, so the assumption that general fungibility diminishes the 
effectiveness of aid may be misleading (Morrissey 2012: 3). Analogously, fungibility is 
said to occur if aid, tied to a sector is used to finance a project that would otherwise be 
funded by tax revenue, releasing domestic resources for spending in some other sector. In 
this case, fungibility arises because donors and recipients have differing expenditure 
allocation preferences (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000). 
 
The question of whether aid has been fungible or not, and whether fungibility limits aid 
effectiveness remains one of the most contentious of the fiscal hypotheses in fiscal 
literature (see Morrissey, 2012 for an adequate summary on the debate). Unfortunately, 
data limitations or specifically, lack of appropriate data as one must know how much of 
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the aid the donors intended to be spent on each of the expenditure heading (Morrissey 
2012; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004) largely constrains inference on aid fungibility. 
Morrissey (2012: 4) terms the evidences in most of (if not all) the previous studies that he 
DGHTXDWHO\UHYLHZVDVµLPSUHFLVH¶2XUVWXG\LVQRH[FHSWLRQ1RWRQO\ZHUHZHXQDEOHWR
establish (or even claim to know) how much of the aid donors intended to be spent on each 
expenditure category, but also, current spending (roughly a key variable for fungibility 
hypothesis) is not a significant element of the long-run fiscal relation.  
 
4.9 Conclusions and Implications for Policy  
 
This paper assesses the dynamic relationship between foreign aid and domestic fiscal 
variables in Uganda using annual data over the period 1972 to 2008. Alternative measures 
of aid were explored to ensure a consistent series and measures of government borrowing 
were collected to identify the fiscal balance. In line with current methods to investigate the 
fiscal effects of aid, a cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) model is employed. 
Attention is paid to features of the data over 1972-79 (a decade of economic collapse and 
social disorder), and effect of ESAP reform from 1988 (adjustment and post adjustment) 
and the Museveni regime in Uganda. A summary of the key results is as follows: 
 
Aid and fiscal variables form a long-run stationary relation and dummies do not have a 
long-run effect (as one would expect). Estimates of this relation reveals that domestic 
borrowing is negatively correlated with aid and tax revenue but positively correlated with 
government spending (in general and development spending in particular), and tax revenue 
is the main driver of budgetary spending plans. A test of structural links between aid and 
fiscal variables reveals that aid is a significant element of long-run fiscal equilibrium, and 
the hypothesis of aid exogeneity is not statistically supported. This has important 
implications regarding the treatment given to aid by the Ugandan budget planners. Either 
they have a target for aid revenue (such that this expected revenue is incorporated into 
fiscal planning) or donors incorporate government spending in deciding how much aid to 
allocate to Uganda or both. Either way, government sets her spending targets according to 
her own development objectives, and then tries to find aid resources to finance those 
ambitions, but in the order: domestic revenue, aid, and domestic borrowing.   
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A number of hypotheses of the long-run effect of aid on fiscal behaviour in Uganda have 
been tested, and these provided interesting insights into fiscal dynamics in Uganda. 
Existence of a budget constraint and not a balanced budget is supported, suggesting that 
while aid flows to Uganda have been substantial, the resource gap has remained big and 
this is often reduced by domestic borrowing (but repaid when revenues are health). Aid 
induces increased tax effort, reduces domestic borrowing and increases public spending. 
Although the increase in spending is less than proportional to incremental aid, there is 
evidence that a budget constraint hangs over the budget implementation. This suggests that 
aid to government (budget) is likely to be fully additional and it is even possible that total 
spending increases by more than aid actually delivered through the budget. The DAC 
measure used overstates significantly the amount of aid to the budget and part of the aid is 
used to reduce borrowing while some is held in foreign exchange reserves. Moreover 
common trends analysis reveals the common stochastic trends as shocks to domestic fiscal 
variables, namely government spending, domestic borrowing and tax revenue. In addition, 
shocks to tax revenue are the pulling forces, so budget spending plans has been adjusting 
to, but not pushing tax revenue and empirical shocks to domestic borrowing, government 
spending and aid are the pushing forces of the system.  
 
In conclusion, a battery of the fiscal hypotheses tests suggest that aid to Uganda has been 
associated with long-term higher public spending (i.e. spending is more than what it could 
have been in the absence of aid), increased tax effort and reduced domestic borrowing. As 
improved public finance management and reduced domestic borrowing are common policy 
conditions attached to aid, this suggests that aid was either associated with or caused 
beneficial policy responses in Uganda. Alternatively, it could be the case that in fiscal 
terms, aid has been utilized sensibly. This is against the backdrop that a distinction 
between aid as finance from aid as policy condition has not been possible, and we do not 
know what donors intended the aid to be used for and the fact that we use the DAC 
measure of aid. This data draw back in our study merits a careful deeper analysis for 
Uganda. Nonetheless, the long-run estimates give results that are consistent with and the 
results from common trend analysis and with observing the data, and are plausible in that 
they are consistent with what is known about the fiscal impact of aid in some of the 
previous country specific applications summarised in Table 3.1 and Morrissey (2012). 
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These results suggest some policy implications. Corroborations from the trend analysis and 
estimates of the long-run coefficients suggest that domestic borrowing remains responsive 
to the uncertainty associated with aid inflows. It is therefore crucial for the donors to 
increase the reliability and predictability of aid in order to improve fiscal planning and 
reduce the need to resort to costly domestic borrowing. In addition, to the extent that 
financing is in the order domestic revenue, aid and domestic borrowing, countercyclical 
aid inflows have the potential to compensate for revenue shortfalls, avoid domestic 
indebtedness and help smooth public spending plans consistent with 8JDQGD¶V
development goals. Moreover as Morrissey (2012) argues, one way to make inference on 
the relationship between aid and spending more clear is for donors to coordinate aid 
delivery systems and also make aid more transparent, i.e. recipients need to know what aid 
is available to finance spending and whether through donor projects or government 
budgets. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
AID, PUBLIC SECTOR AND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
 
5.1 Motivation 
 
Standard growth theory posits that fiscal policy has an important role in stimulating 
investment and economic growth. The belief is that given a right mixture of taxation and 
spending policies as well as other aspects of fiscal policy, the government can increase the 
quantity and productivity of aggregate investment (human and physical capital, research 
and technology) and thus, contribute to overall economic growth (Ram, 1986; Barro, 1990, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). But not all aspects of 
fiscal policy are productive. Government operations are inherently bureaucratic and 
inefficient, and may retard rather than promote growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Landau, 
1983). In particular, some expenditures are productive although the taxes required to 
finance them may create distortions, reducing the private returns to accumulation and 
therefore have a detrimental effect on economic growth. The conventional wisdom is that 
productive government spending financed by non-distortionary taxation is growth 
promoting, but unproductive spending (often interpreted as consumption spending) and 
distortionary taxes are growth retarding (Barro, 1990). This notwithstanding, it is standard 
in public sector growth models to feature channels that explicitly incorporate government 
activities (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Aid is not an argument in this model and we do 
not have time series data on capital or labour, so we adopt a more limited approach to 
investigate relationships of interest. 
 
We have argued previously, following among others, McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) 
that most of the aid that is spent in the country is given primarily to the government and 
that any associated effect of aid on the economy is likely to be mediated by the public 
sector fiscal behaviour. We have also shown empirically in Chapter 4 that aid to Uganda 
has in the long-run been associated with increased public spending, increased tax revenue 
(i.e. these have been more than what they could have been otherwise in the absence of aid) 
and reduced but not eliminated domestic borrowing. Thus, the link between aid and the 
public sector behaviour, and fiscal policy and public sector growth models (the standard 
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growth theory above) provides a useful framework and allows for assessment of aid 
effectiveness from a broader fiscal dimension.  
 
As a source of revenue, aid does not have the price distorting effects of taxes that may 
reduce growth, and that government spending on public goods and services is expected to 
be more than what it could have been in the absence of aid. In the former, aid would be 
expected to have a direct contribution to increased growth (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; 
Lensink and Morrissey, 2000) and may have positive effects on the private sector and 
hence promote growth through the latter channel (Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 2004; 
Lin, 1994). TKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWDLG¶V effect on the economy is mediated by the broader 
fiscal dimension has not been reflected in standard (cross-country) studies of the growth 
effect of aid whereas studies of the fiscal effects of aid have rarely considered growth. This 
chapter extends our fiscal analysis to consider the impact of aid, fiscal variables and 
exports on growth of private consumption to address the growth response to aid in Uganda. 
 
We have chosen to focus on growth of private consumption to measure the 
macroeconomic effectiveness of aid because as we have shown in Chapter 2, 
   MXGICGDPY   in macro accounting terms. Many of the key variables of 
interest are components of GDP, implying there could be a possible identity problem in 
estimating any long-run relationship in levels. Moreover, as (Hansen and Tarp, 2001: 7) 
argue, it is difficult to perceive of aid as a lump-sum transfer, independent of the level of 
income. This suggests a possible simultaneity bias. To circumvent these problems, we 
place C (in the above identity) on the left hand side (LHS). This can then be interpreted as 
capturing how aid mediated through fiscal variables affects private sector growth (and the 
CVAR approach seems appropriate for such an exercise).37 The alternative approaches to 
estimating the growth effect of aid, i.e. single equations raises a likelihood that parameters 
estimates may suffer from endogeneity bias especially when weak instrumental variables 
are used. CVAR allows the data to speak freely about the empirical content of the model 
without compromising the high scientific standards. Importantly, instead of assuming aid 
exogeneity/endogeneity, all variables, including aid are modelled jointly as a system of 
equations and the question of whether aid is endogenous or exogenous is tested. This 
makes the use of CVAR all but appropriate for the task at hand.      
                                          
37 See Juselius et al. (2011: 2) for a detailed justification in favour of the technique and is adopted here on 
exactly these grounds.  
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The relation(s) to be investigated assumes that aid and government spending capture the 
effect of public investment and public wages, taxation captures distortions due to 
government, and exports capture private sector competitiveness. Imports are omitted 
because they are financed using foreign exchange from exports and aid which are 
explicitly modelled. As Morrissey et al. (2007); Osei et al. (2005); and McGillivray and 
Morrissey, (2000) have argued, although these channels are important in understanding the 
growth response to aid, they have too often been ignored and largely overlooked in the 
literature. Moreover, with particular reference to Uganda, no study to our knowledge has 
broadened the empirical search for aid effectiveness as in this study.   
 
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 considers and reviews the 
literature on comparable SSA time series country studies while the determination of the 
DGP and cointegration analysis is described in Section 5.3. The empirical CVAR model is 
given in Section 5.4, and estimates of the long-run growth effect of aid is presented in 
Section 5.5. A disaggregated variant model is discussed in Section 5.6 and finally, Section 
5.7 draws the conclusions and implications.  
 
5.2  Literature Review 
 
The literature on aid effectiveness, typically judged in teUPVRIDLG¶Veffect on economic 
growth is largely in cross-country econometric studies (these are reviewed in Chapter one).  
Approximating cross-country evidence to what is inherently a time series phenomenon is a 
valuable exercise that allows one to attempt to draw general conclusions (Lloyd et al., 
2001: 1). However, countries are heterogeneous and country-specific factors may promote 
or constrain aid effectiveness. As Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) argue, aid-growth 
results are associated with regional differences, and this could be of a serious concern 
when it comes to country-level differences. Thus, one major limitation of focussing on 
cross-country regressions is that country-specific questions regarding aid are omitted (Clist, 
2010), and Riddell (2007), cited in Juselius et al. (2011) argues that country-based 
evidence provides the only reliable backdrop against which to judge aid effectiveness. 
Thus, to enhance our understanding of country-specific questions regarding aid 
effectiveness, it is desirable to conduct studies of the impact of aid on growth in specific 
countries. There are virtually no country-specific empirical studies on how aid, mediated 
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by fiscal variables impact on private sector growth, but an extensive literature search 
turned up the following general studies:   
 
Lloyd et al. (2001), use an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models approach and 
find that exports, aid and public investment are (all) positively related to long-run growth 
in private consumption in Ghana. Studies by Gounder (2001) for Fiji, and Bhattarai (2009) 
for Napal using respectively the ARDL and the Johansen Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
approaches show that foreign aid has had a significant positive impact on economic growth. 
In the only directly comparable study, Morrissey et al. (2007) investigate the impact of aid 
on growth within a fiscal framework and find in Kenya that grants were associated with 
increased spending and that government spending had a positive effect on growth (grants 
also had a small positive association with growth). Loans, on the other hand had a negative 
association with growth. 
 
In some of the most recent applications, Juselius et al. (2011) rely on country-based time-
series analysis and perform a comprehensive study of the long-run effect of ODA on a set 
of key macroeconomic variables in 36 SSA from mid-1960s to 2007. Using a statistical 
benchmark of a CVAR model, they provide broad support for a positive long-run impact 
of aid on investment in 33 of the 36 countries in the sample, but hardly any evidence that 
aid has been harmful. Kargbo (2012) uses a triangulation of approaches and specifications 
on Sierra Leonean data and finds results that are consistent with the view that aid 
significantly contributes to economic growth. In a sharp contrast, however, Fenny (2005), 
and Javid and Qayyum (2011) uses a similar ARDL approach on Papua New Guinea and 
Pakistan respectively, but do not find evidence that aid contributes to economic growth. 
 
This thesis extends the fiscal analysis to consider aid effectiveness within the broader 
context of the economy, over the period 1970-2008. It draws heavily on the most recent 
CVAR in Juselius et al. (2011) to investigate how aid mediated by fiscal variables, and 
exports impact on private consumption growth as the context for estimating the growth 
response to aid in Uganda. Using this approach, we investigate the ceteris paribus and the 
multiplier growth effect of aid mediated by the broader fiscal dimension. With regard to 
the former effects, Gomanee et al. (2005: 356) argue that the aid that generates income-
earning opportunities or that provides social services, such as donor funded projects in 
health or sanitation can directly benefit the private sector in the long-run. The latter arises 
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because aid is directed to the government, and is likely to be associated with incremental 
public spending which implies that aid indirectly generates positive externalities for the 
private sector (Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor, 2004).  
 
Following Lloyd et al. (2001), we focus on the growth of private consumption rather than 
growth of investment (as in Morrissey et al., 2007) or GDP. Although one could argue that 
private consumption is not a measure of growth (usually measured as growth in GDP), our 
approach is premised on a range of grounds. These include theoretical (following Barro, 
1990 and Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1992, 1995) and conceptual (Lloyd et al., 2001). Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin (1992) argue that private consumption can be used as a measure of 
economic growth as the correlation of output and other variables can be modelled from the 
production or utility side of the household. This is because government activities may 
indirectly increase the total output of a country through its interaction with the private 
sector (Lin, 1994). For the data at hand, the correlation between GDP and private 
consumption is about 0.978, which signals WKDW 8JDQGD¶V *'3 JURZWK KDV RQ DYHUDJH, 
expanded household living standards.  
 
The other reason is more conceptual. The concern in economic development is more about 
what is happening to private incomes and consumption levels rather than the overall size 
of the economy (Lloyd et al., 2001). Note that most of the cross-country and country-
specific econometric studies of aid have concentrated on the effectiveness of aid in 
increasing economic growth. However, in recent years, donors have attached greater 
importance to the objective of using aid to reduce poverty (World Bank, 2000). It is argued 
that using aid to guide or influence the allocation of government spending is one important 
way to increase the leverage of aid on private incomes or poverty alleviation (Gomanee 
and others, 2005).  
 
Aid to Uganda has increasingly been used to support public spending as part of the PEAP 
or under HIPC initiative through the PAF spending (Egesa, 2011). Therefore, insofar as 
there is a strong correlation between levels of poverty and growth in private incomes, then, 
use of private consumption is consistent with assessing aid effectiveness from the poor¶V
perspective. Note though that incidence of poverty reduction from increased spending due 
to incremental aid may be un-equally distributed, so that welfare gains for the poor may 
not be guaranteed (Gomanee et al., 2005: 358). Castro-Leal et al. (1999: 54) show that the 
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poorest are the least likely to benefit from pro-poor spending. Nonetheless, it is understood 
that the poor can still benefit as long as some of the aid financed spending goes to them or 
get more in aid financed spending than they pay in taxes. In addition, the fact that private 
consumption expenditure captures non-income dimensions of poverty, it may be more 
important than economic growth (World Bank, 2001).  
 
So, we do consider the implications of our findings to capture the growth effect of aid in 
Uganda. This notwithstanding, it is fair to observe that the growth process depends on an 
intricate range of interacting characteristics and lines of influence (Aghion and Howitt, 
1998; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Thus, the simple analytical framework adopted here 
may not fully capture the growth process. Our concern is not with identifying the 
determinants of growth, but rather how aid and public sector impact on the growth of 
private income, providing the variables included in the system are cointegrated. 
 
5.3 Determination of the DGP and Cointegration Analysis 
 
Cointegration analysis in this chapter draws on the econometric methodology discussed in 
Section 3.3, the visual inspection of the data in figure 3.1 and figure 3.2 and exploratory 
data description, but especially unit-root test results presented in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3. 
It is shown that macroeconomic variables- tax revenue (TR), aid (A), domestic borrowing 
(DB), total public spending (G), exports (X) and private consumption expenditure (PC) ± 
are unit root non-stationary, i.e.  1I in level and  0I in first difference, so could form (an) 
equilibrium relation(s) in a 6-variable VAR model. In addition, all series are in non-log 
specification to preserve the degrees of freedom especially because domestic borrowing 
series is problematic. Most of the series sample points from the mid-1980s are either 
negative or very close to zero which jeopardizes the validity of log-transformations.  
 
Although aid effectiveness has typically been judged in terms of its effect on economic 
growth, this has not been considered within the broader fiscal dimension, i.e. how growth 
is mediated by the inter-relationship between aid and public sector fiscal behaviour. So, 
economic theory may be of little guidance for the precise form of the model we should be 
VSHFLI\LQJ +RZHYHU ZH KDYH DOORZHG IRU D FRPSOHWH µfiscal representation¶ LH DOO
budget variables are included, with an omission and aid is based on DAC measures so that 
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there is no estimation of true identity). As we have shown and established in Chapter 4, 
WKLV µfiscal representation¶ FRXOG MXVWLI\ WKH H[LVWence of one cointegrating vector as 
predicted by the fiscal response theory (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, 2004). We go a 
step further and consider an additional link, i.e. aid, fiscal variables, exports and growth in 
private consumption because the aid¶V DVVRFLDWHG SXEOLF VHFWRU EHKDYLRXU FRXOG KDYH DQ
effect on the economy (McGillivray, 1994; Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998; McGillivray 
and Morrissey, 2001). Moreover, through its effect on the public sector, aid may have 
positive effects on the private sector and hence promote growth (Mosley, Hudson and 
Verschoor, 2004; Lin, 1994). Hence, this additional link considers aid and the public sector 
within the broader context of the economy.  
 
Thus, our empirical framework allows for a possibility of two cointegrating vectors 
because in principle, one relationship is the statistical analogue of the budgetary 
equilibrium among the core fiscal variables (DB, G, A, TR), and a relationship between aid 
(A), public sector (essentially comprising fiscal variables (G, TR, DB) and exports (X)) and 
private consumption (PC). If what we find are two cointegrating vectors, their 
interpretation would be facilitated by the fiscal response and public sector growth theories 
outlined above, including offering guidance to the specification of each vector.  The 
analysis is executed using CATS in RATS, version 2 (by J.G. Dennis, H. Hansen, S. 
Johansen and K. Juselius, Estima 2005), unless otherwise stated.  
 
The estimation technique employed in the chapter mimics the one we employed in Section 
4.2 of Chapter 4, although it is more complex. As in Section 4.2, existence of cointegrating 
relation(s) among the variables is evaluated using the Johansen (1988) trace statistic test. 
The cointegrating space is specified to include an unrestricted constant and a restricted 
deterministic trend and k is initially set at 2 (to facilitate the search for an appropriate 
model specification). Thus, we considered a 6-dimensional CVAR model, an unrestricted 
constant, a restricted trend and let k=2. A VECM similar to one in equation (4.1) is 
estimated. Based on this model, the appropriate lag-length is determined. A summary of 
lag-length determination is presented in Appendix B. From the results in Appendix Table 
B1, we see that SC and HQ select VAR(1) [because the recommendation is to select the 
lowest value for the information criteria] and the LM test suggests this model meets the 
crucial assumption of time independence of the residuals. This DGP nets out the lagged 
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first difference terms stacked in 1tǻ\ of the general model outlined in equation (3.4), 
reducing to one similar to that in equation (4.2) in an unrestricted form. We then proceeded 
to assess the suitability of this model in terms of a battery of residual misspecification tests 
(see inter alia Godfrey, 1988). 
 
First, is the inspection of residual graphs presented in Appendix figure B1. The plots show 
an outlying observation in the residuals of G, PC and X equations that occurs around 
1979/80. The actual and fitted residuals show a slight but detectable change in behaviour 
in most of the series equations (from about 1988). As already alluded to, the former 
corresponds to the climax of the decade of economic collapse and social disorder in 
Uganda and possibly the second oil price shock and the breakdown of the East African 
Community (EAC) in 1977. The latter could be capturing a change in institutional 
environment (ESAP reforms) and the Museveni regime from the mid-1980s.  
 
Turning to residual analysis in Appendix Table B2, we cannot reject the null of no first or 
second order autocorrelation (see LM(1) and LM(2). The multivariate test for ARCH 
rejects the null of ARCH effects, although univariate ARCH effects are accepted in PC, 
but none of the other variables. Rahbek et al. (2002) cited in Juselius (2006) and Dennis 
(2006) show that the rank tests are robust to moderate ARCH effects, so this may not be a 
problem here. In the results, both measures of goodness of fit, i.e. the trace correlation and 
the 2R for each error correction equation suggest that our model captures, to a reasonable 
extent, the correlation among the system variables. The hypothesis of multivariate 
normality is not supported ( 2F  (12) = 22.473 [0.033]). Looking at the univariate statistics, 
normality of the error term is rejected at the conventional 10 percent level for PC, X and G 
series. As the standard normal distribution has skewness of 0 and kurtosis of 3, we see 
from the results that PC, X and G have excess kurtosis (fat tails). In addition, PC and X 
have a large degree of skewness which, usually is due to a problem with large outliers. 
CVAR model is quite robust towards excess kurtosis, but not towards the presence of 
skewness. We observe non-normality of the error terms in G, X and PC equations, 
although we do not have autocorrelated residuals, which again is very important.  
 
Using &$76PLQLQJ SURFHGXUH ³Find large residuals´ ZH HVWLPDWH H[WUHPH YDOXHV RI
standardized residuals scaled by the critical value of 3.19341 simulated for T=36. From the 
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results in Appendix Table B3, we see that the largest residuals are in X and PC equations 
(3.352 and 3.718 respectively) while in the G equation it is borderline so (3.065), in the 
same period 1979.  So as in the previous chapter, we allowed for transitory blip and level 
shift (on the basis of institutional knowledge) and restricted 79dum and 88D dummies to lie 
in the cointegrating space, albeit noting that 79dum cancels out as a consequence of 
cointegration. Residual analysis in Appendix Table B4 considers whether this modification 
improves the specification of the model. Looking at the univariate series in the table, the 
errors from X and PC equations are now normally distributed, although those of G are not. 
In effect, the specification of the model improves, but we still reject multivariate normality 
(ChiSqr(12) = 19.819 [0.014]) . This suggests that the two variant models, i.e. without (and 
with dummies) are not statistically different, so dummies may be impotent in the model 
(i.e. dummies do not correct for the model misspecification problems detected in the basic 
model). This notwithstanding, the good news is that estimates of the VAR model are 
robust to deviations from normality assumption providing residuals are not autocorrelated.  
 
Trace Statistics Test for Cointegration 
 
In the following analysis, cointegration rank is determined using trace statistics test, but 
applied on  two variants of the model, without (and with dummies) as a sensitivity analysis. 
Results for the former are in Table 5.1 while those of the latter are in Appendix Table B5. 
In both of these tablesµ¶LVWKHVPDOOVDPSOH%DUWOHWWFRUUHFWLRQZKLFKHQVXUHVDFRUUHFW
test size (see Johansen, 2002).  
 
7DEOH-RKDQVHQ¶V&RLQWHJUDWLRQtrace test Results   
I(1)-ANALYSIS (without dummies) 
 p-r r Eig.Value  Trace  Trace*  Frac95  P-Value P-Value* 
  6  0     0.726 144.194 129.370 117.451   0.000    0.006 
  5  1     0.695  97.529  89.544  88.554   0.009    0.042 
  4  2     0.479  54.820  51.426  63.659   0.229    0.356 
  3  3     0.378  31.327  29.980  42.770   0.432    0.509 
  2  4     0.219  14.214  13.855  25.731   0.645    0.674 
  1  5     0.138   5.331   5.285  12.448   0.558    0.564 
Notes: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend restricted; Frac95: the 5% critical value of the test of
 H(r) against H(p). The critical values as well as the p-values are approximated using the *
 distribution (Doornix, 1998). 
5 - Aid, Public Sector & Private Consumption Thomas Bwire 
The University Of Nottingham 128 
 
The trace test statistic suggests presence of two equilibrium (stationary) relations among 
the variables and is robust to small sample Bartlett correction in the two variant models. 
This means that the model has 2 r cointegrating relations and 4  rp common 
stochastic trends. Noteworthy is that system variables cointegrate with and (without 
dummies), implying that dummies appear not to have a long-run effect in the model. To 
reflect this, a null hypothesis of long-run exclusion of 88t shift dummy from the 
cointegration relations is tested, but cannot be rejected (L.R test:   944.022  F [0.624]). 
To sum up, we have found statistical evidence that inclusion of dummies does not 
significantly improve multivariate normality of the model. Also, variables in the system 
cointegrate without having to include dummies and more formally, a test of long-run 
exclusion of 88t shift dummy could not be rejected. Based on this, we conclude as in the 
previous chapter that inclusion of dummies is not warranted in this case. So the rest of the 
analysis is based on a model with no dummies without losing the generality of the 
argument, and it is the model based on which we tested for the presence of unit roots in the 
multivariate framework given the cointegration space.  
 
For similar reasons given in Section 4.4, it is a good idea not to exclusively rely on the 
trace test alone. So in the following, the formal (trace) test is complemented with a battery 
of rank condition sensitivity checks, including graphs of the cointegration relations, the 
characteristic roots of the companion matrix or roots of the characteristic polynomial and 
then the recursively calculated trace tests.  
 
Residuals of Cointegrating Relation 
 
In figure 5.1 are plots of all the six potential cointegrating relations from the model (we 
assume full rank of the Ȇ matrix). Each of the cointegration relation comprise a pair of 
residuals, tZ1ÖE c and tR1ÖE c . The former is the equilibrium error as a function of short run 
dynamics and deterministic components, while the latter concentrates out the lagged short-
run dynamics (i.e. the concentrated model. Given the DGP (i.e. lag-length 1 k ) in the 
model, tZ1ÖE c and tR1ÖE c are similar as this nullifies the short run adjustment effects 
embodied in tZ1ÖE c which tR1ÖE c corrects for.  
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Figure 5.1: Residuals of Cointegrating Relation 
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Based on the figure, the first two, i.e. the first and second cointegrating relations appears to 
be stationary, and may suggest presence of two cointegrating vectors.   
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Roots of the characteristic polynomial 
 
Under the assumptions of the cointegrated VAR model, the modulus of the root of the 
companion matrix should be inside the unit circle or equal to 1(because they are equal to 
the inverse of the roots of the characteristic polynomial (Juselius, 2006: 50-2). Or they 
correspond to explosive processes if outside the unit circle. In practice, we need to choose 
the rank so that the largest unrestricted root is far from a unit root, i.e. it has modulus lower 
than 1. The model here is defined for 6 p , 1 k implying 6 ukp roots in the 
characteristic polynomial (i.e. we assume full rank of the Ȇ matrix). 
 
Table 5.2: The Roots of the Companion Matrix 
The Roots of the COMPANION MATRIX // Model: H(6) 
       Real  Imaginary Modulus Argument 
Root1  0.943     0.052   0.945    0.056 
Root2  0.943    -0.052   0.945   -0.056 
Root3  0.622     0.000   0.622    0.000 
Root4  0.295     0.000   0.295    0.000 
Root5 -0.059    -0.047   0.076   -2.469 
Root6 -0.059     0.047   0.076    2.469 
 
In the table, we seem to have two complex pairs (roots1+2 and roots5+6) and two real 
roots. One of the complex pairs (roots1+2) has a modulus close to 1, which we in practice 
cannot distinguish from unit roots. This indicates that we have 2 potential unit roots.  
 
Recursive graphs of the Trace-Test Statistics 
 
In the figure are recursive graphs of the recursively calculated trace-statistics based on 
equation (4.2) in Dennis (2006: 100) or equivalently, equation (8.1) in Juselius (2006: 131). 
These are scaled by the critical value of the trace test distribution derived for a model 
without exogenous variables, shifts or dummies ± µEDVLF PRGHO¶ (Dennis, 2006:100). A 
baseline line model was estimated for a subsample period, 20011  t , and then was 
recursively extended until the full sample is covered, noting that the X- form (full model) 
and the R-form (concentrated) versions of the model are similar. The main point in this 
graph is to observe the time path of the trace statistics. The visual impression of the graph 
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is that two test statistics are above unity, suggesting 2 r , albeit showing the effect of 
policy regime shift on the eigenvalues.   
 
Figure 5.2: Recursive graphs of the Trace-Test Statistics    
 
 
In conclusion, the trace statistics test, recursive graphs of the trace-test statistics, roots of 
the characteristic polynomial and residuals of cointegrating relations together suggest that 
the preferred rank is 2 r . Following the confirmation of the cointegrating rank, we 
tested for the presence of unit roots within the multivariate framework using the CATS 
procedure as in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4.   
 
Table 5.3: Test for Stationarity: LR-test,  42F   
DB G A TR X PC 
22.724 
(.000) 
22.765 
(.000) 
22.642 
(.000) 
22.690 
(.000) 
21.543 
(.000) 
22.687 
(.000) 
Notes: Restricted trend included in the cointegrating relationship(s); 5% C.V = 9.488; P-values in 
parentheses 
 
Results in Table 5.3 clearly show that stationarity of each variable by itself cannot be 
supported, so the series are unit root non-stationary or  1I .   
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5.4  The Empirical Specification of Cointegrated VAR(1) Model  
 
From the preceding analysis, we consider a 6-variable CVAR model for  
 c ttttttt PCXTRAGDB ,,,,,y , and structure the restricted empirical error correction 
specification around 2 r cointegrating relations, an unrestricted constant, 0ȝ and a vector 
of linear trends, tȕĮ c restricted to lie in the cointegrating space. Lag-length 1 k implies
01  ī , so the lagged short-run dynamics in (3.4) drops out. The restricted CVAR model 
for the data becomes  
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Where tiyȕc is the equilibrium error, ijĮ is the adjustment coefficient, 0ȝ is a  1up vector 
of an unrestricted constant, and tȕĮ c is a  1up  vector of linear trend restricted to lie in the 
cointegrating space.'
 
is the first difference operator and  uit N ȁİ ,0~ 5  . Given the DGP, 
the long-run is the same as the short-run and the system, after having been pushed away 
from equilibrium by an exogenous shock, will adjust back to equilibrium exclusively 
through ijĮ  so that weak exogeneity is then the same as long-run exogeneity. Although 
this specification is intuitively similar to (4.3), we have to formerly just-identify the two 
stationary long-run relations and impose joint restrictions on the long-run parameters (i.e. 
ijȕ and ijĮ ) where permissible. For example, restrictions on ijĮ coefficient would tell us 
which variables adjust to maintain equilibrium after the system has been pushed out of its 
long-run equilibrium.  
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Long-run Identification Strategy and Structural Analysis 
 
The two joint long-run stationary relationships detected above are unidentified and merely 
represent statistical rather than meaningful economic relationships. In the following, we 
wish to uniquely identify (on the basis of the discussion a priori) these two relations. We 
assumed, in the spirit of the fiscal response theory (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, 
2004) that the first vector links the fiscal variables ( tttt TRAGDB &,, ) only (as has been 
discussed in Chapter 4). Exports ( tX ) and private consumption ( tPC ) are set to zero in 
this relation (because these are not fiscal variables).   
 
The second relation relates to the link between aid, fiscal variables, exports and private 
consumption. It follows from the recognition that aid is primarily given to the government, 
and that any impact of aid on the economy is mediated by government fiscal behaviour. 
This allows us to investigate issues relating to the effect of aid and public sector on the 
growth of private consumption, i.e. a growth-type relationship (see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995). In this relationship, tax revenue is set to zero due to a number of 
considerations. First, it measures (in practice) more or less the same thing as government 
expenditure (Hansson and Henrekson, 1994: 390). Second, in a framework where the 
government is assumed to be free to borrow (especially that we allow for domestic 
borrowing in the model), taxes may have zero long-run effect on growth (Milesi-Ferretti 
DQG 5RXELQL  0¶$PDQMD DQG 0RUULVVH\  DUJXH WKDW JRYHUQPHQW HIIHFW RQ
long-run growth is through expenditure, and taxes have no or a marginal impact (as tax 
was found to be insignificant).  
 
We conduct a formal statistical test and complement economic theory in choosing the 
variables to include in each system. Formally, identification is checked by imposing (over-) 
identifying restrictions (i.e. imposing at least  1rr ) restrictions on each cointegrating 
relation or ȕ vector (Dennis, 2006: 62). Following the restrictions strategies in Dennis 
(2006: 60-70), we will require two normalizations and at least one restriction(s) per 
cointegrating vector, but imposed jointly for just-identifying the system in equation (5.1). 
We chose to jointly normalize (respectively) on domestic borrowing in the fiscal vector 
and on private consumption in the second vector. The former (as argued in the previous 
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chapter) is a residual and is incorporated to identify the fiscal balance. The latter is because 
our focus is on the growth of private consumption.  
 
Using the automated CATSmining procedure, we test first for the theoretical validity 
(sensitivity analysis) of long-run exclusion of variables from beta1 and from beta2. This is 
achieved by restricting one cointegrating relation while keeping the others unrestricted and 
then testing for variable exclusion. In Table 5.4, we report variable exclusion test results 
for 1 r and 2 r  cointegrating vectors.  
 
Table 5.4: Test of Exclusion: LR-test,  r2F  
r DB G A TR X PC Trend 
1 
 
 
3.682 
(0.055) 
 
2.682 
(0.014) 
 
3.331 
(0.068) 
 
3.390 
(0.066) 
 
0.525 
(0.469) 
 
0.261 
(0.609) 
 
3.390 
(0.066) 
2 
 
22.506 
(0.000) 
8.403 
(0.015) 
12.943 
(0.002) 
1.208 
(0.547) 
18.721 
(0.000) 
13.118 
(0.001) 
20.786 
(0.000) 
Notes: Null hypothesis: variable is excludable from the respective cointegrating relation(s); p-values in 
parentheses  
  
From the table, the p-values corresponding to X and PC coefficients are insignificant in the 
first cointegrating vector ( 1 r ), but are significant in the second ( 2 r ) relation. This 
suggests that exclusion of X and PC from beta1 cannot be rejected. Similarly, TR seems to 
be unimportant in both cointegrating relations but important in the first. These results 
reinforce our choice of the variables that we include in the respective cointegrating 
relations: X and PC are not fiscal variables and therefore do not need to enter into the first 
(fiscal) relation but in the second (growth-type) relation. Similarly, it seems clear that tax 
revenue does not have to enter into the long-run growth-type relation but is important in 
the fiscal relation. Furthermore, using the same CATSmining, we restricted X and PC from 
the first relation and tested for the long-run stationarity of Beta1. Stationarity of Beta1 
vector could not be rejected (   309.422  F [0.116]). Then, TR was restricted in the second 
relation and stationarity of the second vector (beta2) could not also be rejected 
(   083.012  F [0.774]). Thus, stationarity of each of the restricted vectors could not be 
rejected, and as the results in Table 5.5 show, the globally loaded model is stationary and 
this rank condition was just satisfied. 
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Table 5.5: Test for Stationarity of each Beta Relation 
*** MODEL 1: DGF: 3 // P-value: 0.189 
BETA(transposed)  
 
DB G A TR X PC TREND 
Beta(1) 
0.004 
(7.352) 
0.001 
(3.889) 
-0.001 
(-4.891) 
-0.001 
(-5.327) 
0.000 
(.NA) 
0.000 
(.NA) 
1.000 
(.NA) 
Beta(2) 
-0.005 
(-10.547) 
-0.001 
(-6.496) 
-0.001 
(-7.155) 
0.000 
(.NA) 
-0.002 
(-9.304) 
-0.000 
(-1.838) 
1.000 
(.NA) 
 
Finally, we jointly exclude tPC  and tX  from beta1 and tTR from beta2, i.e. we imposed a 
joint (over-) identifying restrictions using the LR test. The test yielded:   650.212  F
(0.104), albeit noting that the standard errors of ijE

could not be generated as this depends 
crucially on whether each cointegrating vector has been properly normalized. Nonetheless, 
the joint test could not be rejected and is consistent with the evidence in Table 5.4. Hence, 
X and PC are excludable from the fiscal relation and TR is excludable from the growth 
relation. Equally important is the result that aid is a significant element of both the long-
run fiscal and growth equilibria. This mirrors the results we obtained in the fiscal model 
and may, in the growth relation, capture the effect of aid on private consumption.  
 
With the long-run structure identified and long-run variable exclusion implied, we focus 
next on the long-run weak exogeneity test (i.e. a zero row in Į : joint and vector specific) 
using procedures proposed in Johansen (1996). This has been discussed in detail in Section 
4.6.2 of Chapter 4, so we utilize the same here. Testing for example whether aid is weakly 
exogenous for the long-run system in (5.1) involves imposing joint restrictions on the 
corresponding Į coefficients (i.e. :0H 02,31,3   DD ), whilst other Į coefficients are 
unrestricted.  The test results for the joint restrictions are reported in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6: Long-run Weak Exogeneity: LR-test,  22F   
Variable Null Hypothesis Statistic p-value 
tDB  01211   DD  8.797 0.012 
tG  02221   DD  0.617 0.734 
tA  03231   DD  7.945 0.019 
tTR  04241   DD  7.060 0.029 
tX  05251   DD  10.708 0.005 
tPC  06261   DD  1.994 0.369 
Notes: Null hypothesis: a variable is weakly exogenous. A large test statistic (small prob.) indicates that the 
null hypothesis of weak exogeneity is rejected.   
 
The results indicate that jointly, the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity cannot be rejected 
for total public spending and private consumption. These do not seem to adjust to system 
disequilibrium, and are as such exogenous to the long-run relations. Conversely, long-run 
weak exogeneity is firmly rejected for aid, domestic borrowing, tax revenue and exports, 
suggesting these adjust to maintain equilibrium, and are, as such endogenous to the long-
run relations. However, as these results apply to the entire cointegrating system, it is 
difficult to pin down or even claim to know the role played by aid, fiscal and the other 
variables in reinstating equilibrium in each of the vector specific relations. Thus, in 
addition, we tested for long-run weak exogeneity in the fiscal and growth-type relations 
respectively. Test results are reported in Table 5.7.  
 
Table 5.7: Specific Vector Long-run Weak Exogeneity Tests: LR-test  
Identified Relations DB G A TR X PC 
 Fiscal Relation  32F
 
 
 11.546 
(0.009) 
 9.529 
(0.023) 
 10.306 
 (0.016) 
 11.677 
    (0.009) 
 --- 
 
 --- 
 
  
Growth Relation  22F
 
 
 6.313 
  (0.043) 
 4.452 
   (0.108) 
 5.588 
  (0.014) 
 --- 
 
 6.348 
   (0.042) 
 5.045 
   (0.080) 
Notes: p-values in parentheses  
 
While the results in Table 5.6 suggest G and PC are weakly exogenous to the system, the 
results in Table 5.7 suggest that G and PC are in the margins of significance. The result for 
long-run weak-exogeneity of aid is consistent with test evidence we obtained in the fiscal 
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response model, and is also consistent with the evidence in Juselius et al. (2011). Strong 
exogeneity of aid received little support in the majority of the SSA countries in their 
sample (25 (including Uganda) of the 33 countries). Also worth noting is the behaviour of 
the domestic borrowing variable. Although it happens to be weakly exogenous in the fiscal 
response model, it is endogenous in the macroeconomic set-up, corroborating our earlier 
conjecture that it may be influenced by factors other than domestic fiscal variables (say 
factors in the macro economy).    
 
5.5 Long-Run Growth Effect of Aid 
 
Section 5.4 shows the links between aid and the macrovariables in Uganda but these are 
uninformative about the signs and magnitude of the individual effects of aid on individual 
macrovariables. In this section, we investigate the signs and significance of the direct and 
multiplier effect associated with aid, fiscal variables and exports on the growth of private 
consumption. For example, a significant positive association of aid with private 
consumption could imply that aid contributes to private sector growth. Furthermore, 
allowing for the fact that aid itself is included in government spending, then, a positive 
significant correlation of public spending with private consumption may capture, in part, 
the multiplier effect associated with aid. Due to the difficulties implementing routines in 
&$76 LQ 5$76 WKH FDOFXODWLRQ RI µVWDQGDUG HUURUV¶ IRU EHWD ZDV LQYDOLGDWHG ZKHQ ZH
normalized on PC38 , but as this is a variable of interest, we had to switch to E-views 7.2 to 
analyse the long-run estimates. Estimates of the long-run growth-type relation as set in 
Table 5.8 are obtained (t-ratios in parentheses): 
 
From the table, we see that results in the first column (fiscal relation) are consistent with 
what we obtain in equation (4.4) of Chapter 4 and would be consistent if normalized on G 
and TR or A (as in equation (4.5) and equation (4.6a, b) respectively). So a similar 
interpretation of the long-run effect of aid on individual fiscal variables (i.e. the fiscal 
effects of aid) as in section 4.6 applies. Thus, it is fair to argue that results in the first 
column of Table 5.8 imply that in the long-run, aid is associated with: (i) increased public 
spending, albeit noting that spending is less than proportional to aid increment, but it is 
                                          
38 When identifying restrictions have been imposed on the long-run structure, it is only possible to get 
standard errors of ijE

when each cointegrating vector has been properly normalized.  
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more than what it could have been in the absence of aid and it is possible that total 
spending increases by more than aid actually delivered through the budget; (ii) Increased 
tax effort; and (iii) reduced domestic borrowing. 
 
Table 5.8: Vector Error Correction Estimates (Aggregate model)  
Cointegrating Eq:  Fiscal Relation Growth Relation 
 
DB(-1)  -1.000  6.988 
  [7.284] 
   
G(-1)  0.223  1.392 
 [6.506] [5.007] 
   
A(-1) -0.345  0.431 
 [-9.087] [1.503] 
   
TR(-1) -0.391  0.000 
 [-8.423]  
   
X(-1)  0.000  2.030 
  [3.377] 
   
PC(-1)  0.000 -1.000 
   
@T(72)  207.448  1567.252 
 [7.081] [5.563] 
   
C -3803.436 -993.795 
Notes:  Normalization is on DB in the fiscal relation and on PC in the growth relation. X and PC are
 restricted to zero in the fiscal relation, and so is TR in the growth relation. In parantheses are t-ratios. 
 
In the second column of the table is the growth in private consumption relation. In the 
relation, all variables have expected signs. Ceteris paribus, public spending, exports and 
domestic borrowing positively contribute to private sector growth in Uganda. In the fiscal 
relation, aid is associated with incremental spending, and spending has a significant 
positive effect on private sector growth. This confirms the view that incremental 
expenditure on public goods and service due to incremental aid generates positive 
externalities for the private sector. From this angle, aid appears to have an indirect 
(positive and significant) multiplier effect on private consumption, and presumably 
through this on growth. Aid itself has a positive albeit insignificant coefficient, suggesting 
µabsence of evidence DQGQRWHYLGHQFHRIDEVHQFH¶ (see Temple, 2010 cited in Juselius et 
al., 2011: 2) that aid has had a direct beneficial association with private sector growth in 
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Uganda. Hence, even though aid may plausibly have no direct effect on private 
consumption, it does conditional on government expenditure.  
 
The result for a rise in government bond issuance may appear counter intuitive. However, 
as estimates of the disaggregated variate model will show (and consistent with estimates of 
the disaggregated variate of the fiscal relation in Section (4.8) of the previous Chapter) 
domestic borrowing is linked to public investment spending. Given this, the result may 
imply that domestic borrowing is associated with a µcrowding in¶ effect linked to public 
investment spending, which has a complementary relationship with private sector growth. 
In this regard, deficit financing raises wealth and stimulates household consumption 
demand. Overall, it is quite remarkable from the results that public spending, exports and 
even domestic financing have coefficients well above unit, implying that increase in either 
of this may increase private consumption more than one-for-one.   
 
The trend term has a positive association with private income and is significantly different 
from zero suggesting that private income has been increasing with time. This mirrors the 
remarkable declines in income poverty or a rise in household living standards in Uganda 
over the past two decades. Income poverty has declined from 44% in 1997/98 (Appleton et 
al., 1999) to 38.4% in 2002/03 and further to 31.3% in 2005/06 (UBOS, 2006; Appleton, 
2001). Since this period coincides with large increases in aid inflows on a scale that 
Uganda had never previously received (Egesa, 2011; Mugume, 2008), it could be case that 
the rising private income trend has a bearing on the aid inflows.  
 
5.6 A disaggregated Variant Model 
 
Kweka and Morrissey (2000) argue that the nature of the impact of increased government 
spending due to incremental aid on growth depends very much on its form. Verschoor 
(2002) cited in Gomanee et al. (2005: 357-58) argues that some categories of public 
spending are recognized as being pro-public and tends to do so in a manner that is pro-
poor especially as the level of spending increases. Specifically, social sector spending and 
expenditures on rural roads, microcredit, agricultural extension etc. may be as beneficial to 
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the poor as it could be to the public at large (Morrissey, 2004). 39  So we considered 
disaggregating G into current consumption (GC) and development (GK) spending. Thus, a 
refinement of the results in Table 5.8 is considered and estimated to reveal the overall 
LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH IRUP RI VSHQGLQJ LQ 8JDQGD¶V JURZWK UHFRUG 5esults are set out in 
Table 5.9 [t-ratios in parentheses]40 
 
Table 5.9: Vector Error Correction Estimates (Disaggregated variant model) 
Cointegrating Eq:  Fiscal Relation Growth Relation 
DB(-1) -1.000  9.467 
  [8.119] 
   
GC(-1)  0.056  1.399 
 [0.306] [2.606] 
   
GK(-1)  0.245  1.974 
 [4.401] [1.317] 
   
A(-1) -0.379  0.732 
 [-7.491] [1.533] 
   
TR(-1) -0.337  0.000 
 [-6.578]  
   
X(-1)  0.000  1.326 
  [1.781] 
   
PC(-1)  0.000 -1.000 
   
@T(72)  198.273  1862.173 
 [5.432] [4.817] 
   
C -3361.828 -8885.767 
Notes:  Normalization is on DB in the fiscal relation and on PC in the growth relation. X and PC are
 restricted to zero in the fiscal relation, and so is TR in the growth relation. In parantheses are t-ratios. 
 
Save for the GC and GK coefficients in the fiscal relation shown in the first column in the 
table, the rest of the coefficients are consistent with those in the aggregate model. In 
addition, current spending coefficient is insignificant, so comment is restricted to capital 
spending coefficient. Results suggest that in the long-run, domestic borrowing is more 
closely linked to capital spending. We however caution that care should be exercised when 
                                          
39 While one may discredit this argument on grounds that there could be limited efficiency of service 
delivery especially to the poor, Devarajan and Reinikka (2004), and Reinikka and Svensson (2004) ( in  
Gomanee et al., 2005) argue that new techniques for monitoring expenditure and delivering services offer 
potential for improvement.  
40 Estimates obtained using E-views 7.2 software  
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interpreting this result. It may be a measurement problem where the aggregation of 
productive (investment) expenditure includes substantial non-productive (consumption) 
expenditure (Kweka and Morrissey, 2000) 
 
The decomposition results in the second column in the table (growth relation) suggest, 
ceteris paribus, current spending and domestic borrowing positively contribute to private 
sector growth. The fact that aid is associated with increased spending, the significance of 
current spending suggests that some aid finances government consumption spending via 
probably public sector wages and services, which contribute to aggregate demand. Egesa 
(2011) observes that donor funding has been characterized by an adjustment from heavy 
capital expenditures in the early 1990s to social programs spending enshrined in the PEAP 
(and specifically the PA)(JHVD¶VREVHUYDWLRQ FRUURERUDWHV WKHDYDLODEOH VWDWLVWLFVZLWK
UBOS and MoFPED. Government consumption spending has averaged about 14.5% of 
GDP over 2001/02 ± 2007/08 period, while investment spending over the same period has 
been about 5.2% of GDP on average. So the above results are not entirely surprising as 
they could be driven by the spending patterns.  
 
Results in the fiscal relation (see column 1 in the table) show that domestic borrowing is 
associated with a µFURZGing in¶ effect linked to investment spending, which has a 
complementary relationship with private sector growth. However, investment spending 
itself is insignificant in the growth relation. This could be because investment (even when 
it was actually under taken) was in unproductive state owned enterprises (SOEs) (Collier 
and Reinikka, 2001). Lloyd et al. (2001) finds a similar result for Ghana: investment 
spending is not significant in their solved long-run relationship, and (in addition to 
investment itself being unproductive), they argue that in the pre-ESAP period, much of the 
money designated as government investment ended up in private accounts. This granted, it 
may be the case that a similar situation potentially reduced long-run capital accumulation 
in Uganda.  
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5.7  Conclusions and Implications  
 
This study adopted CVAR and investigated the impact of aid on growth of private 
consumption but mediated by the broader fiscal dimension in Uganda over the period 1972 
to 2008. Attention is paid to the differential impact of aid and the overall importance of the 
IRUPRIVSHQGLQJLQ8JDQGD¶VJURZWKUHFRUGWe also incorporated dummies for the effect 
of political and economic instability over 1972-79 period and the possibility that policy 
reform following structural adjustment (initiated with the ESAP in the late 1980s) and the 
Museveni regime created a more favourable environment for growth in private incomes.  
 
Aid and the Ugandan macrovariables are significantly cointegrated, and a battery of 
sensitivity and robust checks demonstrate that the cointegration rank is 2. We use this rank 
condition to test for causal links of interest between aid and macrovariables in Uganda. We 
find that aid is a significant part of the long-run equilibria, and this is separately robust to 
the fiscal and growth-type relations. The hypothesis of aid exogeneity is optimally tested 
within a system of equations, and separately in the fiscal and growth-type relations, but 
this is not statistically supported.  
 
There is broad support that aid has had a positive impact on the private sector, albeit 
indirectly through public spending. 'HILFLW ILQDQFLQJ LV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK µFURZGing LQ¶
linked to public investment spending, which has a complementary relationship with private 
sector growth. To the extent that investment spending itself is insignificant in the solved 
long-run growth relation implies that it is the productivity, not the level of investment that 
clearly matter. With particular reference to aid, Berg et al., (2010: 27) make a similar 
assertion in their calibrated model to Uganda arguing that it is the efficiency of aid-related 
public investment relative to stead-state investment efficiency that determines the growth 
impact of aid-financed public investment. Thus, in agreement with a conclusion in Kweka 
and Morrissey (2000), the wide-VSUHDG UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ WR LQFUHDVH SXEOLF LQYHVWPHQW¶V
share of the national budget in developing countries could be misleading. Similarly, the 
EHQHILFLDO HIIHFWV RI µHDUPDUNLQJ¶ DLG WR LQYHVWPHQW VSHQGLQJ PD\ EH H[DJJHUDWHG
Actually, what we find is that aid may have an important role in supporting consumption 
spending, and this may have more beneficial effects than is commonly acknowledged. This 
counters the widely held view that aid diverted to consumption spending reduces 
effectiveness of aid (World Bank 1998) or is growth reducing. In contrast to our 
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expectations, we do not find evidence in support of the view that political and economic 
instability and policy reform effects are significant in the long-run.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
BRIEF CONCLUSION, STUDY LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
While confronting the question of aid effectiveness, an important issue (but often ignored) 
in the context of a developing country like Uganda was which GDP measure would be 
most reliable as this is crucial for measuring the macroeconomic impact of aid. The most 
commonly used GDP measure in the aid-growth literature is typically from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) or Penn World Tables (PWT) (being considered the most 
reliable or the easiest to obtain). However, disparities in GDP from alternative sources are 
common and in practice one has different estimates of the level, change and growth of 
GDP for the same country over the same period. This is of a particular concern especially 
in developing countries (without exception) where the informal and subsistence sectors are 
a large share of the economy (Jerven, 2010) and where not all transactions in the formal 
sector are recorded (MacGaffey, 1991), and the quality of data is still very poor and 
measurement perceptions of macroeconomic aggregates are varied and weak (Mukherjee, 
White and Wuyts, 1998). Because the source chosen for GDP may affect inferences on 
growth and economic performance for African countries, the thesis entry point was an 
analysis of alternative sources of GDP, and aimed to construct a consistent GDP series for 
Uganda. The extent of discrepancy in GDP estimates was investigated, and the year on 
year percentage GDP growth rates, including percentage and average growth rate 
discrepancies were derived, with a particular focus on sub-periods when GDP from 
alternative sources diverge most.  
 
Although UBOS and WDI real UGX GDP year on year growth rate estimates had a 3.6 
percentage point average absolute discrepancy per year, they are consistent, similar and 
cointegrated. In fact, over 1970-76 and 2000-08 the two series are very close, and they are 
quite close for 1978-83 and 1993-99. Therefore, either series can be considered to 
represent trends in the size of the macroeconomy. However, the UBOS real series is 
smoother and produces a more stable measure of GDP than does the WDI series and it is 
the underlying source from which macroeconomic data is sought by the international 
agencies, including WDI. Given this, the less volatile UBOS real series (real UGX GDP/U) 
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was preferred especially as there was less need to incorporate dummies in the rest of the 
thesis. Fiscal data and private consumption (our preferred measure of growth) in the thesis 
were derived from this same source. A powerful and scientifically strict CVAR model was 
employed and was executed using CATS in RATS, version 2 and E-views 7.2, while paying 
specific attention to the effect of political and economic instability over 1972-79 period 
and policy reform following structural adjustment (initiated with the ESAP in the late 
1980s) and the Museveni regime in Uganda.  
 
Considering first the core fiscal variables, we find that aid and fiscal variables form a long-
run stationary relation. Estimates of this relation reveal that about 61 per cent of 
incremental aid is spent, and suggests prima facie that spending is less than proportional to 
aid increment. However, this remains inconclusive considering that the DAC measure of 
aid used is an overestimate of the amount of the aid that goes to and through the budget, 
while part of the aid is used to reduce borrowing and some is held in foreign exchange 
reserves. A test of structural links between aid and fiscal variables reveals that aid is a 
significant element of long-run fiscal equilibrium, so aid may have been effective atleast in 
fiscal terms. Moreover, the hypothesis of aid exogeneity is not statistically supported, 
suggesting that Ugandan fiscal planners have a target for aid revenue and incorporate this 
in their budget planning process. Alternatively, it may be that donors incorporate public 
spending in deciding how much aid to allocate to Uganda.  
 
In the long-run, aid is associated with increased tax effort, reduced domestic borrowing 
and increased public spending. Although, as shown above, the increase in spending is less 
than proportional to incremental aid, it is also clear that a budget constraint hangs over the 
budget implementation despite aid flows being substantial. This suggests that the actual aid 
to government (budget) is likely to be fully additional and it is even possible that total 
spending increases by more than aid actually delivered through the budget, i.e. aid illusion. 
The common stochastic trends are identified and these are shocks to the domestic fiscal 
variables (government spending, domestic borrowing and tax revenue). A decomposition 
of the common trends shows that shocks to tax revenue are the pulling forces, a result that 
is broadly consistent with the long-run estimates and suggests that budget spending plans 
have been adjusting to, but not pushing tax revenue, while empirical shocks to domestic 
borrowing, government spending and aid are the pushing forces of the fiscal system.  
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Finally, we extended the fiscal analysis and also considered how aid, mediated by the 
fiscal variables, and exports impact on the growth of the private sector- a relationship a kin 
to the growth response to aid in Uganda. Aid and the Ugandan macrovariables are 
significantly cointegrated, and a battery of sensitivity and robust checks demonstrate that 
the cointegration rank is 2. These are formally identified as representing respectively the 
statistical analogue of the budgetary equilibrium among the core fiscal variables and the 
link between aid, fiscal variables, exports and growth in private consumption. Using this 
rank condition, the hypotheses of long-run exclusion of aid and aid exogeneity are 
optimally tested within a system of equations, but these are not statistically supported. 
Based on the former test, one can argue that aid or policy conditions linked to aid seem to 
have been beneficial to the Ugandan economy, while on the basis of the latter, similar 
implications (as in the fiscal case above) may seem reasonable.  
 
We find statistical support that aid has had, in the long-run, a positive impact on the 
private sector, albeit indirectly through public spending, and deficit financing is associated 
with µFURZGing LQ¶ linked to public investment spending. Theory would suggest that public 
investment is growth-promoting while current spending is unproductive. In contrast, our 
evidence for the sample analyzed here shows it is current spending not investment 
spending that is beneficial to growth in Uganda because it contributes to private incomes 
and consumption. This is consistent with what Kweka and Morrissey (2000) find for 
Tanzania - another low income country. This has implications especially if we consider the 
emphasis put on investment spending (i.e. the overt recommendation to increase public 
LQYHVWPHQW¶VVKDUHRIWKHQDWLRQDOEXGJHW, and so is the preference of donors to earmark aid 
to investment spending in developing countries).  Our evidence suggests that the argument 
that tagging aid to investment spending contributes to achieving target growth rates may be 
exaggerated. Clearly, it may be the productivity, not the level of investment that matter. 
Similarly, the widely held view that aid allocated to consumption spending is growth 
reducing may be misleading. Instead, aid may have an important role in supporting 
consumption spending, and this happens to be more beneficial to growth in Uganda than 
may be commonly acknowledged. The role of structural changes remains unclear as the 
policy shift dummy seems unimportant for the long-run fiscal and growth relations, but 
may matter for the short-run.  
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While our empirical estimates give results that are consistent with observing the data, and 
are plausible in that they are consistent with what is known about the fiscal and 
macroeconomic impact of aid in some of the previous country specific applications 
summarised in Table 3.1, Morrissey (2012) and Juselius et al., (2011), it is important to 
acknowledge the caveats that accompany the results that have been generated. VARs are 
inherently over parameterized and thus results tend to be sensitive to model specification, 
sample size and lag-length, particularly in small samples. Therefore, our results should be 
considered as no more than indicative. A more serious limitation of the study is that we 
could not legitimately draw inference on the effectiveness of aid, policy and public 
spending. A distinction between aid as finance from aid as policy condition has not been 
possible, and we do not know what donors intended the aid to be used for and the fact that 
DAC measure of aid is used. Moreover, the classification of expenditure categories is 
problematic, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding the impact of 
government spending due to incremental aid on growth. This data draw back in our study 
merits a careful deeper analysis for Uganda.  
 
Besides, aid surges carry with them an expectation of macroeconomic repercussions and 
potential macroeconomic management problems. These are subjects beyond the scope of 
this study but appropriate for further research. Even more, the data generating process 
based on the present sample could not support the analysis of the important current 
contemporaneous dynamic effect of aid on the rest of the variables in the systems analysed 
here. Thus, an expansion in the information set (especially a longer time series) that would 
accommodate a VAR of order higher than the one analyzed here (say VAR(2)) is very 
much desired. To this end, there is considerable scope in Uganda. This notwithstanding, it 
is fair to observe that if the stories in this study are put together, i.e. the derivation of a 
most reliable GDP measure for Uganda (as this is crucial for measuring how aid may have 
related to growth); the fiscal response to aid receipts; and the consideration of how aid 
mediated through fiscal variables affect growth (measured by growth in private incomes) a 
representative picture of the effect of aid in Uganda is gained.  
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LIST OF APPENDENCIES 
Appendix A: Sector Disaggregation of GDP 
 
This section draws on both GDP aggregates, and sector value added and expenditure GDP 
disaggregates data (in current prices of local currency (LCU), hereafter UGX) from the 
two primary sources of GDP (i.e. WDI and UBOS). We use these data sets to: (i) 
reconstruct GDP by the two commonly used approaches (the expenditure and value added 
approach); (ii) establish if there are measurement inconsistencies in the components of 
each of the approaches across the two sources (as one could suspect this to be one possible 
cause of discrepancy across the two sources); and (iii) establish which of the two 
reconstructed series replicates the aggregate GDP series reported by each source, and if 
this is similar for the two sources.  
   
1.1  Sector Expenditure Approach 
  
GDP reconstruction uVLQJ:',¶VFXUUHQWSULFHH[SHQGLWXUHGLVDJJUHJDWHGGDWD 
 
Commentaries available from the source (WDI) shows that GDP by expenditure approach 
is an aggregation of two major components: the gross national expenditure (GNE), and 
external balances on goods and services. The former constitutes household final 
consumption expenditure (private consumption, C) and general government final 
consumption expenditure (government consumption, G), including any statistical 
discrepancy in the use of resources relative to the supply of resources, and gross capital 
formation (gross domestic investment, I). Thus, 
 
IGCGNE         (A1) 
 
In (A1), C is the market value of all goods and services purchased by households, 
payments and fees to governments to obtain permits and licenses and includes the 
expenditures of non-profit institutions serving households, even when reported separately 
by the country. The estimation ofC excludes purchases of dwellings but includes imputed 
rent for owner-occupied dwellings. G sums up expenditures by all government bodies on 
general public administration, defence, public order and safety affairs, education, health, 
Appendices                               Thomas Bwire  
The University Of Nottingham 172 
 
community, social and economic services, agriculture, roads, water, loans repayment and 
pensions, among others. The measurement of I consists of outlays on additions to the fixed 
assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include 
land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. 
Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations 
in production or sales, and "work in progress". According to the 1993 SNA, net 
acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation  
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files, 
2009). 
 
External balances on goods and services is given as exports of goods and services (X) 
minus imports of goods and services (M), and is expressed as 
 
X-M         (A2)  
   
Summing up Equations (A1) and (A2) gives the GDP identity by the expenditure approach 
in Equation (A3)  
 
 MXIGCGDP        (A3) 
 
GDP reconstruction uVLQJ8%26¶VFXUUHQWSULFHH[SHQGLWXUHGLVDJJUHJDWHGGDWD 
 
This sums household final consumption expenditure (C), general government final 
consumption expenditure (G), Capital formation  I , and the trade balance  MX  as in 
Equation (A3), but with only one exception: the treatment given to statistical discrepancy. 
WDI incorporates this explicitly in the final consumption spending, but UBOS considers it 
as a separate item in the identity (UBOS and Back Ground to the Budget, various issues, 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, MoFPED). In this regard, we 
denote it separately and enter it as  :  in (A4).  
 
    : MXIGCGDP        (A4) 
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1.2  Sector Value Added Approach  
  
GDP reconstruction uVLQJ:',¶VFXUUHQWSULFHVHFWRUYDOXHDGGHGGLVDJJUHJDWHGdata 
 
In terms of sector value added, the World Bank and OECD (2009) National Accounts data 
files define GDP at purchaser prices as the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes, and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and 
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation 
of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources, and the source 
uses it as determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), 
UHYLVLRQ  ,Q 8JDQGD¶V *'3 DFFRXQWV WKLV DSSURDFK VXPV XS YDOXH DGGHG LQ WKH WKUHH
sectors of agriculture  A , industry  N and services  S  that make up the economy. The 
GDP identity by value added is represented in Equation (A5).  
 
SAadded uesector valby  GDP  N      (A5) 
 
In (A5), A corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, 
as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production; N corresponds to ISIC divisions 
10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37), which comprises value added in 
mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup by national compilers), 
construction, electricity, water, and gas. S corresponds to ISIC divisions 50-99 that 
include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), 
transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as 
education, health care, and real estate services. Also included are imputed bank service 
charges, import duties, and any statistical discrepancies noted by national compilers as 
well as discrepancies arising from rescaling 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files 
(2009). 
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GDP reconstruction uVLQJ8%26¶V current price sector value added disaggregated data 
 
GDP by value added approach is the net monetary value of the output of the agriculture
 A , industry  N , services  S  sectors as above and other activities  <  after adding up 
all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. Its calculation does not incorporate 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
UHVRXUFHV7KHµµRWKHUDFWLYLWLHV¶¶  <
 
include imputed bank service charges, import duties, 
and any statistical discrepancies noted by national compilers as well as discrepancies 
arising from rescaling (UBOS and Back Ground to the Budget, various issues, MoFPED). 
The GDP identity by value added is represented as: 
 
  < SAadded uesector valby  GDP N     (A6) 
 
Considering the corresponding entries in (A3) and (A4) (GDP by sector expenditure 
approach), and (A5) and (A6) (GDP by sector value added approach), there is no evidence 
of material inconsistencies in the measurement of the components of each of the 
approaches across the two sources. What we find, but immaterial, are minor differences in 
activity aggregations. As noted above, the estimates for final consumption expenditure in 
(A3) for example includes any statistical discrepancy, but this is considered separately in 
(A4). Also, UBOS separates µother activities¶DVdefined in (A6) from the services while 
WDI incorporates this explicitly in the mainstream services sector. Thus, WDI and UBOS 
consider the same components in their respective GDP identity approach. Based on this, 
we use data on GDP disaggregates to reconstruct GDP by sector expenditure and sector 
value added identities, which we then compare with the aggregate GDP series reported by 
each source. As set out earlier, the comparison aims to investigate whether it is GDP by 
sector expenditure or GDP by sector value added that is used to derive aggregate GDP as 
is reported by the respective sources.    
 
$JJUHJDWHDQGµDXWKRUV¶UHFRQVWUXFWHG*'3VHULHVDUHJLYHQLQ)LJXUH$IRU:',DQG
Figure (A2) for UBOS, while Figure (A3) compares the aggregate GDP series across the 
two sources. Given large changes in scale, each of this is conveniently split into three 
panels: panels A (covering the period until 1979); panel B (early to mid-1980s period); and 
panel C (which covers the entire sample period). In Figure (A1), UGX GDP (value added) 
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and UGX GDP (aggregate) are clearly distinguishable, but UGX GDP (aggregate) and 
UGX GDP (expenditure) are identical, i.e. GDP by sector expenditure replicates the 
aggregate GDP that WDI reports. Also, UGX GDP (aggregate) and UGX GDP 
(expenditure) (as one) is systematically higher than UGX GDP (value added) at almost all 
data points.  
 
Figure A1: Aggregate and Reconstructed GDP from Sector Expenditure and Value Added 
Disaggregated Data: WDI 
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Notes: On the vertical axis is GDP in billions of current UGX   
Source:   World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files
  DQG$XWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQV 
 
The story in Figure (A2) is mixed. UGX GDP (expenditure) appears to replicate UGX 
GDP (aggregate) at least initially over the period 1970-77. Between 1978 and mid-1979, 
UGX GDP (expenditure) rises sharply over and above the other two measures (aggregate 
and value added GDP) and falls significantly below both aggregate and value added GDP 
between mid-1979 and mid-1980. Over the period 1978-2001, neither UGX GDP 
(expenditure) nor UGX GDP (value added) replicates UGX GDP (aggregate), suggesting 
that the latter may have been derived in a way that approximated data and/or taken as a 
proxy economic indicator from international sources. Effective 2002 however, UGX GDP 
(expenditure) replicates the aggregate GDP, and the two (combined into one) are 
systematically higher than UGX GDP (value added).   
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Figure A2: Aggregate and Reconstructed GDP from Sector Expenditure and Value Added 
Disaggregated Data: UBOS 
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Notes: On the vertical axis is GDP in billions of current UGX   
Source:  8%261DWLRQDO$FFRXQWV(VWLPDWHVRIPDLQ$JJUHJDWHVDQG$XWKRU¶VRZQ
calculations 
 
Overall, it appears that sector value added and expenditure approaches yield similar but not 
identical estimates of level GDP. Expenditure and aggregate GDP are identical, at least for 
the greater part of the series sample periods, suggesting that both sources compile 
8JDQGD¶V *'3 E\ H[SHQGLWXUH DSSURDFK. Following from this, subsequent comparisons 
and analysis are based on aggregate UGX GDP estimates.  
 
Finally, Figure (A3) compares aggregate UGX GDP estimates across the two sources. 
Although these move together in nominal terms, they are inconsistent (UGX GDP/U is 
consistently higher than UGX GDP/W) and converge in 2004. The series look similar 
because alternative sources use a similar fixed-base Laspeyres index splicing/linking 
technique to construct continuous time series. The procedure requires several 
heterogeneous shorter series to be pieced together (Fuente, 2009), because as (Brueton, 
1999) notes, over time relative prices and volumes of goods and services change; some 
products disappear from the market place and new products appear. Thus, in order to 
ensure that the price structure reflected in the index construction remains representative, it 
is a common practice to link the national accounts data at regular intervals. 
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Figure A3: Aggregate UGX GDP (current prices) Comparison: WDI and UBOS 
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Notes: On the vertical axis is GDP in billions of current UGX; U denotes UBOS and W stands for 
WDI.  
Sources:  World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files 
(2009) and UBOS National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates 
                     
The series are inconsistent because of differences in regularity of the time intervals at 
which alternative sources pieced together several heterogeneous shorter series. 
Commentaries with WDI show that the series was linked by butt splicing in 1972 while 
1979, 1986, and 2002 corresponds to a break in analytical comparability data or change of 
magnitude. It is also shown that multiple time series versions were linked by ratio splicing 
using the first annual overlap in 1991 and 2004. No such commentaries about the series 
linking points are available with UBOS except for one point, 2004 when multiple time 
series versions were linked by ratio splicing as in WDI. So, it appears 2004 corresponds to 
a harmonized series linking point. Another plausible explanation for the observed 
inconsistencies may relate to whether the series is spliced at the aggregate or disaggregates 
level. It is worth noting that while the individual expenditure components of WDI add up 
to aggregate GDP, those of UBOS do so only for the period 2002-2008. It is therefore 
possible that UBOS series may have been spliced at the aggregate level and that of WDI at 
the components level. Romer (1987) shows that aggregate level splicing does not 
genuinely convert the revised series, suggesting that components and aggregate level 
spliced series tend to differ. 
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Appendix Table A1: Selected WDI Data Set 
      USD Denominated   UGX Denominated 
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1970 9,443,100 0.0714 1.26 100 133.4 100 
 
0.08997 48.21 100 5,105.27 100 
1971 9,727,225 0.0714 1.42 112 145.7 110 
 
0.10123 50.37 105 5,178.32 101 
1972 10,009,099 0.0714 1.49 118 149.0 112 
 
0.1065 48.77 101 4,872.80 95 
1973 10,293,317 0.0690 1.70 135 165.3 124 
 
0.12156 48.39 100 4,701.04 92 
1974 10,586,431 0.0714 2.10 167 198.3 149 
 
0.14722 47.62 99 4,497.79 88 
1975 10,893,437 0.0826 2.36 187 216.6 163 
 
0.21236 48.19 100 4,423.83 87 
1976 11,217,082 0.0831 2.45 194 218.2 164 
 
0.24473 47.15 98 4,203.72 82 
1977 11,557,069 0.0795 2.94 233 254.1 191 
 
0.4992 53.15 110 4,599.31 90 
1978 11,911,811 0.0742 2.42 192 203.2 153 
 
0.55666 43.01 89 3,610.56 71 
1979 12,278,381 0.0733 2.14 170 174.2 131 
 
0.85561 37.63 78 3,064.92 60 
1980 12,655,396 0.0757 1.24 99 98.3 74 
 
1.24461 36.68 76 2,898.02 57 
1981 13,041,409 0.8515 1.34 106 102.5 77 
 
2.6746 38.09 79 2,920.77 57 
1982 13,439,426 1.0582 2.18 173 162.0 122 
 
4.355 46.33 96 3,447.61 68 
1983 13,857,714 2.4000 2.24 178 161.7 122 
 
6.721 49.29 102 3,557.09 70 
1984 14,307,266 5.2000 3.62 287 252.7 190 
 
8.390833 36.78 76 2,570.49 50 
1985 14,795,432 14.0000 3.52 279 237.9 179 
 
17.87674 30.15 63 2,037.47 40 
1986 15,325,608 14.0000 3.92 311 256.0 192 
 
42.58355 30.72 64 2,004.48 39 
1987 15,894,088 60.0000 6.27 498 394.5 297 
 
124.3953 27.89 58 1,754.77 34 
1988 16,492,254 165.0000 6.51 517 394.7 297 
 
390.5359 33.33 69 2,020.71 40 
1989 17,107,626 370.0000 5.28 419 308.4 232 
 
894.926 43.97 91 2,570.42 50 
1990 17,730,869 540.0000 4.30 342 242.8 183 
 
1,375.747 52.79 110 2,977.15 58 
1991 18,360,515 915.0000 3.32 264 180.9 136 
 
1,829.999 53.39 111 2,908.10 57 
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1992 18,998,629 1217.1500 2.86 227 150.4 113 
 
2,745.492 50.52 105 2,659.26 52 
1993 19,643,839 1130.1500 3.22 256 163.9 123 
 
3,870.387 70.00 145 3,563.34 70 
1994 20,295,395 926.7700 3.99 317 196.6 148 
 
4,400.27 68.41 142 3,370.92 66 
1995 20,953,589 1009.4500 5.76 457 274.7 207 
 
5,367.456 78.87 164 3,764.23 74 
1996 21,617,190 1029.5900 6.04 480 279.6 210 
 
6,122.089 87.34 181 4,040.53 79 
1997 22,288,245 1140.1100 6.27 498 281.3 211 
 
6,633.475 89.38 185 4,010.33 79 
1998 22,974,610 1362.6900 6.58 523 286.6 215 
 
7,570.25 101.74 211 4,428.54 87 
1999 23,686,817 1506.0400 6.00 476 253.2 190 
 
8,170.7 105.05 218 4,435.10 87 
2000 24,432,843 1766.6800 6.19 492 253.5 191 
 
9,364.317 116.67 242 4,775.06 94 
2001 25,215,902 1727.4000 5.84 464 231.6 174 
 
10,296.37 126.56 263 5,018.88 98 
2002 26,035,327 1852.5700 6.18 490 237.3 178 
 
10,840.67 130.82 271 5,024.85 98 
2003 26,890,404 1935.3200 6.61 524 245.7 185 
 
12,443.5 138.07 286 5,134.52 101 
2004 27,778,909 1738.5900 7.92 629 285.2 214 
 
15,331.31 163.15 338 5,873.27 115 
2005 28,699,255 1816.8600 9.23 732 321.4 242 
 
16,026 160.26 332 5,584.07 109 
2006 29,651,734 1741.4400 9.96 790 335.8 252 
 
18,172 172.46 358 5,816.03 114 
2007 30,637,544 1697.3400 11.89 944 388.2 292 
 
21,168.4 188.16 390 6,141.49 120 
2008 31,656,865 1949.1800 14.53 1153 458.9 345 
 
24,647.53 206.10 428 6,510.41 128 
Source: World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files (2009) DQG$XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSXWDWLRQV  
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Appendix Table A2: Selected UBOS Data Set 
        USD Denomination 
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1970 9,443,100 0.0714 0.00 1.38 100 146.1 100   0.098558 52.81 100 5592.60 100 
1971 9,727,225 0.0714 0.00 1.53 111 156.9 107   0.109043 54.26 103 5577.99 100 
1972 10,009,099 0.0714 0.00 1.66 120 165.7 114   0.11848 54.26 103 5420.91 97 
1973 10,293,317 0.0702 0.00 1.94 141 188.6 129   0.136304 54.26 103 5271.23 94 
1974 10,586,431 0.0714 0.00 2.35 170 222.1 152   0.167759 54.26 103 5125.28 92 
1975 10,893,437 0.0916 0.00 2.57 187 236.4 162   0.235911 53.53 101 4914.42 88 
1976 11,217,082 0.1020 0.01 2.72 197 242.8 166   0.27785 53.53 101 4772.63 85 
1977 11,557,069 0.1736 0.01 2.93 213 254.0 174   0.509567 54.26 103 4694.82 84 
1978 11,911,811 0.2236 0.01 3.02 219 253.2 173   0.67418 52.09 99 4372.81 78 
1979 12,278,381 0.3626 0.02 2.86 207 232.8 159   1.036243 45.58 86 3711.98 66 
1980 12,655,396 0.4962 0.03 3.04 220 240.1 164   1.507367 44.42 84 3509.83 63 
1981 13,041,409 0.9384 0.07 3.45 250 264.7 181   3.239251 46.13 87 3537.39 63 
1982 13,439,426 1.1841 0.09 3.95 286 293.7 201   4.673993 49.73 94 3700.14 66 
1983 13,857,714 1.6523 0.14 4.36 316 314.9 216   7.21047 52.88 100 3816.14 68 
1984 14,307,266 2.6649 0.23 4.32 313 301.8 207   11.50821 50.44 96 3525.48 63 
1985 14,795,432 6.7202 0.59 4.44 322 299.9 205   29.81711 50.28 95 3398.35 61 
1986 15,325,608 14.0000 1.39 5.05 366 329.8 226 
 
70.75753 51.04 97 3330.67 60 
1987 15,894,088 42.8413 4.46 5.65 410 355.7 244   242.2313 54.31 103 3417.01 61 
1988 16,492,254 106.1358 11.72 6.46 468 392.0 268   686.1612 58.55 111 3550.34 63 
1989 17,107,626 223.0916 20.35 5.71 414 333.8 229   1273.844 62.59 119 3658.75 65 
1990 17,730,869 428.8547 26.06 4.04 293 227.8 156   1732.171 66.46 126 3748.46 67 
1991 18,360,515 734.0099 34.27 3.27 237 178.3 122   2403.339 70.12 133 3819.21 68 
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1992 18,998,629 1133.8343 54.34 3.52 255 185.1 127   3987.053 73.37 139 3861.83 69 
1993 19,643,839 1195.0168 55.29 3.63 263 185.0 127   4343.127 78.55 149 3998.57 71 
1994 20,295,395 979.4454 64.32 5.72 414 281.6 193   5597.813 87.03 165 4288.32 77 
1995 20,953,589 968.9167 68.05 6.69 485 319.1 219   6478.947 95.21 180 4543.72 81 
1996 21,617,190 1046.0848 70.09 6.78 491 313.5 215   7088.54 101.13 192 4678.37 84 
1997 22,288,245 1083.0087 74.21 7.30 529 327.4 224   7903.363 106.49 202 4778.06 85 
1998 22,974,610 1240.3058 74.40 7.01 508 305.1 209   8693.913 116.85 221 5085.88 91 
1999 23,686,817 1454.8272 77.78 6.65 482 280.9 192   9681.518 124.48 236 5255.18 94 
2000 24,432,843 1644.4753 80.26 6.34 459 259.5 178   10427.61 129.92 246 5317.25 95 
2001 25,215,902 1755.6588 81.36 6.40 464 253.9 174   11238.47 138.14 262 5478.10 98 
2002 26,035,327 1797.5505 82.86 6.67 483 256.2 175   11989.65 144.69 274 5557.42 99 
2003 26,890,404 1963.7201 90.13 7.05 511 262.2 180   13843.25 153.60 291 5712.10 102 
2004 27,778,909 1810.3047 93.97 8.44 611 303.7 208   15271.32 162.51 308 5850.28 105 
2005 28,699,255 1780.6658 100.00 10.04 728 349.8 240   17877.94 178.78 339 6229.36 111 
2006 29,651,734 1831.4534 105.37 11.01 798 371.3 254   20166.19 191.38 362 6454.28 115 
2007 30,637,544 1723.4918 112.50 13.57 984 443.0 303   23391.98 207.92 394 6786.60 121 
2008 31,656,865 1720.7001 119.59 15.83 1147 500.0 342   27236.57 227.75 431 7194.28 129 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics: National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates DQG$XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSXWDWLRQV
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Appendix Table A3: GDP PPP per capita Data Set 
  PWT6.3    WDI   
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1982 452.10 100   567.44 100 
1983 510.58 113   581.93 103 
1984 532.66 118   561.70 99 
1985 499.93 111   525.21 93 
1986 493.77 109   509.02 90 
1987 498.06 110   510.26 90 
1988 507.44 112   532.40 94 
1989 534.77 118   545.91 96 
1990 570.11 126   560.82 99 
1991 589.47 130   571.67 101 
1992 599.44 133   571.35 101 
1993 632.73 140   598.59 105 
1994 767.40 170   616.48 109 
1995 794.09 176   665.92 117 
1996 796.57 176   704.04 124 
1997 870.17 192   717.66 126 
1998 894.78 198   730.37 129 
1999 939.38 208   765.47 135 
2000 962.92 213   783.94 138 
2001 1000.83 221   797.15 140 
2002 1034.57 229   821.51 145 
2003 1069.47 237   846.88 149 
2004 1109.95 246   875.60 154 
2005 1167.26 258   901.19 159 
2006 1224.15 271   966.31 170 
2007 1298.83 287   1015.53 179 
Sources: World Bank; International Comparison Program database; & Alan
 Heston ,Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Centre
 for international Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University
 of Pennsylvania, August 2009DQG$XWKRU¶V own computations. 
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Appendix B: Determination of the Lag Length and Misspecification Tests  
 
The SC and HQ information criteria are used. With several regressors and a relatively 
small sample, it is not possible to test long lag-lengths.41  We started with lag 2 and 
employed a general-to-specific modelling approach. Test results for minimising the 
information criteria are given in Appendix Table B1 
 
Appendix Table B1: Lag Length Determination 
LAG LENGTH DETERMINATION 
Effective Sample: 1974:01 to 2008:01 
 
MODEL SUMMARY 
Model  k T  Regr  Log-Lik    SC    H-Q   LM(1) LM(k) 
VAR(2) 2 35   14 -1493.863 93.896 91.452 0.363 0.101 
VAR(1) 1 35    8 -1538.639 92.798 91.401 0.611 0.611 
Notes: SC: Schwarz information criterion and HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion; LM (k): LM order 
autocorrelation test at lag k.  
 
As the recommendation is to select the lowest value for the information criteria, both SC 
and HQ suggest VAR(1) could be a reasonable approximation of the DGP. The LM test 
further shows the model meets the crucial assumption of uncorrelated residuals. So, we 
adopted VAR(1) and subjected it to residual misspecification tests. Results of model 
suitability tests, including the residuals plots and residual analysis (normality, 
Heteroskedasticity, and the models goodness of fit) are reported in Appendix figure B1 
and Appendix Table B2.  
 
Residuals Plots 
 
In the figure below, each error correction model equation consists of a panel of 4 plots: (a) 
Actual and fitted values (top left); (b) standardized residuals (bottom left); (c) 
autocorrelations (top right); and (d) histogram (bottom right). Also, overlaid on the 
histogram is the estimated density function of the standardized residuals (appears as a 
dotted line in print) and the density of the standard normal distribution. It also contains 
some statistics: the univariate normality test by Doornik and Hansen-DH (2008) and 
                                          
41 Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004) VXJJHVW WKDW DQ ³H[FHVVLYHO\ ODUJH YDOXH RI pmax [maximum lags for test] PD\EHSUREOHPDWLF´VLQFHLWDIIHFWVWKHRYHUDOO7\SH,HUURURIWKHWHVWLQJVHTXHQFH  
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov-K-S (Lilliefors, 1967) test for normality, and the Jarque-Bera test 
FRPSXWHGE\WKH5$76¶VWDWLVWLFVLQVWUXFWLRQ'HQQLV.  
 
Appendix Figure B1: Actual, Fitted and Standardized Residuals, Autocorrelations and 
Histograms 
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The plots do not suggest any significant problem except some outlier observation in the 
residuals for G, X and PC that occurs around 1979. The actual and fitted residuals show a 
slight but detectable change in behaviour from about 1988. This notwithstanding, the 
histograms portray reasonably normal distribution behaviour. 
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Residual Analysis 
Appendix Table B2: Residual Analysis 
Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
       DDB         DG         DA         DTR         DX        DPC 
      775.1173  1548.3985  2218.4111  1234.6740  1003.8957  8454.8802 
DDB   1.000 
DG    0.088      1.000 
DA    -0.059     -0.009     1.000 
DTR   0.143      -0.007     -0.068     1.000 
DX    0.299      0.265      -0.308     0.087      1.000 
DPC   0.308      0.813      -0.057     -0.064     0.424      1.000 
 
 
LOG(|Sigma|)                      =  87.858 
Information Criteria: SC          =  92.636 
                      H-Q         =  91.261 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.439 
 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
Ljung-Box(9):         ChiSqr(288) = 672.615 [0.000] 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(36)  =  34.161 [0.556] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(36)  =  53.704 [0.129] 
 
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(12)  =  22.473 [0.033] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(441) = 442.955 [0.465] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(882) = 756.000 [0.999] 
 
 
Univariate Statistics 
 
    Mean   Std.Dev   Skewness Kurtosis Maximum   Minimum 
DDB -0.000  775.117     0.480   2.875   1910.088  -1491.420 
DG   0.000 1548.398     0.740   4.328   4812.824  -2692.423 
DA  -0.000 2218.411     0.265   2.714   5091.461  -4345.092 
DTR -0.000 1234.674     0.477   2.734   2926.464  -2044.831 
DX  -0.000 1003.896     1.004   5.063   3412.345  -1702.573 
DPC  0.000 8454.880     1.099   6.738  31877.318 -16252.478 
 
    ARCH(1)           Normality          R-Squared 
DDB  0.449   [0.503]    1.732  [0.421]     0.447 
DG   1.510   [0.219]    5.375  [0.068]     0.452 
DA   0.683   [0.409]    0.557  [0.757]     0.406 
DTR  0.198   [0.657]    1.868  [0.393]     0.483 
DX   0.094   [0.759]    7.398  [0.025]     0.488 
DPC  3.576   [0.059]   13.869  [0.001]     0.452 
Notes: The multivariate diagnostic test is the chi-square for the joint significance of the variables. Null 
hypothesis is: VEC residuals are Gaussian errors. 
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Appendix Table B3: Extreme values of Standardized Residuals 
Date Entry SRes_DB SRes_G SRes_A SRes_TR SRes_X SRes_PC 
1973:01 1 -0.721 0.167 1.111 0.169 -0.163 0.259 
1974:01 2 0.100 0.640 0.459 -0.417 -0.104 0.642 
1975:01 3 -0.710 0.178 0.234 0.728 -1.522 -0.099 
1976:01 4 0.897 -0.374 -0.657 0.359 0.017  -0.192 
1977:01 5 -0.579 -1.287 -0.407 -0.109 -0.315 -1.725 
1978:01 6 -0.403 -1.191 0.254 2.049 -0.880 -1.511 
1979:01 7 0.872 3.065 -0.497 -0.969 3.352 * 3.718 * 
1980:01 8 -1.142 -1.715 -0.216 -1.340 0.748  -1.895 
1981:01 9 0.439 1.351 1.272 -0.175 -1.250  0.914 
1982:01 10 1.034 0.294 -1.635 0.412 0.562   1.273 
1983:01 11 0.157 0.467 -0.810 0.441 -0.051  0.268 
1984:01 12 0.639 0.919 -0.339 0.004 0.735  -0.917 
1985:01 13 0.601 -1.347 -0.076 -0.838 -0.388 -0.570 
1986:01 14 0.504 -0.968 -1.584 -0.849 0.551  -0.125 
1987:01 15 -0.215 -0.180 -0.088 -1.633 -0.105  0.089 
1988:01 16 -0.090 0.681 -0.084 -1.269 0.487   0.741 
1989:01 17 -1.456 1.047 0.443 1.957 0.610   1.220 
1990:01 18 0.875 -0.340 2.263 0.458 -0.398  0.175 
1991:01 19 2.296 -0.005 2.113 -0.242 0.046  -0.082 
1992:01 20 -0.676 -0.260 0.174 -0.828 -0.778 -0.190 
1993:01 21 -0.086 0.230 -1.040 0.762 -0.140  0.245 
1994:01 22 -0.790 -0.456 -1.278 1.436 0.252  -0.862 
1995:01 23 -0.130 -1.648 0.478 0.202 -0.311 -0.853 
1996:01 24 -0.053 -0.502 -1.034 0.993 1.133  -0.601 
1997:01 25 -0.589 -1.292 0.823 0.175 -1.216 -1.185 
1998:01 26 -1.101 -0.844 -0.610 -0.792 -0.463 -0.668 
1999:01 27 1.196 0.187 -0.581 0.810 -0.061 -0.132 
2000:01 28 -1.897 0.604 1.529 -1.078 -1.672 -0.630 
2001:01 29 -0.701 0.461 -0.105 0.028 0.007   0.146 
2002:01 30 -1.072 2.231 -0.523 -0.139 -1.242  0.780 
2003:01 31 0.942 -0.383 1.040 -1.336 -1.112  0.603 
2004:01 32 0.186 -0.145 0.549 -0.514 0.208  -0.212 
2005:01 33 -1.113 -0.020 0.790 -0.214 2.058   0.076 
2006:01 34 2.430 0.322 -1.931 0.812 1.020   0.793 
2007:01 35 1.321 0.098 0.813 2.337 1.084   0.339 
2008:01 36 -0.965 0.014 -0.849 -1.391 -0.698  0.169 
Notes: * Maximum Value occurring at 1979:01; 5% C.V = 3.1934 
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Appendix Table B4: Residual Analysis with Modification 
Residual S.E. and Cross-Correlations 
       DDB         DG         DA         DTR         DX        DPC 
      680.9422   867.7248  1999.7439  1114.7484   867.6104  3344.0263 
DDB   1.000 
DG    -0.276     1.000 
DA    0.088      0.140      1.000 
DTR   0.293      -0.313     -0.110     1.000 
DX    0.087      -0.095     -0.251     0.181      1.000 
DPC   -0.032     0.406      0.050      -0.332     0.058      1.000 
 
 
LOG(|Sigma|)                      =  84.912 
Information Criteria: SC          =  91.482 
                      H-Q         =  89.592 
Trace Correlation                 =   0.602 
 
Tests for Autocorrelation 
Ljung-Box(9):         ChiSqr(288) = 452.633 [0.000] 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(36)  =  30.485 [0.728] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(36)  =  40.893 [0.264] 
 
Test for Normality:   ChiSqr(12)  =  25.152 [0.014] 
 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):                ChiSqr(441) = 460.556 [0.251] 
LM(2):                ChiSqr(882) = 791.187 [0.987] 
 
 
Univariate Statistics 
 
    Mean   Std.Dev   Skewness Kurtosis Maximum  Minimum 
DDB -0.000  680.942     0.743   3.427  1895.180 -1192.224 
DG  -0.000  867.725     1.382   5.867  3146.004 -1124.920 
DA  -0.000 1999.744     0.489   3.038  5050.911 -3526.707 
DTR -0.000 1114.748     0.233   2.611  2517.336 -2303.465 
DX  -0.000  867.610     0.434   3.109  1981.644 -1581.349 
DPC  0.000 3344.026    -0.376   2.488  5402.220 -7381.602 
 
    ARCH(1)           Normality          R-Squared 
DDB  0.399   [0.528]    3.841  [0.147]    0.573 
DG   0.492   [0.483]   10.478  [0.005]    0.828 
DA   0.834   [0.361]    1.794  [0.408]    0.517 
DTR  0.060   [0.807]    0.424  [0.809]    0.579 
DX   0.086   [0.770]    1.611  [0.447]    0.617 
DPC  0.128   [0.721]    1.456  [0.483]    0.914 
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$SSHQGL[7DEOH%-RKDQVHQ¶VCointegration trace test Results (Model with Dummies) 
I(1)-ANALYSIS 
 p-r r Eig.Value  Trace  Trace*  Frac95  P-Value P-Value* 
  6  0     0.796 180.924 162.324 146.478   0.000    0.004 
  5  1     0.770 123.640 113.517 113.492   0.009    0.050 
  4  2     0.601  70.732  66.353  84.328   0.330    0.492 
  3  3     0.454  37.659  36.040  59.025   0.779    0.838 
  2  4     0.288  15.897  15.496  37.361   0.953    0.961 
  1  5     0.097   3.691   3.659  18.911   0.987    0.988 
 
WARNING: Critical/P-values correspond to a model with no dummies. 
WARNING: The Bartlett Corrections correspond to the 'Basic Model'. 
Notes: Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend restricted; Frac95: the 5% critical value of the test of 
H(r) against H(p). The critical values as well as the p-values are approximated using the * - distribution 
(Doornix, 1998). 
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Appendix Table D1: Data used in the Analysis 
Year A Dum79 D87 DB X G GC GK PC TR GC GK 
1972 1335.62 0 0 1934.493 5671.81 9749.68 6757.16 2992.53 39356.77 6420.543 6757.16 2992.53 
1973 608.39 0 0 2157.536 4656.97 9993.82 7011.72 2982.1 40839.47 4741.007 7011.72 2982.1 
1974 405.04 0 0 2603.623 4188.56 10022.19 7019.2 3002.99 40883.04 3476.888 7019.2 3002.99 
1975 890.1 0 0 1854.011 2398.97 8595.89 5674.02 2921.87 33048.08 4486.388 5674.02 2921.87 
1976 335.44 0 0 2252.378 3151.23 7980.12 4975.5 3004.62 28979.58 4238.864 4975.5 3004.62 
1977 141.62 0 0 1020.073 2871.6 5887.45 3007.66 2879.79 17517.99 3340.261 3007.66 2879.79 
1978 198.29 0 0 541.6023 1180.85 4948.45 2334.04 2614.41 13594.49 4297.278 2334.04 2614.41 
1979 149.32 1 0 826.8801 4952.38 11920.33 9756.99 2163.34 56829.17 1068.347 9756.99 2163.34 
1980 252.8 -1 0 1148.643 4809.41 6090.13 4096.33 1993.8 23858.88 1120.649 4096.33 1993.8 
1981 1645.13 0 0 1426.454 1036.29 7654.96 5696.7 1958.26 40318.39 377.1215 5696.7 1958.26 
1982 1478.8 0 0 1573.118 2319.21 6571.06 4574.87 1996.19 41610.06 2558.95 4574.87 1996.19 
1983 2406.38 0 0 880.6161 2562.19 6848.09 4840.56 2007.53 42552.96 3795.956 4840.56 2007.53 
1984 3693.8 0 0 1004.663 3630.11 8740.23 6929.46 1810.77 35992.89 3875.591 6929.46 1810.77 
1985 4237.16 0 0 836.5146 2757.45 7091.27 5384.3 1706.97 39147.07 2733.33 5384.3 1706.97 
1986 1934.68 0 0 625.1017 3015.21 5884.81 4145.89 1738.92 42238.78 2051.478 4145.89 1738.92 
1987 4021.62 0 1 0 2344.68 5549.12 3796.74 1752.37 46230.61 690.3083 3796.74 1752.37 
1988 5513.66 0 1 0 2241.02 6326.08 3781.93 2544.15 49990.42 282.7985 3781.93 2544.15 
1989 8117.64 0 1 -1094.18 2343.01 7364.57 3886.47 3478.1 55399.02 4400.493 3886.47 3478.1 
1990 13739.3 0 1 359.6036 2321.61 8543.33 4921.11 3622.22 56239.6 5117.215 4921.11 3622.22 
1991 17707.68 0 1 1634.711 2946.26 10387.18 6013.74 4373.43 58211.94 5261.467 6013.74 4373.43 
1992 16209.81 0 1 -438.444 2525.66 11356.8 5918.11 5438.68 61438.81 5239.507 5918.11 5438.68 
1993 12447.71 0 1 -487.62 3048.79 13496.8 7684.45 5812.35 63686.65 7020.768 7684.45 5812.35 
1994 10818.25 0 1 -1348 4678.73 14597.47 8745.44 5852.03 59852.45 9674.243 8745.44 5852.03 
1995 12354.57 0 1 -1179.44 5237.55 15187.29 10010.32 5176.97 66657.55 9385.876 10010.32 5176.97 
1996 9895.76 0 1 -904.852 6995.47 17098.06 12499.68 4598.38 73134.32 10570.32 12499.68 4598.38 
1997 12489.26 0 1 -1140.22 6080.69 17248.82 12599.27 4649.54 77131.53 10921.46 12599.27 4649.54 
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1998 11850.23 0 1 -1749.89 6599.96 18543.57 13886.09 4657.48 82911.65 10199.6 13886.09 4657.48 
1999 11423.39 0 1 69.55812 7266.37 20769.58 14970.26 5799.32 89138.17 12028.77 14970.26 5799.32 
2000 17984.74 0 1 -2165.34 7104.42 23107.29 16061.92 7045.37 94726.68 12184.77 16061.92 7045.37 
2001 16780.7 0 1 -1424.56 8396.24 26166.04 17797.09 8368.95 100447.5 13211.91 17797.09 8368.95 
2002 15865.32 0 1 -1549.51 8533.02 31212.08 22596.14 8615.94 113296.7 14626.12 22596.14 8615.94 
2003 20961.37 0 1 0 10157.39 31319.12 22755.55 8563.57 118162.3 15548.18 22755.55 8563.57 
2004 22157.33 0 1 0 12230.91 31819.89 23577.6 8242.29 121254.4 17474.5 23577.6 8242.29 
2005 21766.54 0 1 -812.694 15256.07 33215.53 24408.4 8807.13 133869.6 18930.45 24408.4 8807.13 
2006 12923.72 0 1 2484.529 15879.2 35080.33 25552.16 9528.17 153190.5 21172.68 25552.16 9528.17 
2007 19012.09 0 1 2084.851 18792.49 34341.31 24754.36 9586.94 167248.8 27494.23 24754.36 9586.94 
2008 15990.39 0 1 786.3493 19224.58 36633.31 25381.52 11251.79 190606.8 26432.68 25381.52 11251.79 
Notes:  All the data (except dummies) are in millions of constant 2005 UGX prices.   
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics: National Accounts Estimates of main Aggregates; Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows 
  (OECD-DAC, 2009) databases, DQG$XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSXWDWLRQV 
 
